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Abstract
This dissertation argues that the critical methods developed by and used within
the field of religious studies can be reimagined as an expression of the modern desire for
Utopia. It investigates how applications of critical social theory occlude the category of
experience either deliberately or through methodological slight. Utopia addresses this
problematic of representing the existential dimension of social life through its particular
formulation of social contradiction. Analyzing Utopia's own representational situation
within modernity affords scholars in religion a means to consider their investments in and
desires for representing society as a totality that creates the conditions for and anticipates
resolutions to these contradictions.
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Introduction
The Desire for Utopia in the Critical Study of Religion

In this dissertation, I contend that the critical methods developed by and used
within the field of religious studies can be reimagined as an expression of the modern
desire for Utopia. Utopia indexes a host of ambivalent hopes and dreams, and in its
colloquial sense, has little in common with the methods of historicization, ideology
critique or realist politics that contribute to this branch of religious studies. In looking
closely at Utopia's appeal, I have been struck by how it generates an equal dose of
frustration as it represents social contradictions without presenting viable resolutions.
Thus, in its representation or figural form, Utopia brings about a new kind of experience
for readers, one that allows readers to feel social contradiction and to sense, at least
partially, the social obstacles to resolving those contradictions. Considering how
successful Utopia is in generating and representing the frustrated feelings of the social
present, it is odd how its scholarship, in its dependence on social theory, ignores or
occludes subjective, existential feeling altogether. This disjunction between the work of
this literary figure and the means of analyzing it forms the basis of my dissertation.
Critical methods in the study of religion share this problem of representing the social
present within their own representations of social totality. My turn to Fredric Jameson
and his psychoanalytic and Marxian approach to Utopia exposes this investment in social
totality as a desire imbued with Utopia's ambivalence. When held up as a Utopian form,
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critical religious studies reflects obliquely the existential and experiential contents it has
otherwise eschewed.
Colloquially, Utopia signals a place of perfection and implies a good life lived in
harmony with others but which is ultimately impossible. As a neologism created by
Thomas More in 1516 to name both the island and the title of his satire by the same
name, Utopia carries conflict within its etymology. The root, "topos" is Greek for "place
or region" with the prefix of "ou" that negates, generating "non-place." Translated into
Latin as U-topia, the word shifts to its homonym, eu-topos or “good place."1 More's twopart book is known for its travel narrative of a land far away whose inhabitants seem
inordinately happy. The reality of the place and the happiness of the inhabitants,
however, is undermined throughout as the main narrator, Hythloday, whose name
translates from Latin as “nonsense peddler,” regales his audience with a picture of a far
away place with a quirky resemblance to their hometown of London. Utopia as a word
has been, since this time, positively and negatively valenced, made overdetermined by
use across different historical moments and for different discursive communities. Utopia
signals a host of associations that may make it unstable as a category. Instead of moving
from Utopia because of this ambivalence, my project takes its ambivalence as an
occasion for analysis.
Utopia's contradictory character actually presented a problem for the field of
religious studies in a formulation by Jonathan Z. Smith. Early in his career, Smith
1

According to Robert Adams introduction to More's text, translations from the Latin into English present a
particular challenge to the translator. The translator must preserve the complex linguistic innuendoes that
saturate the text while also making the text colloquial as it would have been for his intended audience of
highly-educated humanists. For these reasons, I have found annotations to More's text useful such as found
in Adam's version. The footnotes explain the word play and provide supplementary texts that both show the
intellectual atmosphere of More’s time and also explain the impact of his text on future authors of the
genre. Thomas More, Utopia, ed. Robert M. Adams, Norton Critical Edition (New York: Norton, 1975).
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proposes that religion carries within it a tension towards place-making or orienting
enterprises and a resistance or refusal to orient. In several early essays, Smith opposed the
"locative" tendency of religion to a "utopian" one. Smith notes that while myths and
rituals center or help the practitioner of religion locate or find place, religious traditions
also preserve the role of chaos through characters and rituals. The force or source of this
chaotic element is itself difficult to locate in Smith, and over time, Smith tries on various
terms to mark this movement or function that is not towards place or emplacement,
claiming in different essays how chaos, incongruity, or disjunction function in relation to
religious myths as well as to religion scholarship itself. In one account in the essay "The
Wobbling Pivot," Smith lands on the term "utopian" to describe the "no-place"
perspective that values being out of place, out of orientation, to resist the confinement of
the locative. 2 Through other iterations of this problematic of religion's relation to place,
Smith eventually moves on from "utopia," turning to "incongruity" and then "difference"
to signal the tensions of human existence, the social worlds that mark human life, and the
scholarly projects that describe and then analyze or "redescribe" these lives. Utopia, as a
no-place, is also a good place and thus, suggests its own place-making as it seeks escape.
Utopia, on closer scrutiny by Smith, turned into another locative project.3
Utopia, in some sense, becomes a lost category in religious studies and while it is
still used, it is done so with only weak reference to its sense of "no-place."4 The import of
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Jonathan Z. Smith, “The Wobbling Pivot,” The Journal of Religion, 52, no. 2 (1972), republished in Map
Is Not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions, (New York: Brill, 1978), 101. For a larger discussion
of this in the formation of his work, see “When the Chips Are Down,” in Relating Religion: Essays in the
Study of Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 1–60. Much of Smith's work are essays
that are republished in a collected volume. I will refer to essay names, the titles of the collections, and the
relevant page number numbers from the collections.
3
Smith, "The Influence of Symbols on Social" in Map Is Not Territory, 129-146.
4
In her introduction to a recent set of essays on contemporary religion in Southeast Asia, Joanne Punzo
Waghorne recounts Smith's formula of utopia in opposition to locative, thinking of the no-place of the
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Smith's insistence of religion scholarship as second-order discourse has not been lost,
however.5 Smith's work has been widely engaged by scholars using historicization and
social theories who see the value of category formation as a scholarly task. Scholars in
religious studies using critical social theory have endeavored to clarify the terms and
conditions of knowledge production in the field, drawing attention to enterprises that
either have sidestepped or ignored questions of category formation and use. In light of the
social theories of Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim, these scholars have
challenged phenomenological projects like Mircea Eliade's that treat religion as a sui
generis category and exempt religion from critical social analysis.6 Instead of describing
religion, the religion scholar’s task, for these scholars, is Smith's redescription—to
interpret the primary materials of religion into the language of analysis, explanation, and
history.
My project addresses these critical perspectives in religious studies and draws on
our shared concern that academic discourses are strongest when they are self-conscious
of their contexts and constructions. I agree that an unexamined use of phenomenology of
religion leads to confusion and obfuscation of the political and economic roles that

present as an urban "Third Space" that is contested territory. I think this a fitting term for the Asian urbanity
described in the book's essays. "Negotiating Place, Non-place, and No-place," in Place/No-Place in Urban
Asian Religiosity, Springer Asia Series (Singapore: Singer, 2015), 7.
5
Smith, "Religion, Religions, Religious," in Relating Religion, 194.
6
The concern is raised by Russell McCutcheon thusly: “On the one hand, the study of religion is the
generally liberal pursuit of universal and yet deeply personal feeling gained largely through paraphrasing
texts, claims, and behaviors inspired by, or which somehow are said to manifest, essential meanings and
values, all of which is derived from experiences of god, the gods, the sacred, the wholly other, the
numinous, or the mysterium. On the other hand, the study of religion is but one instance of the wider, crossdisciplinary study of how human beliefs, behaviors, and institutions construct and contest enduring social
identity—talk about gods and talk about mythic origins are but two strategies for doing this. Although the
former employs such methods as phenomenology and hermeneutics to study normally unattainable deep
essences by means of surface descriptions, the latter employs social scientific tools to study how human
communities construct and authorize their essentialist myths (by [sic] they grouped together and named as
nationalist, ethnic, or even religious)” Russell T. McCutcheon, Critics Not Caretakers: Redescribing the
Public Study of Religion (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001), 16.
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religion has played both historically and in contemporary academic discourse, and that
this confusion re-inscribes categories that the academic study of religion should take as
its task to question. However, in foregrounding how religion functions, these critical
methods reduce attention to—or simply dismiss—how the subject either recognizes or
resists these redescriptions. Put simply, while the critical turn in religion scholarship
accounts for society and social relations, it cannot or does not account for personal
experience.
In researching Smith's work and his legacy, I was alert to how utopia disappeared
but how other topics remained. Smith sustains attention to the difficulty of scholarly
production, the felicity of some categories over others, and the dialectical nature of
scholarship as it labors under same sky as the subjects it studies but challenges itself to
present a different relation to these religious forms. In pursuing the multifaceted relations
of the utopian, the chaotic, and the incongruous of Smith, I discovered the recent
scholarship of Tyler Roberts, a Philosopher of Religion at Brown University. In
Encountering Religion: Responsibility and Criticism after Secularism, Roberts lifts out
how Smith makes parallels between the function of religion and religion scholarship in
their task of orienting human life in time and space.7 Whereas Smith brought incongruity
and locative into dialectical tension, Roberts charges that Smith's work has been more
recently used to dismiss incongruity altogether. Looking at scholarship in religion that
uses social constructionist methods, Roberts re-reads prominent voices such as Russell
McCutcheon, Willi Braun, and Steven Wassertrom and sees their work as too invested in
"locating" subjects in society. Roberts concludes that scholarship becomes overly rigid
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Tyler T. Roberts, Encountering Religion: Responsibility and Criticism After Secularism (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2013).
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and didactic when it always looks to situate or locate religion. He argues that the field of
religious studies misses its remit by the academy if it depends solely on its social science
side. In turn, scholarship loses the existential dimensions of human life, with the result
being a flattened subject, unrecognizable as the dynamic, conflicted, embodied person
that humanistic approaches emphasize. Roberts proposes a critical tack that is also
constructive—a tack more amicable to theological and psychoanalytic discourses—that
theorizes incongruity for religious studies scholarship as what is at risk and held in
potentia in encounters with texts, traditions, others, and the unknown aspects of the self.
In by theorizing "encounter," Roberts argues how scholars and religious others alike
confront and make use experiences of incongruity.
Roberts's excellent book offers an astute means of reflecting on Smith's terms and
of proposing a path to sustain incongruity as a category for scholarship. I, too, think that
commitments to social scientific approaches can blind current research to incongruity as a
category of scholarly concern and as a dimension of human life. However, I do not
believe that critical approaches to religious studies can be effectively challenged from
alternative discourses that leave behind political economy as guiding frame for the force
of religious interest. I agree that religious studies is uniquely situated within scholarly
discourse to attend to incongruity, however, I also am convinced that social life is more
than the sum of individual psychologies, to paraphrase Durkheim. Refocusing
incongruity through social theory would yield how conflict, disjuncture, and gaps are not
only cognitive operations but historically distinct and fully material.
As a first move in my remapping of incongruity through social theory, I have
returned to Marx and recognized how incongruity is materially-related to the
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contradictions of history and production that Marx outlined in his historical materialism.
Where in Roberts, incongruity remains at the register of individual experience, even as it
encounters the otherness of self, text, and empirical others, Marx binds contradiction to
both the finitude of being and conflicts in modes of production. This seems a ripe path for
considering incongruity through social theory for religion. Critical methods in the study
of religion rely on Marxian ideology critique and dialectical methods to interrogate the
impacts of social life on subjective formation. Critical scholarship has also tracked the
histories of the categories we as scholars use and pointed out their western, Protestant
pedigree and resonances. However, less has been made of Marxian contradiction in
contemporary critical projects. Marxian contradiction is not generally considered as an
organizing category for the study of religion. Whereas Roberts aims recover the
experiential by way of explicitly humanistic discourses, my project suggests another
route to this lost or occluded dimension—the existential, lived or "experiential" aspect in
religious studies—by way of the archive of social theory. I contend that a fuller
consideration of Marxian contradiction can support that category of socially-constructed
experience in religious studies. Let me explain.
In resituating the concern with incongruity within social theory as Marxian social
contradiction, I have been struck by how critical projects in religion actively resist or
avoid the subjective or existential register. This elision of personal experience in social
theory is the succinct problematic of my dissertation, and it remains a problematic, that
is, a terrain for questions and investigations and not an issue open to a single or best
answer. Issues of representation are endemic to religious studies as "religion" has been a
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category for what, as Mark C. Taylor says, what "slips away."8 Religious studies, as a
corner of the liberal arts, has worked with heterogeneity, alterity, and differences in its
contents, methods, and theories. Examples of this include the use of apophatic theologies,
its study of prohibitions of likeness in Abrahamic traditions, or its methods of discourse
analysis that track cooperation of practices and phenomena. Instead of carving up religion
for what is or is not irreducible, inviolable, representable, or debateable, I interpret the
field of religious studies as one that tracks the political, historical, and linguistic valences
of representation, forming sets of questions or "problematics" to study. By these
parameters, I ask about the role of subjective experience for Roberts and the critical
scholars he addresses. This is not to assert the legitimacy or accuracy of their claims but
to speculate about the resemblance between the way religion fixes or stabilizes the
incongruity of lived reality—the unknowns of temporal, material existence—and how
religious studies fixes or stabilizes collectives and events into themes, terms, or groups
for study. The status of experience, as I see, presents as an antinomy which inheres in the
study of religion, one that excites and propels our field. I have found the scholarship of
Tomoko Masuzawa as modeling this kind of approach of problematics. Masuzawa
makes use of the contradictions of our discipline, such as our reliance on the category of
origins despite its problems and the mixed legacy of Christian universalism, to great
effect to reflect dialectically about the practice and limitations of methods in our field.
From within this nexus of incongruity and Marxian social contradiction, and the
obstacles which inhere to religion and representation generally and to "experience" for
critical methods specifically, I return to Smith's lost term "utopia." In investigating the
8

As Mark C. Taylor says in interpreting Friedrich Schleiermacher: "since religious awareness slips away in
the very effort to grasp it, the unity or identity it portends can only be 'present' as 'absent.'" Mark C. Taylor,
Disfiguring: Art, Architecture, Religion, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 22.
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term's provenance, its relationship to a distinctive literary form, and its expansion into
social theory via Marx, I see Utopia as a complex term with the potential to connect the
social perspectives of critical theory with the experiential, personal view dismissed or
occluded from social construction. I thus aim in this dissertation to give an account of this
category of Utopia as a category relevant to critical social theory. My account cannot
attack on all fronts religion's engagements with alterities and difference. It thus is
contained to the logics and limits of representation, with attention to the seam of the
socially-shaped subject who feels and thinks her temporal existence uniquely. I aim to
argue and demonstrate how the figure of Utopia could reframe religion’s problematic of
representation, and that the opposition of subjective perspectives and social theories of
religion could be remapped within a field of Utopian desire.
Utopian desire as a category for critical religious studies
Much research about Utopia today is concerned with how Utopia lost its viability
over the twentieth century. When considering the disappearance of Utopian thought and
literature, scholars note twentieth-century political crises and violence of large nationstate conflicts in Europe.9 Some focus on Utopia's dispersal into technological utopianism
or bourgeois notions of romantic love.10 These support a broader conception of the
displacement of Utopia with a "neoliberal utopianism."11 Literary theorist Northrop Frye
sees the decline of Utopia as a contraction of education itself, namely, that the paralysis
9

Krishan Kumar, "Utopia and Anti-Utopia in the Twentieth Century," in Utopia: The Search for the Ideal
Society in the Western World, ed. Roland Schaer, Gregory Claeys, and Lyman Tower Sargent, New York
Public Library (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 251-66.
10
Eva Illouz, Consuming the Romantic Utopia: Love and the Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Howard P. Segal, Utopias: A Brief History from Ancient
Writings to Virtual Communities, (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012); and Lucy Sargission, Fools
Gold? Utopianism in the 21st Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
11
David Harvey, Spaces of Hope, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
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of the Utopian imagination is connected to the confusion about the objectives of the inner
structure of the educational system, one that no longer relates arts and sciences as they
once did.12 Within all of these assertions are at least two implicit claims: one, that there
was once a Utopia that the West has since backed away from and two, that there is some
meaning to be gained by thinking against the grain of the historical moment, to reassert
Utopia either on the popular front or as a scholarly object.
These two claims—that Utopia is weaker than it once was and that its
contemporary scholarship is a political act—is consistent across these scholarly
appraisals of Utopia. One of the most visible of these appraisals comes from British
sociologist Ruth Levitas, whose work has had significant bearing on the formation of
interdisciplinary field of "utopian studies."13 In 1990 with the publication of her book The
Concept of Utopia, Levitas looked to the Marx, his interlocutors from the Frankfurt
School and to British Marxists to renarrate Utopia as an tool for social transformation.
Responding to the proliferation of new writings on utopianism out of the political and
social climate of the 1960s and 70s, Levitas diverges from a taxonomic or historical
12

Northrop Frye, "Varieties of Literary Utopias" in Utopias and Utopian Thought, ed. Frank E. Manuel
(Cambridge, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 25-49.
13
The study of utopia as an object occupies historians of Utopia and literary theorists at several points. The
Manuels' point to Louis Rebaud in 1840 with Etudes sur les reformateurs ou socialistes modernes branding
utopies sociales subversive in Fritzie P. Manuel and Frank E. Manuel, Utopian Thought in the Western
World, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 10. They insert that a 1704 publication was
misattributed to Georg Pasch and thus, received no attention. Lewis Mumford’s Story of Utopia (1922) and
Joyce Hertzler’s History of Utopian Thought (1923) provide the basis for a history of the idea. The
institutionalization of the field took off with the formation of The Society of Utopian Studies in 1975 and
its annual conference. The peer-reviewed journal, Utopian Studies appeared in 1987 with the publication of
select proceedings from the 1984 conference. In a similar vein and also in the mid 1970s, a professional
organization for the study of American communal societies, the Communal Studies Association, began
meeting in 1974 at locations of relevant interest to the society and has been publishing its peer-reviewed
journal for 25 years. This development of the field is important to show how relatively recent it is to speak
of utopia as an object of scholarly reflection as compared to religion as a field. Other narratives of this
history can be found in Robert Tally's to his Utopia in the Age of Globalization (Palgrave Macmillan, 2103)
and in Chapter Three, "Daring to Dream," in Tom Moylan's Scraps of the Untainted Sky: Science Fiction,
Utopia, Dystopia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), which provides a blend of fiction and theoretical
perspectives.
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approach of others writing in the 1980s and instead, relates the diverse forms, contents
and functions as dimensions of a single concept—"a desire for a better way of being and
living.”14 Utopia, in its variety of forms and contents, fulfill, distort, and/or constitute
what humans need, and thus, represent to them how and what to desire. Her concept has
been used widely since and grounds current scholarship to label both the realized and
unrealized of architecture, intentional communities, biomedicine, technology, political
treatises, engineering, sexualities, economics and ecology.15
Levitas reclamation of utopia as an abiding and formative aspect of social theory
and as embedded in all projects of social change is compelling. In more recent work, she
has made a strong case for how the methods of sociology are indebted to utopia.16 I
engage her work at multiple points in this study but differentiate my own approach from
hers in key ways. The most significant of these is in how I relate Utopia narrowly to its
literary form as developed in early modernity. As is evident with the waxing and waning
of the term, Utopia is a barometer for history's effects. More's text connects the genre of
utopian fiction through its name and marks its conventions. For these reasons, I capitalize
the term, using Utopia and not the lower-case, utopia. This allows me to index More's
text and the literary genre that it references. This is not simply a semiotic convention but
my argument: to capitalize Utopia is to historicize the term, to connect it to its places and
times and its constructions within intellectual and economic locations particular to
European capitalism, nation-state formation, liberal and Marxist politics, Renaissance
humanism, scientific knowledge production, transcontinental ocean travel and

14

Ruth Levitas, The Concept of Utopia (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 7.
Most recently in Sargisson's Fools Gold? and Segal's Utopias: A Brief History.
16
Ruth Levitas, Utopia as Method: the Imaginary Reconstitution of Society (London: Palgrave Macmillan,
2013).
15
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colonialism. To capitalize Utopia is also to situate its use as an aesthetic figure used to
respond and reconstruct these histories by and for Western knowledge communities.17
Capitalizing Utopia serves to relay these connections that may be referred to but not
visible when seen as lower case. This is, in part, precisely because of Western forms of
knowledge that apply words universally. Utopia, then, is the aesthetic figure of Utopian
literature, a figure that resonates across the centuries for its ability to present—but not
resolve—social contradictions. By considering the formation of Utopia as a modern
figure derived from its narrative form, I align my argument with those critical approaches
that use Smith and trace religious studies as a uniquely modern construction that blends
European Christian hegemony, Enlightenment science, and colonialism to make its
distinct academic character.
I follow this historicizing method from critical methods in religious studies
because it allows me better to unfold the signifying features of Utopia. Approaches like
Levitas's that apply "utopia" broadly to non-western or pre-modern cases or cultural
products obscure or dilute Utopia's ambivalence or contradiction. Using the lower-case
form "utopia," these theorists identify a need to collect the diversity of Utopia's
contemporary contents, forms, and functions under a single definition. They broadly
define utopia as a case of social dreaming, a human impulse to fill in the gaps of time, or
as with Levitas, a desire for a better way of living. While there is some attempt to limit
the appearance of utopia to times and places where there is more openness or receptivity
to the opportunities for change of a more structural variety or to tame the diversity of
utopia by offering taxonomies to catalogue different utopian types, these approaches

17

Gregory Flaxman, "The Future of Utopia" in symplokē, 14, no. 1/2, Discouragement (2006): 197-215, :
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40550721.
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generalize utopia in hopes of offering a definition that matches the hopefulness that
utopia implies.
I fault these approaches on several grounds. In making Utopia generalizable to a
variety of conditions, they erase non-European particularity and histories. In seeking a
broad enough definition to collect the diversity or make sense of its overdeterminations,
they lose purchase on the conflicted, contradictory character of Utopia. These
contradictions are, as I argue, not a problem of perspective or definition but the key to
making sense of what Utopia is. For example, how it is that some Utopias are focused on
leisure while others on work, or how some are set in cities while others in the
countryside. Other contradictions include how Utopia is a tool for practical political
change but is also impossible, or how Utopias can be both rigid and hierarchical and
egalitarian. A category useful and relevant to the critical study of religion would need to
make sense of Utopia's contradictions without subsuming them.
Thus, my reading of Utopia and its relation to the study of religion is not one of
religious Utopias, nor does it address expressions of Utopia in intentional communities or
communal experiments.18 Historicizing Utopia as a figure of contradiction related to its
literary form remaps its relation to religion beyond familiar formulations. One familiar
trope is to treat modern utopian literature in a line with other, pre-modern hopes and

18

The directions of analysis of religion and utopia are multiple, from literary studies of ancient texts like
Augustine's City of God or the Benedictine monastic code to modern ones such as Campanella's
Christianianpolis or the programs of Etienne Cabet and Robert Owen, the Ephratites, Shakers or Oneida
perfectionists in the United States or the Kibbutzim of modern Israel. A well-researched and colorful
introduction to these and other intersections of religion and Utopia can be found in Gregory Claeys,
Searching for Utopia: The History of An Idea (New York: Thames and Hudson, 2011). As for a survey of
the various ways scholars have marked this intersection or dialectical relation of religion and utopia, or of
what counts for religion in utopia or utopia in religion, I am unaware of such a work. A place to start a
project of this would be to consider more fully Krishan Kumar's claim that "Christian civilization may be
unique in giving birth to utopia." Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times (Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell,
1987), 19.
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aspirations, as if all directed by a single religious ambition. The reverse also applies,
where one ontological utopian impulse is treated as animating all cultural production,
including religion. These methods do not necessarily exclude historical analysis that
would treat religious and utopian features as changing or differently valenced through
time. However, both approaches tend to treat one term as ahistorical or as the point for
the information on which to pivot.
For example, in the case of Ernst Bloch's work, utopia is regarded as an
anticipatory impulse that is a result of time's structure—an ontological condition that is
easily turned into a theological or universal. I will discuss this slippage at several points
in the chapters ahead, especially as it is used by Levitas. Where he most frequently uses it
is to lift Marx from the debates of whether or not Marx is properly utopian, how to
interpret Marx's critique of the Utopian Socialists, and how utopia can be retrieved for
postmodern situations. By most accounts, Marx would seem utopian for the teleology of
his project and the glimpses of the future beyond capitalism where a man [sic] mixes his
days with hunting in the morning, fishing in the afternoon, rearing cattle in the evening,
and critiquing after dinner.19 Yet, Marx is also read more closely as anti-utopian for
dismissing the explicit programs of the industrialists like Owen or Christian-inspired
communalism of Saint-Simon for the way that they promised present relief and thus,
focused attention away from the structural critiques of capitalism. Bloch takes Marx—
and utopia—out of these arguments and plots Marxism along paths of both critique and
comfort. The potentials of the temporal moment, for Bloch, structure the struggle towards
liberation as itself a pleasurable, embodied project, one that enjoys its compensations of
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visual art, music, narrative, stories, fairytales, wishes, religious practices and cosmic
myths for the way they both are artifacts of humanity's creative capabilities and guides
for the struggle. This is, in Bloch's words, the "warm stream" of Marx that shows
humanity as tender and courageous at the same time as it critiques the structures of
oppression.20
Bloch's approach intersects my project at multiple points. I critique those who
cling to the ontological category of a utopian impulse and thus, distance Utopia from its
form, as Levitas does. But Levitas's close reading of Bloch pays off in other ways.
Levitas calls attention to Bloch's Marxian anthropology—the "warm stream" of Marx—
as highly relevant to the recuperation of Utopia and social theory both for contemporary
social change. This is where she calls in the term "desire" to stand in against the
deadening effect of social critical methods noticed by Roberts. Levitas does not work
closely with the term desire and misses the role that formalizing ideas for social change
has in turning them into Utopias. It is these two points, along with the ahistorical tinge of
her concept, that force me to look elsewhere for a category of Utopia consonant with
critical religious studies.
Bloch's focus on cultural products as the site for Utopia caught Marxian literary
theorist Fredric Jameson's attention and in turn, has directed my own inquiry. I contend
that it is by way of aesthetic productions and the analysis of these productions—which
are themselves aesthetic products—that scholars come in contact with "warm stream" of

20

"Marxism as a doctrine of warmth is thus solely related to that positive Being-in-possibility, not subject
to any disenchantment, which embraces the growing realization of the realizing element, primarily in the
human sphere. And which, inside this sphere, signifies the utopian Totum, in fact that freedom, that
homeland of identity, in which neither man behaves towards the world, nor the world behaves towards
man, as if towards a stranger." Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, Vol. 1, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen
Plaice, and Paul Knight (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 209.

16
Marxian anthropology by way of the "cold stream" of critique. Jameson identifies in
Bloch the religious quality of Marxism that points to an anticipated time where social life
is not a matter of alienated labor. Whereas Bloch calls out this anticipation of a
transformed future as a quality of time itself, Jameson attends to how aesthetic
productions like literature and even Marxist theory are the means to make sense of the
alienations, the social contradictions, as they appear in capitalist production. According to
Jameson, the anticipation of a transformed future—the utopian moment in Bloch—is
fundamentally inaccessible and "can never reveal itself directly but must always speak in
figures, which always calls out structurally for completion and exegesis."21 Thus, it is
only by way of the forms of culture that we can access the existential, lived dimension of
reality beyond our own parochial viewpoints. When handling cultural productions,
however, we cannot escape the social, political, economic conditions that engendered
them. Therefore, interpreting cultural productions becomes both the means to access the
Utopian hope for transformation and the historical circumstances that condition and
characterize the terms of this transformation.
Jameson's move to form and figure is the first in several ways that Jameson's
work helps me isolate where "experience" may be available for scholars using social
critical theory. As I argue through Jameson, analyzing culture with a dialectic of ideology
critique and attention to form affords oblique access to the existential register of social
life. Jameson's theoretical and interpretive projects see cultural products as the occasion
to analyze social and existential life together. As humans piece together the scraps of
their experiences and give them form, what they produce carry the not only the weight of
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their cultural moments and social formations but also what seem to be the "private"
fantasies and neurosis peculiar to them. Jameson's method does not psychologize or even
psychoanalyze authors. Instead, he sees how the theories of Marx and Lacan and other
"greats" of the modern "west" can be read as another way that scholars are like authors;
and like the pensée sauvage figured by Levi-Strauss, they give shape to the sensorium as
they find their way in the world.
This reflexiveness about the scholarly task and its analogies in other domains
excites my interest in Jameson's work in a second way for this project. My project does
not read Utopia through religion or vice versa but treats both as modern knowledge
productions formed around questions and obstacles to representation. This is a method of
thinking by way of set of questions while recognizing the limits of all constructions.
Jameson's work frequently begins with a question or dilemma faced in thought. Jameson
is perhaps most widely known for his work analyzing the culture of postmodernity--a set
of aesthetic patterns that he relates to the late-stage of capitalist production where
industrial machines have been dismantled in favor of the speed of electronic circuits and
have left a wake of disorienting architecture. I do not see his commentary on architecture
as promising as his method of abstracting questions from the change we see. Jameson
himself has written through a series of cultural moments that have produced a dizzying
array of change in the way we communicate, conduct business, acquire and distribute
material goods, and interact with strangers, new ideas, and our communities. To think
these changes from the present (factoring in the social, economic, and political realities)
and to track how material culture is ideologically-striated, pleasurable, and open for
critique give handholds for the proliferation that is cultural life in 2017.
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The third influence of Jameson on my approach is specifically for the way
Jameson leverages the Utopian form as indicative of the social contradictions particular
to modern, consumer capitalism. Jameson's interpretation of Utopia as the premier
literary expression of the larger modern impulse to aesthetic closure gave me occasion to
reflect on how scholarship relies on closure as a condition of its possibility. My argument
that critical theories and methods in the study of religion are, first, aesthetic objects that
are constructed as circuits of desire, stems from the import of representations and they
way they substitute or stand in for a lost object (in psychoanalytic terms) or for other
representations (in linguistic terms). In relating Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis to
Marxist materialism, Jameson delivers a method of interpretation that situates ideology
and its critique as both productions of satisfaction—both routes to pleasure—thus
inscribing the scholar-subject into her own historicized location.
Chapter Summaries
In Chapter One, I expand on the themes introduced in this introduction, especially
how critical scholarship has resisted the experiential dimension that Roberts elevates. I
argue that social theory has resources for addressing Robert's concerns, and I review
critical social theory for its methods in ideology critique, dialectical interpretations, and
historiczation. I note how Marxian contradiction has been less engaged by these scholars
and can be seen to remap incongruity with attention to political economy. I introduce the
scholarship of Fredric Jameson by way of religion scholar Constance Furey to show how
his work with Utopia has been recently used for thinking with religious studies and
outline where my project in Utopian desire fits within current critical scholarship.
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In Chapter Two, I engage the contemporary scholarship in utopian studies and
chart my argument that Utopia, as a distinctly modern figure related to its literary form,
provides the most useful frame for studying the problematic of representing the
existential dimension of social life within critical social theory. This argument challenges
several well-known and highly-cited definitions for how they do not account for the
charged, ambivalent quality of Utopia. I counter that Utopia, wrapped in terms of
"dream," "impulse," and "desire," generates its appeal out of its on formalization and
reification. Utopia is more useful when its contradictions are not contained in a definition
about desire but met through interpretative procedures using a theory of desire.
In Chapter Three, I develop my theory of Utopian desire by showing how Utopian
narratives generate the feeling of encountering the structural conditions and cognitive
effects of social contradiction. I first discuss the conventions of the literary form, its
status as a genre, and how, as travel narratives, Utopias engage spatial operations of
comparison. Fredric Jameson's Marxian and Lacanian interpretive tools are welldeveloped to show how the analysis of cultural forms is a dialectical operation, able to
reflect on its own movement of thought while lining out the multiple social and libidinal
attachments that produce aesthetic products. Jameson's own account of the contradictions
which inhere with and across the Utopian form interacts with the conventions introduced
earlier in the chapter. His theorization intensifies how Utopia figures a modern,
existential longing for resolution and collective social arrangements, delivering this as a
desire for the potentials contained in society as a totality.
In Chapter Four, I expand on how critical social theory is invested with Utopian
desire by way of Levtias, Jameson, and religion scholar Tomoko Masuzawa. I discuss
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how each scholar, by different means, have sought to show how social critique is
affectively and libidinally invested or activated. I contend that social critique is activated
with Utopian desire when it articulates a social totality and, in doing so, anticipates the
analytic potential of that representation—the dual expression of living within and
desiring to live beyond social contradiction. Critical scholarship can reflect more readily
the existential, lived dimension of social life when it attends more closely to how it, like
Utopia, is a wish-fulfilling aesthetic creation that configures and reconfigures its
descriptions and explanations of society.
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Chapter One
From Locative to Utopian: The Modern Project of Critical
Religious Studies
This chapter examines contemporary religious studies debates about the uses and
limits of social constructionist methods, particularly as they relate to the category of the
subject. Scholars using social theory and critical methodologies have emphasized the
subject as a product of social forces, resisting claims to "religious experience." Some
scholars have turned their methods towards the field of scholarship itself, questioning the
privilege of categories like "experience" or "religion." I introduce these debates by way
of Philosopher of Religion Tyler Roberts who argues against these approaches. Roberts
claims that they fix subjects within social fields and do not present the dimensions of
human life that are more uncertain, ones that that give rise to ethical responses. He
maintains that critical approaches have lost site of the "incongruity" that religious
behaviors are constructed to address. I contend that Roberts's characterization of critical
methods misses how social theory, when more closely considered, presents ethical
responses through the methods of ideology critique, dialectical thought, and
historicization. I explain that incongruity is not cancelled or controlled by historical
methods but is active within them, recognizable as historical, material, and social
contradictions. This close reading of both Roberts and his interlocutors produces a
framework for reimagining subjectivity for critical theory with an emphasis on
contradiction. I propose that critical methods can do more to foreground the
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contradictions which inhere in social life and can map these as historical formations
without a loss of their constructionist approaches.
I propose the category of Utopian desire as a frame for this further
methodological engagement with contradiction. Critical scholar Jonathan Z. Smith used
"Utopia" as a category early in his project of redescription. I consider the history of this
term and propose it again through a different formulation by way of the more recent work
of Tomoko Masuzawa, Constance Furey, and Fredric Jameson. I argue that Utopia,
specifically limned as desire, is a way to remap "experience" by means not considered by
either Roberts or the scholars of critical religious studies. As I construct the category, it
foregrounds contradiction and presents it as an object that refracts the existential, lived
dimension of social life, holding onto critical social theory. I introduce this category at
the end of the chapter for how it reframes the representation of experience within critical
methods as an obstacle not easily resolved, one that an explicit appeal to humanistic
language offered by Roberts does not satisfy and is not yet countenanced by critical
studies.
Outline
The first part of this chapter presents Tyler Roberts's objections to social
constructionist approaches in religious studies and considers his counterproposal that
both religion and religious studies both be considered as projects of "encounter." I revisit
the criticisms of phenomenological methods that privilege description and depend on a
sui generis object of study have led to a surge in social scientific approaches that handle
religious behaviors as ordinary phenomena. I look at how Roberts's criticisms of social
scientific approaches in the works of scholars I treat as a subset of the field—critical
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religious studies. Roberts foregrounds the work of J. Z. Smith and his framing of
religions as "locative" and "utopian." Honing in on the "locative" aspect, Roberts tracks
how Smith's category of "locative religion" can be used to describe critical religious
studies scholars who want to fix or situate all subjects and objects as products of social
construction. While I agree that problems inhere in some aspects of these approaches, I
contend that Roberts fails to consider the importance of political economy in his proposal
of "encounter" as a way to reintroduce ethics and subjective experience into the field. I
argue that social theory has resources for addressing the concerns that Roberts's raises
when moving away from his characterization of critical methods. When engaged through
a different lens, social theory presents ethical responses through the methods of ideology
critique, dialectical thought, and historicization. I unpack these three methods as
responses to Roberts for how they offer more refined approaches than what he proposes.
How I differentiate myself from Roberts and the critical religious studies scholars is my
claim that social contradiction operates as a background operation motivating these
methods. In reference to Marx, I relate his materialist account of contradiction as a
dimension of social life not emphasized as such in religious studies. This close reading of
both Roberts and his interlocutors produces a framework for reimagining subjectivity for
critical theory with an emphasis on contradiction. It also serves to introduce a set of
questions which motivate this dissertation, questions about category formation and
representation in the study of religion.
In the second part of this chapter, I begin to develop my category of Utopian
desire that I argue reimagines how critical religious studies can credibly consider the
existential dimension of social life that Roberts defends is occluded by social scientific
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methods. Through the work of philosopher Constance Furey and literary theorist Fredric
Jameson, I introduce how the term “utopia,” once used but then discarded by Jonathan Z.
Smith, can be reimagined for critical religious studies. While Furey invests in “Utopian
history” as a way of holding the sedimented and undetermined together, I am more
interested in her gesture toward the desires of the scholar and how they may be refracted
through a practice of Utopian history. “Desire” labels the affective and libidinal
dimensions of knowledge production, criticism, and uncertainty. A sympathetic
perspective on the historicized subject within the contradictory social sphere is
recognizable as a desiring subject, a subject who desires. This chapter contributes to my
argument in that it establishes that contemporary religious studies struggles for ways to
represent political economy and subjective experience simultaneously and offers that the
figure of Utopia can be a means to examine this problem as it inheres in critical
discourses.
I. Incongruity Remapped: Roberts through Social Theory
In his recent monograph, Encountering Religion: Responsibility and Criticism
after Secularism, Philosopher of Religion Tyler Roberts identifies a waning of concern
for the subject within contemporary discourses on religious studies and identifies a lack
of humanism within social constructionist approaches to religious studies. Roberts
introduces readers to these recent debates that frame religion as a contested category and
spotlight how scholarship has toyed with, understood, or resisted the slippage of religious
person and religion scholar. He identifies several scholars such as Jonathan Z. Smith,
Russell McCutcheon, Willi Braun, and Steve Wasserstrom for their work in separating
academic thinking from religious thinking about religion. Roberts counters that in rooting
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out whatever cannot be grasped by social or scientific theory, these and other scholars
have become overly-concerned with circumscribing their terms and their objects, and in
doing so, have lost touch with the “incongruous” aspects of life that religion and religious
studies encounters.
The terms and figures that Roberts introduces deserve attention for the lineages
and problematics they represent in the field of religious studies. Field-reflexive critiques
of the classifications and categories of religion have been a growing subset of the field of
religious studies and have occupied the main journals of the field, as well as sprouted
new journals and scholarly organizations that attend to these concerns directly.22 Critical
perspectives within religious studies have focused on the formation of the field within
mostly Christian and Western contexts, using forms of historiography to track the field’s
investments.23 Criticisms of the History of Religions scholar Mircea Eliade are perhaps
the most widely known and referenced, with concerns ranging from his textualist
approach, his use of description and morphology, or the political dimensions of his life
and theory.24 Critical scholars replace treatments of religion as a distinct, autonomous, or
special aspect of human life excited by religious behaviors with studies that see religion
22
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as one cultural product among others, or as ordinary.25 Lively debates and refinements
have helped the field understand problems which inhere both in established theories and
methods and in the terms and concepts it uses.26 The goal has been a more precise
approach to the diverse and contradictory contents of the field.
However, to Roberts, these criticisms have corroded a vital dimension of what
funds religious reflection, practiced by scholars and adherents alike. In a careful, close
reading of Jonathan Z. Smith, Roberts concludes that scholarship becomes overly rigid
and didactic when it always looks to situate or locate religion. As Roberts reminds his
readers, Smith critiqued Eliade for the way Eliade promoted religion as primarily a placemaking enterprise. Through such concepts as the Axis Mundi and the myth of an eternal
return, Eliade summarized religion as the activity of orienting a person in space and time.
In “The Wobbling Pivot,” a paper delivered in 1971 and published in 1978, J. Z. Smith
takes up Eliade’s work and redescribes his sacred/profane distinction as a concern with
fixing the fluid or unsettled (i.e. wobbly) human experiences within time and space. In
Eliade’s religious or sacred category, religion is treated as a mode of human activity to
make or fund a point or location within a chaotic field of experience or, to think as Eliade
does, within a cosmos. Smith uses Eliade to show that place and world-making are
important questions for religious studies but are not the only activity of religion.27 Smith
refashions the question of religion through late antique sources and sees religious texts as
not just trying to fit or place themselves in relation to others, and thus, creating worlds, or
having a “locative” purpose or effect.
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After identifying “Center” as a guiding image for Eliade, Smith proposes a new
pair—locative/utopian—to describe the placing and displacing aspects of religion. Smith
has reworked this pair over the span of his career; his earliest mention shows Smith’s
caution with category formation:
In my own writings I have toyed with the distinction centrifugal and
centripetal, central and peripheral, considered adopting Bergson’s classic
distinction between the closed/static society and the open/dynamic one, or
Eric Voegelin’s contrast between a ‘compact’ and ‘differentiated’
experience of the cosmos. With some hesitation I have settled for the
present on the dichotomy between a locative vision of the world (which
emphasizes place) and a utopian vision of the world (using the term in its
strict sense: the value of being in no place). Whatever terminology is
employed, we must be careful to preserve a sufficient sense of the
experiential character of this dichotomy and resist imposing even an
implicit evolutionary scheme of development ‘from the closed world to
the infinite universe’ (to borrow the title of Alexander Koyre’s wellknown work.)28
As Smith discusses, utopian means “no place,” and he shortly thereafter abandoned the
term for incongruity and then, for difference. Smith uses “utopian” again in his collection
of essays entitled, Map is not Territory, where “utopian” is a type of restless seeker
religious orientation that contrasts “locative” types of religious behaviors that center or
attach people to places. But in employing these two terms, Smith calls out how both
religion and religious studies are projects of orientation AND disorientation, that the
scholar, too, can adopt these positions.
In interpreting Smith, Roberts focuses on two of Smith’s terms: “locative” and
“incongruity,” setting them up as binaries for contrast. Roberts subsumes “utopian” as
another aspect of locating, but of “relocating” just in another place, not the more radical
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dislocating of “incongruity”.29 Roberts sees that the utopian, as a method of engaging
hegemonic power, could be mapped as method of revolution; however, this revolutionary
force is tamed for the work of collecting the group identity: “From this perspective,
utopian, rebellious, and revolutionary forms of religion are in crucial respects ultimately
locative, for they still seek to secure a stable place in the world for believers, even if this
means that they or another group will be dislocated before they can relocate
themselves.”30 Thus, it is the less addressed, more animated notion of incongruity, not
utopian or locative, that is the more radical force, and for Roberts, the more common and
recognizably religious aspect of what constitutes religious studies.
Smith’s work has given rise to many other projects within what I have named
“critical religious studies.” This makes him important for a discussion of how the modern
category of religion reflects the social formations of multiple eras. His method in
historical analysis addresses how religion and history are topics made available through
texts and only approached obliquely. Tuning to the myths and symbols in texts of late
antiquity, Smith reflects on the historian’s task and acknowledges its distinctly modern,
post-Enlightenment orientation. It is this reflexivity that brings into view insights such as
how “universality” is a category for modern elites31 or how the “primitive” is predicated
on a binary contrast to the “civilized.”32 J.Z. Smith’s work shows how historians inherit
and then revise or create the categories that they use.
Roberts reads J.Z. Smith against himself and sees locative patterns forming
around Smith and other historicists and instead wants to refocus on encounters with the
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incongruous, unformed, or surprising. Moving away from texts and elite forms has been a
necessary correction, according to Roberts. However, in reading for particularity of place
and situation through demands to historicize, scholars fall into a pattern of constant
positioning and reassertion of academic legitimacy. In this move, these critical scholars
of religion expose themselves to their own critique of being overly “locative” of religion,
“locating both their religious subjects and themselves too securely and [so that they] are
not nuanced enough in their explorations of the power of religion.”33
It is this constant resituating that troubles Roberts: the disinterested inquiry of
social scientific and historicist methods miss the humanistic perspective of self and
scholarship that is about encounter. Objectifying distance has been brought on by the
“dead ends of critical consciousness that has emptied concepts such as ‘responsibility,’
‘ethics,’ ‘freedom,’ and ‘subjectivity’ of critical and emancipatory force.”34 For Roberts,
the humanities house the tools to live with incongruity and develop “processes of
reflection and representation,” responding so as “to reflect on what the ideas and
practices we study might mean for us, in our worlds.”35 He sees that a humanities
approach would reinvigorate both the inquiry into religion and the place of the scholar in
that inquiry, to acknowledge the contingency of all human pursuits.
Roberts accuses critical studies of having its own “locative” bias: as it accuses
Eliade of making religion about place, critical studies makes everything about its
historical location. Roberts pushes back against historicist methodology by saying that it
produces a kind of “undeadness” and “evacuates our acts and our subjectivities and so
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turns them into artifacts of social formation.”36 Social constructionist approaches,
according to Roberts, rob the self of its affirming gestures and contact with its “finitude”
and “power” and put in their place a critical attitude towards the various social formations
of which the self is a part. He reclaims the humanities, theology and psychoanalysis for
interpreting social relations and institutions, and in doing so, situates the self in fields of
interpellation and desire. Thus, the social is present but is strained through terms such as
meaning, becoming, life, and desire. He seeks a way into constructive and affirmative
approaches to religious studies theory and scholarship so as to recuperate “questions of
justice, meaning, and purpose” that are foreclosed by explanatory and historicist
methods.37
In sum, Roberts argues humans are made into “artifacts” when seen as processes
of social formation, and that the critical mind is trained to be suspicious and guarded,
without affirmation. Ultimately the human is discouraged from seeing herself as
purposeful, for herself or for others. Social constructionism does not allow enough
nuance into the explorations of the “power of religion”, and in marking out and
occupying a distanced, secularist perspective, these scholars fail to reflect the more
realistic portrait of humans as experimenters. Exceptions to this are scholars such as
anthropologists Robert Orsi and Michael Jackson and historians Amy Hollywood and
Romand Coles who cut against the grain of traditional scholarship to explore finitude,
power, and self-dispossession. In turning to the philosophers and psychoanalytic
interpretations, Roberts maps out how power can be removed as an object of suspicion
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and repossessed by religious studies for an account of human responsibility,
answerability, and encounter.
I agree with Roberts that there are “locative” patterns at work in some strains of
critical studies. I also agree that the consequence of these and other patterns is to refuse to
engage “responsibility, ethics, freedom and subjectivity” as terms because of their
unexamined appeals to liberal humanism. I appreciate the turn to the humanities for the
ways that they have held up the incongruous and framed uncertainty as productive of
relations and of cultural goods. I want to argue, however, that Roberts’s concerns can be
remedied by critical social theory and are arguably more thoroughly confronted by the
tools and terms within the wheelhouse of critical religious studies itself. Critical religious
studies has “critical and emancipatory force” within its genealogy and practices that can
be leveraged for social critique. This dissertation explores how the incongruity that
Roberts seeks to recuperate for religious studies can be reintroduced through critical
religious studies as “Utopian”—the lost word of Smith’s project. As this chapter
introduces, “Utopia” is not simply a “no place” or an “escape” from order but a wrestling
with order that is ongoing, dialectical, and critical, accounting for the embodied,
tempermental aspects that Roberts sees as constitutive of humanistic inquiry. Whereas
Roberts gives up on the social-theoretical models and regroups in humanities and
theology, I see mediation through the figure of Utopia and its cognate, Utopian desire. In
order to develop this concept of Utopian desire, I first want to survey recent critical,
social and historical methods of religious studies to see how they can resist the “locative”
characterization given by Roberts and also add to the political economic dimension
untouched by Roberts.
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Ideology Critique: Objects of Suspicion or Ethical Position
I agree with Roberts that social constructionism, with its frame of the social, can
turn the subjects of religion into objects through its attention to the function of religion to
construct objects. Social constructionism has its roots in the critiques of liberalism
wrought by Hegel and Marx and found anchor in the developing field of religious studies
through the foundational works of Durkheim, Weber, and Berger.38 By the lights of social
constructionist interpretations of the field of religious studies, “Religion” is a concept that
was created to name a type of social behavior, observable in collective behaviors. The
method foregrounds the discretion of the analyst to frame social behavior as religious and
to distinguish it from other social behaviors, and though it may be associated with what is
extreme, exceptional, or socially taboo, as Durkheim remarks, religion registers at the
level of ordinary human behaviors, institutions, and beliefs.39 This human-centered
feature means that religion is, in one sense, ordinary human activity.
In order to elaborate on religion as a set of social phenomena—as opposed to
supernatural or psychological ones—social constructionists emphasize how the subject is
always within a social field and report on how social groups shape themselves and are
shaped through discourses. Language and materiality combine, taking shapes in
38
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prohibitions, permissions, and institutions on multiple scales. Social constructionist
approaches to religious studies investigate these discursive operations generally and
particularly how whatever is “religious” functions to permit, restrict, or constrict behavior
and potentials within social space.40 In this frame, knowledge is seen as a product of
social groups that often behave to sustain themselves in a field of competing interests.
Religious studies should therefore do more than describe “religious” social groups: it is
tasked with asking how knowledges that challenge and sustain, i.e. construct, these social
groups interact with other knowledges.41
Ideology critique structures much of this discourse of social constructionism by
analyzing the flows of authorization, the legitimacy of certain representations and the
obscuring—intentionally or not—of others. 42 It is easy to mistake what is meant when
critical religious studies scholars view religion as ideology. Despite efforts to nuance the
word and to open it to its more general meaning of a system of ideas, its negative use—as
was used by its 19th century originators—prevails. Ideology as a term was developed to
describe the circulation of ideas at the expense of occluding other vital information. The
way that language and behaviors disguise class interest was a main concern of Marx,
along with the way ideologies disconnect from the conditions of production. Marx
identified that religious ideas did this very effectively in the way that they assert a reality
beyond material reality.43 They also salved a wounded heart in a cruel world. As Marx
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described it, the deception was the institutional practices that enabled conceit to persist
undetected. Twentieth century scholarship has extended this analysis of religion and other
ideologies, tracking how ideology is sustained as structures of normativity that gain
legitimacy and adherence through aesthetic forms or institutions. Terms like hegemony or
habitus, while adding to the function and character of ideology can, as Marxist literary
theorist Terry Eagleton avers, be used in such a way that waters down the power
dynamics and struggle of Marx’s initial critique.44 All three terms, however, sustain focus
on the social aspects of behavior that otherwise would devolve into stories of unique
individuals acting as free, unencumbered agents. Ideology critique for religious studies is
a marker of how all discourse excludes and argues that religious discourse excludes in
particular way.
Russell McCutcheon lays out this role of ideology critique in Manufacturing
Religion, noting that this is not the “harsher Marxist use of the term that denotes false
consciousness or deluded thinking.” He rejects these for the way they presume a “true
consciousness.”45 Instead, McCutcheon proposes a generic alternative: “ideology denotes
a process for authoring particular representations whose trace, history or context is
obscured (whether intentionally or not).”46 Turning to Eagleton, McCutcheon identifies
how ideology performs as a political tool through unifying, orienting, rationalizing,
legitimating, universalizing, and naturalizing social processes. Through figures such as
Durkheim and Freud, McCutcheon sees that religion functions to obscure social
44
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operations, to reassert hegemony and to bolster dominant power structures. This is a wellestablished interpretation of religion that has been critiqued for its reductionism.47
McCutcheon detours around this criticism by claiming that reductionism is the work of
functionalist theories, and he is joined by other contemporary scholars in continuing this
path.48 Critical methods within religious studies argue that the ideological operations of
religion are especially adept at creating the illusion of closure and building absolute
claims. Religion shores up other systems, and thus, deserves the attention of critics.49
For the purposes of my research, I use the term “critical religious studies
scholarship” to denote these methods that view religion as social phenomena and that
question the theories and methods in the field that may treat religion as interactive with
the social field but as a response to a unique experience. Roberts defends this “unique
experience” perspective as he articulates a framework for “response and responsiveness”
to difference. 50 He situates his method as an enterprise of the academy that takes up
concern with an attention to change:
The humanities, as I understand them, are the site in the academy where
we try not only to understand the immense diversity of ways that human
beings have in the past and continue in the present to reflect on and
represent themselves to themselves and others, but also to respond to these
47
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processes of reflection and representation and to the processes of self and
social formation, to which they not only are bound but also effect and
enable. To respond, in this sense, is to reflect on what the ideas and
practices we study might mean for us, in our worlds.51
For Roberts, it is the humanities, not social sciences, that offer the more precise method
of handling religious texts and people. The humanities accept theological material but not
its assumptions, reading religious texts through a position of humility and
indeterminacy—a kind of ethical stance. The ethical position, for Roberts, is to see how
“certain kinds of self-dispossession” incite the more responsible positions: there is too
much certainty or self-assuring happening within the critical position, and the effort to
establish authority blinds the scholar from the way religion destabilizes its subjects, and
even its scholars.
I like the space that Roberts holds for the humanities within the academy,
especially the way that it points to the subjective position of the scholar relative to the
subjectivities of its “objects” for reflection. I want to emphasize, however, that critical
perspectives have an advantage to other kinds of ethic's claims when they challenge the
productions of hegemony. The normative stance within critical religious studies
scholarship persists in McCutcheon and others as they call attention to where powers are
unequally distributed.52 Societies are not set up to serve everyone’s interests equally. By
pointing to how social structures are legitimated and maintained, critical scholars bring to
light what is not as prominent in popular discourses and may be missing from other
methods of studying religion.53 As Marx assured his readers of Theses on Feuerbach, the
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point of philosophy is not only to interpret the world, but to change it.54 Marx’s legacy
within critical theory is a turn in the road from the more isolated social science of
Durkheim.55 Social theory with this critical approach has a normative dimension. It has
within it the motivation to both study and produce change.56
These histories are absent or obscured within Roberts’s analysis. Roberts’s
concerns about the ethical dimensions of critical religious studies telescope out first with
the concern that there is a lack of ethics in the critical perspective when it refuses to judge
certain social formations due to its necessary detachment as a public, scholarly service
and then zooms in to the places where McCutcheon appears to freely judge religious
others when he describes his scholarly peers as “data.”57 Roberts overall is concerned that
the ethics of critical religious studies are unevenly applied, “failing to explain why some
kinds of socially stabilizing activities are preferable to others, they offer instead the allto-easy language of ‘transgression’ and ‘critique.’”58 McCutcheon defends his privilege
by noting that scholarly autonomy has its own ideologies or systems of thought and thus,
its own exclusions, ones that its own practitioners may not be aware of. Scholarly
discourse, as McCutcheon sees it, does not actively work to disguise its trace or disavow
its privilege whereas religious discourse does.59 When challenged about the success of
scholarly discourse to police itself for its disavowed or disguised exclusions,
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McCutcheon admits that this would be akin to pulling the rug out from under one’s own
feet and that a critique of the institutional setting of his own work “falls outside the
parameters of this book.”60 Arguing against McCutcheon’s privilege is part of the drive
of Roberts who sees such positioning as overly defensive and guarded.
If one is to follow McCutcheon’s insistence on the “radically contextualized
nature of all human thought and practice,“ then McCutcheon plays with an ever-growing
list of criteria to assure one’s scholarship is properly accountable and situated. However,
he excludes biography of particular subjects. This kind of bait-and-switch of McCutcheon
relative to specific standards of disclosure and distance is confusing if one reads him as
laying out rules for religion scholarship. McCutcheon sustains this argument through
reifying "religion" and "scholarship," setting them in opposition, then reassigning
descriptive scholarship to the “religious” side. Sui approaches to religion fund more
idealist than materialist positions, he argues, and ideology critique, what he calls
“materialist and naturalist critiques,” taken up against religion and sui generis
approaches, “not only contextualize such idealism but, in the very act of contextualizing
it, simultaneously deauthorize and challenge it.”61 However, what becomes apparent with
McCutcheon is that religion is exclusive to groups. The object of study, then, is not
religion, but people—who are treated as objects, not subjects. This objectification extends
beyond religious people to scholars themselves, who are seen to be directed by interests
and rewards, with appeals to authorities. McCutcheon has promoted this argument with
his attention to scholars—as a group—in such categories as “caretakers” and “critics.
This turn to analyze the scholar as a religious “data” may have rhetorical purpose for
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McCutcheon but without a more sympathetic account of the scholar-as-subject, it
alienates scholars from each other and from their shared conditions of existence,
imagining them more different than the same. It is also what leads Roberts to misread the
benefits of social constructionism, its inherent ideology critique, and its ethical force.
Roberts criticizes McCutcheon and other scholars for bypassing the “messy
questions of advocacy and social formation” that are central to good inquiry in the study
of religion. 62 I would say more precisely that McCutcheon loses his argument when he
characterizes scholarship as religion's opposite. I would argue that religiousness and
scholarship are more precisely overlapping fields of social formations with degrees of
attention to constructedness that are always incomplete. I maintain that social critique has
this more nuanced history and the resources for taking positions that have political effects
as constitutive of their purpose and are invested in social transformation, not merely
disinterested inquiry. The failures of critical religious studies discourse highlighted by
Roberts are perhaps failures of rhetoric but not of method, by my view, and not fatal.
They instead should be treated as productive critique, helping to focus on the ways
critical religious studies can better account for subjectivity and perspective in their social
analysis.
Dialectical Methods
As remarked above, Roberts watches ethical, responsive selves treated as objects
void of lived perspective in social constructionist projects. The social constructionist
would respond by arguing that the analytical view is just that—one view among others
and a view the scholar must inhabit and explain. Roberts sees the critical scholar as
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excepting himself (as these are male scholars he references) from this treatment by virtue
of his scholarly location, creating an us-vs.-them dynamic that is skewed against those
who disagree with the critical religious studies approach. This section continues with
Roberts’s disagreement with social constructionism and how its social view of religion
obscures processes of encounter and transformation. I argue that this is because he is not
reading for the dialectics at work in the theory of social construction.
Roberts believes that social constructionism stabilizes itself through proposing a
neutral stance on social processes, avoiding normative claims. However, this privileging
of social constructionism is itself a normative claim. Others agree. Benjamin Fong
describes how critical discourses, in resisting one standard, just institute another: what
was “religion, experience and authenticity” becomes “discourse, discipline and
power/knowledge.” New monoliths, such as “Western Civilization,” emerge, instituting a
new universal that explains the conditions of a situation just as the liberal humanist one
did and the reductionist one did before that.63 By protesting so much against the “reality”
of certain stable formations by calling them “nothing but constructions,” critical theorists
like McCutcheon lose sight of the complexity of the reality they claim to be able to
explain.64 Fong challenges social constructionists by pointing out their inconsistency
when they argue that reality is too complex to be viewed completely but then claim that
they have a leg up on analyzing this reality. He suggests that instead of advancing an
argument through these oppositional constructions, social constructionist approaches
would gain more traction by beginning with the shared social field of the scholar and
reader and drawing out its successes and failures at sustaining a consistent reality.
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Fong’s recommendation to preserve social construction by drawing the circle to
include scholar and other would go some distance in taking the edge from critical
religious studies while preserving its message. This would be consistent with a genealogy
of social theory building on Marxist praxis and immanent critique, proposing selfreflexivity about the subject’s class position in relation to the forces of production. But
this lineage also contains a facet of science that has come under scrutiny by
poststructuralists, namely the positivism of social science methods and its accompanying
objectivity. Where critical religious studies appeals to scientific or rational inquiry for its
authority, it depends on a western hegemony that it claims it can see through.65 In order
to do what Fong recommends without falling towards the positivistic side of social theory
and to counter this normative, hegemonic tendency, I propose that critical religious
studies re-engage a more dialectical methodology that reflects the dialectal production of
the subject within the social. An attention to dialectics would both situate the subject
within a livelier, more deliberative or even “messy” context, as Roberts and Fong
suggest, with the recognition and force of the human, creative aspect of the social.
Dialectical approaches preserve subjective perspectives, accounting for a self as
one that is constituted socially but in process. In The Sacred Canopy, Peter Berger
emphasizes how life, society, and scholarship all function dialectically and so should be
perceived as such. Berger’s social theory thus no longer analyzes society as hypostatic
but rather as creatively dynamic, correcting Durkheim’s legacy. He reminds his readers
that, “the sociological understanding ought always to be humanizing, that is, ought to
refer the imposing configurations of social structure back to the living human beings who
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have created them.”66 Berger also dismantles a rigid subjectivity by arguing that
“socialization… is always partial” and that internalization is always incomplete, with a
non-social self-consciousness in uneasy relation to the social consciousness.67
Berger’s processual subject-in-formation corrects the misreading of Marxist
ideology critique that ascribes ideology only to persons and not to systems. It also represents social theory’s subjectivity as malleable and troubled—a view of social theory
not considered in Roberts’s survey. Through the term “social formation,” subjects are
situated within a society that functions to obscure or promote some ideas and transfers
this function to competing subjective, social formations. 68 When subjectivities are
framed as social formations, scholars can distinguish between the bluntness of some
ideological formations and the subtlety of others, allowing some social formations to
counter other hegemonic social formations, yet acknowledging that they are all formed
through political economy. Social formations, as partial or in process, point to the
overlapping and contested experiences, where a single human body can be marked by
multiple social formations.
Roberts does not dig deep into the references used by critical religious studies
scholars for these more dynamic perspectives on subjectivity. He instead invokes
humanism for this account. By pointing to more nuanced descriptions of subject
formation and describing them as social processes, I aim to answer one of Roberts's
criticisms of social theory—that critical perspectives drain life from their objects of
study. I do not believe that this is the case, and I want to preserve these elements of social
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theory as I build my case for a critical religious studies theory and method that is
ethically-tuned and responsive to others. What is clearer from this correction is that
Roberts takes issue with an overriding arc of social theory—its habit or pattern towards
social science objectivity and positivism that is primarily engaged with social, not
personal, processes. It would seem that this is a general pitfall of Enlightenment reason:
reification for the purposes of abstraction. However, that does not mean that social
formations are static.69 Roberts might respond: if social theory attends to selves, it calls
them subjects and only does so for more abstracted, less human ends, and this kind of
thought pattern does not have to be the only game in town.
I agree that there is abstraction and consolidation and objectification in the theory
and methods in social theory. But instead of abandoning it, I want to point out how this is
more precisely just a moment of a dialectic. Thought is in motion, a dialectical procedure
of integration and proposal. I want to reframe Roberts's rejection of social methods and
say: if critical methods appear as “locative,” it is only because they have not brought
attention to the movement of thought itself in the presentation of their work. Critical
methods do not necessarily lead to deadening analysis or less responsibility per se. I
would say (and am performing through this dissertation) that it produces new ethical
responses and expands experience, as Roberts wants religious studies scholarship to do,
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and a recognition and integration of the dialectics of thought in scholarship helps with
this.
Peter Berger and J.Z. Smith both demonstrate this reflexive work as a method for
religious studies. Like the social process he describes, Berger calls attention to how
theorizing is a dialectical process: “Depending on the starting point, one may then be able
to show how a particular theoretical constellation results from a certain practical
infrastructure, or conversely how a particular social structure is the result of certain
movement in the realm of ideas.” The method of scholarship then matches the contents,
which have, to Berger, an “intrinsic dialecticity” as socio-historical phenomena.70 The
ever-incomplete aspect of human life, lived in social exchange, continues as production.
It is a restless and expressive process.71 Scholarship is one instance of other productions.
J. Z. Smith lists religion as a practice of producing knowledge through making
connections. As mentioned above, this is religion as ordinary, not unique or exceptional.
But it is also dialectical process:
All of this is to say that the usual portrait of the primitive (the non-human
‘them’ of our cultural map)—whether in the nineteenth century negative
form or our more recent positive evaluation—has prevented us from
realizing what is human and humane in the worlds of other men. We have
not been attendant to the ordinary, recognizable features of religion as
negotiation and application but have rather perceived it to be an
extraordinary, exotic category of experience which escapes everyday
modes of thought. But human life—or, perhaps more pointedly, humane
life—is not a series of burning bushes. The categories of holism, of
congruity, suggest a static perfection to primitive life which I, for one, find
inhumane.72
In this quotation, Smith contrasts the religion of “burning bushes” to the religion of
“negotiation and application.” In reacting to this as “locative,” Roberts is dwelling on the
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products of social theory and not their production, nor the way that scholars inscribe
themselves as subjects in negotiation. This issue of dialectics—of the reinscription of the
scholar as a producer in a field of other producers where concepts and categories are
constructions for use in an economy of knowledge production that turns with its own
contradictions and resolutions—is a difficult counternarrative to sustain while making
arguments and is a delicate task to insert dexterously into one’s work, both in structure
and in content.
A quick example of this challenge of presenting scholarly objects as moments of a
dialectical process comes from a review of Tomoko Masuzawa by Robert Orsi. Orsi
follows Roberts’s concern that a too critical position leaves religion as reduced to other
terms. In reviewing Masuzawa’s book Inventing Religions, Orsi calls Masuzawa’s work
an “anti-history” for its way of wringing out earlier moments of the religious studies
tradition and finding only Christian hegemony at work.73 Like Roberts, Orsi wants
historiography to show the fissures and lines and struggles of its process. This struggle is,
however, lost for Orsi because he is looking at the “struggle” at a different register: he
wants to see history from the perspective of the personal decision tree—the wins and
losses—that troubled early scholars.
But Masuzawa’s project shows more that the decisions of scholars are often not
their own, or more precisely, they are decisions made under conditions that are degrees of
difference from our own. Masuzawa focuses her archival research less on the particular
circumstances surrounding individual nineteenth-century scholars, and more on the
specific rules of discourse that constituted and sustained the “reason” so valued by these
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scholars. Through this, she is able to show how those rules (and Enlightenment
discourses generally) are framed and anchored by diffuse Christian presumptions.74
Those nineteenth-century scholars simply could not ignore or rebut these rules of
discourse, then, without ignoring or rebutting reason itself. It is not only the past but now
the present that is under consideration: if there is a sense that religious studies is still too
Christian, to what degree is the familiar yet increasingly insufficient nineteenth century
“reason” responsible? The praxis for Orsi—and for Roberts—is between something
domestic or familiar and something strange or unsettled. For Masuzawa, the strange is
what was supposed to be familiar or resolved. The conflict is present within the scholar—
she doesn’t have to encounter others or religiousness to find it.
Dialectical methods appeal to a variety of theorists within religious studies,
crossing the boundaries of social science and humanist approaches. Employing and
demonstrating the dialectics at work in one’s theory would help critical religious studies
from the positivistic tendencies of social science and keep discourses on social
formations focused on their dynamic and creative aspects. What critical religious studies
adds to a general dialectical method is the self-consciousness about thought itself within
the scholarship of religion, an attunement to the social formations of scholars themselves
as knowledge producers. Roberts attempts a theory of a self-conscious scholar via his
own method of encounter and response. However, he fails to account for the social or
political dimensions that circumscribe or limit the terms or range of thought available.
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Instead, he theologizes them, or more precisely, "quasi-theologizes" them by turning the
limitations of one’s own experience into a disorientation that he reveres.
I agree with Roberts and Orsi that texts, practices, or human/living others
disorient and surprise expectations. I share with Roberts an interest in theorizing
encounters and regard it as project of scholarship. Where we diverge is in how one talks
about the conditions that create these encounters. Dialectical methods permit the insight
of processes and incompletion, as social formations lived as subjectivities and as social
formations that are distinctive to times and places. It is not a choice between a personal
decision and a subject as an effect of social processes but more that certain material and
discursive conditions give rise to what is lived and experienced as personal decision.
Dialectical methods can bring the scholar into the frame of this analysis, keeping
attention on how scholars are ordinary humans who both create their conditions and are
created by them.
To sum up the previous two sections, Roberts characterizes social constructionism
as disinterested and presenting subjects as static objects. However, ideology critique has
ethical norms both at the level of analysis and at the subjective level, and both are in
process and (thus) changing. To examine the human creative social life—what I have
been labeling subjectivity—I will further trace Roberts’s notion of incongruity so as to
show how he attaches it to humanism. Debates about whether or not “religious
experience” can be included as data for analysis is an irritant to Roberts who wants to
acknowledge it as a type of more general human encounter. I will show that “experience”
and “incongruity” are better framed as contradiction. Contradiction is a more precise
word than incongruity when describing the subjective experience. Marxian contradiction
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communicates both how the subject is cast by the play of forces in social life and how she
experiences these forces—as conflict calling for resolution. When Marxian contradiction
is introduced to the historical analytics of critical religious studies, the existential, lived
experiences of subjects comes into view with a social frame.
Incongruity Remapped as Contradiction
“Incongruity” stands in Roberts’s work as the experience of the subject in the
midst of undecidable or excessive arrangement. Roberts traces the term in J.Z. Smith’s
work, following how Smith presented it as the religious strategy for “grappl[ing] with
that which seems out of place.”75 As mentioned above, this was developed alongside of a
“locative” strategy of orientation. Roberts claims that Smith inadequately develops
incongruity as its own strategy, one where “chaos, disorder, lack of fit” are a part of a
religious disposition that is “neither overcome nor (only) a spur to a new ordering or
reordering, a disposition that in some significant sense bears or inhabits chaos.”76 Using
his positive examples, Roberts calls out how people, texts, and the singularity of self
deliver incongruity as a particularly lively place or mode. Meeting the incongruous is a
challenge for both the subject-scholar and for the field of religious studies. It is also the
condition of responsiveness as such, “that which stands out and cannot be incorporated
into or subsumed under any kind of unified self, historical tradition, or social formation.77
Incongruity cannot be resolved but can and should be responded to by “thinking
respectfully and responsibly.”78 It may take shape in philosophy as an aporia or in
experience as liminality. The injunction to reduce it, to see it only as the property of
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another text, society, or person, or consolidated as ‘the other’, is to close off its
situational givenness.
Roberts sees that critical, social methods close off incongruity, both as an object
of study and as a legitimate method. If the scholar is willing to be remade in the process
of engaging another’s worldview that is under critique, then perhaps there is room for the
study of social formations and subjectivities: this is critique under the lights of the
incongruous.79 Still, Roberts does not want the political to hamper this open inquiry, this
vulnerable subject or tender moment, instead conceding that it will need to be considered
in due course.
Critical religious studies closes off incongruity when it patrols institutions and
departments, claiming that theology tarnishes religious studies as a credible study within
the university.80 In seeking to separate social scientific methodologies from more
humanistic or theological ones, some have seen critical religious studies dismissing the
historical lineage that has mutually produced both.81 Other institutional contexts may
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house theology but this accommodation may just reinforce the denominational affiliation.
The object of study is still sniffed closely to check for sympathetic reasoning.82
In focusing on incongruity and encounter, Roberts elevates it as an essential
human experience and associates it with religiousness. As mentioned in my introduction,
religion scholarship traffics in the problematic of identity and difference, of what is fixed
and what slips away. Roberts wrestles with this and decides that the doing of scholarship
is its risk of undoing, of the undecidability of encounter. As I have argued thus far, there
are resources for this kind of complex account of human life within social theory. Where
I see the most need for a close examination of alterity as it registers in religion
scholarship is in the case of “religious experience.” As I will argue, if there can be some
way of accounting for something like “religious experience” within critical religious
studies, then there will be ways for analyzing a subjective perspective that satisfies the
social constructionists and the existential dimension of incongruity that Roberts wants
centered in religious studies.
Religious Experience, or a Claim Made within the Phantasmagoria
The topic of religious experience has been another boundary line, policing
incongruity, according to Roberts, and is at the heart of Roberts’s concept of encounter.
Scholars such as Robert Segal have argued that projects that describe other’s experience
and label it as “religious” are always acts of interpretation and explanation because no
one else’s experience is ever directly accessible.83 Critical religious studies calls on
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religious studies generally to own its redescriptive task: without immediate access to the
same experience, the scholar will always be in a position to redescribe, to translate, or to
propose in other language, that which is properly another’s.84 Also, choosing which
redescriptive terms has consequences: relying on insider or “emic” categories may not
add any insight or may reinscribe assumptions. Critics say it is better to choose
redescriptive terms consciously, using theoretically driven etic categories, organizing and
analyzing and not relying on self-evidential or the emic terms of those whom the scholar
studies.85 Third, religious experience discourse, beginning with Rudolph Otto and
William James, emerges from the context of a humanist liberal paradigm and assumes a
self-possessed individual, missing the social altogether.
More stridently, McCutcheon identifies “experience” as the way humans signal
the end of signification and he treats this limit not as a condition of human finitude (and
thus, a potential for alterity as such), but as a rhetorical device. By this account,
“religious experience” is the signpost for upcoming claims about particularity and
universality. Whether ancient or modern, any discourse on experience moves shared
reality into a different register, defending the author’s interpretation as inviolable. In this
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register, religious experience is hot with normativity. The scholar, however, cools this
engine with her explanatory tools.
Thus, when religious experience is invoked, it is more than a defense of an
individual set of sensations, one experience among others. According to McCutcheon it
marks an occlusion of history by an appeal to nature, a claim to authority that refuses any
challenge.86 The scholar cannot unlock all of human life and culture with one
hermeneutical key, but the scholar can and should point out whatever she sees as offlimits, unique, or natural and to ask how it got that way and what sustains it, taking
nothing for granted. Critical scholars should approach “religious experience” discourses
ready to interpret them for their implicit “shoulds.”
Is there such a thing as experience at all for McCutcheon or is it only ever an
argument for authority? The short answer is “yes”—McCutcheon separates experience
from the claims to experience: experience itself, and not just its position as authority, are
approachable when treated as sociopolitical events. Experience is a “contestable byproduct of a stratified, diverse community, a by-product always in need of
contextualization when studied.”87 He continues on the same page to elaborate the
dimensions of experience: “Experience is the localized depository of complex and often
virtually transparent messages communicated through, and made possible by, social life.”
These “virtually transparent messages” are teachers and, in McCutcheon’s example of a
John Mellencamp lyric, those teachers could teach the fear of Jesus.88 Combined with
other sections from McCutcheon and other voices from social theory, these notes on

86

Ibid., 9.
Ibid.
88
Ibid.
87

53
experience begin to show how critical religious studies could expand its inquiry into the
more affective dimensions of the subject that I believe Roberts is searching for.
This extended foray into McCutcheon’s work shows that incongruity is not, in
fact, lost in critical religious studies scholarship. It is, instead, understood as a social
effect. Restated, there is something recognized as and called “religious experience,” but it
should be first examined for who it appeals to and why. There is still a subject in critical
religious studies, having the ups and downs of life, getting lost and found. But this is
measured through its social, political and economic extensions. The interiority that
Roberts appeals to is—and here I agree with McCutcheon—a mystification of social,
political and economic events that are no less traumatic for this reason, no less profound
or disorienting when understood as socially constructed. Instead of retreating into a
humanist camp of “self” whose disruptions are counted through psychoanalytic selfestrangement or the secularized theological terms of deconstructive thought, there are
means within critical theory still to appreciate the dynamic account of human life that
permits an objective account of social forces constructing subjects. Critical theory makes
room for the psychoanalytic and post-structuralist positions, too. Disagreeing with several
strains of critical religious studies does not mean leaving it behind. Its value is that it
actually has a chance at addressing and accounting for the massive material structures
that produce the experiences of incongruity that register on the level of a “self” in
Roberts’s system.
Marxist literary critic Raymond Williams introduces us to the subjective
encounter of the experiential, as a counter to Roberts’s structural account of subjective
experience. Thus, Williams helps to tease out undecidability and incongruity within a
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frame of social formation. This further demonstrates that social construction can be home
for “experience”—but casts it as social process. It is true that the social-in-process is
difficult to witness and thus, analysis of a social form such as a religious institution or a
common scriptural interpretation tends to treat it as fixed. As Williams observes, analysis
tends towards the past because of sedimentation where the material conflicts and uneven
disruption of resources can be more easily examined.89 The present recedes under the
conditions of social production, requiring special effort. One is searching
not only the temporal present, the realization of this and this instant, but
the specificity of present being, the inalienably physical, within which we
may indeed discern and acknowledge institutions, formation, position, but
not always as fixed products, defining products. And then if the social is
the fixed and explicit—the known relationships, institutions, formation,
positions—all that is present and moving, all that escapes or seems to
escape from the fixed and explicit and the known, is grasped and defined
as person: this, here, now, alive, active, ‘subjective.’90
The subject is experienced as this point of production, of its construction. If Roberts
resists social constructionism, the work of Williams explains: because of “all the knowns,
complexities, the experienced tensions, shifts, and uncertainties, the intricate forms of
unevenness and confusion, are against the terms of the reduction and soon, by extension,
against social analysis itself.”91 Roberts is in one sense correct—that first-person,
incongruous human life will not be reduced.
Rejecting social analysis and diving towards humanistic analysis, however, is not
the way through. Williams cautions that general concepts such as “human imagination”
or “human psyche” are foils for complex conditions and displace specific social
89
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conditions.92 Modern psychological or aesthetic descriptions, as well as appeals to
“experience, immediate feeling, and then, subjectivity and personality” are derivations of
what is more precisely instances of a social process. 93 Without sliding towards these
other modern discourses, Williams sticks to the social register and proposes that there are
“structures of feeling” that are prompted and conditions by relations that tremble and
pulse, carving up social reality into what could be felt as personal or important.94 While
the spark of interpersonal responsibility that Roberts wants for religious studies could be
threaded through these structures (what has come to be known as “Affect theory” or
“Affect studies”), I instead am interested in the habits of thought that in, rejecting social
analysis, push for psychology or aesthetics—to the exclusion of social analysis. I aim to
critique this move, wanting to stay with social analysis. Can there be a social account of
incongruity? Where and how are these discourses folded into each other, such that
scholars can speak across these lines?
One such way is to show how incongruity can be cast in social terms. In social
theory, there is language for life lived with incongruity, even in McCutcheon. There is a
density to human experience: “the busy and unruly flood of material and information that
comprises the phantasmagoria of historic existence.”95 But can the “encounters”
(Roberts’s term) with the “phantasmagoria” (McCutcheon’s term) become the object of
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study? If, as Roberts says, these encounters and experiences of incongruity are an
important aspect to religious content, my turn to critical religious studies is to use their
tools for interpreting incongruity at the site of so-called "experience." It does this,
acknowledging the reifying process of locative work but then re-animates this through the
dialectic.
I am concerned to show that scholars can theorize subjective encounters with or
experiences of what McCutcheon terms the ‘phantasmagoria’ without relinquishing the
social constructionism of social theory. It requires a dialectical method that grasps such
experiences as social events. It also, however, implies keeping track of a multiplicity of
forces and shifts in order to hold them up for analysis. Incongruity is a call for humility
and submission to this impossible task. Social constructionism responds with
Nietzschian-like affirmation of the human capacity for theorizing and ordering. Social
theory has other routes. Where social theory best responds to Roberts is where it shows
the heterogeneity of thought, its active procedures of composition, along with the
elisions. It also has within it ways of talking about the material risks of incongruity, the
affective gratifications of thought achieved and then again, the material consequences of
those gratifications. Leaving social theory for the humanities is not necessary to get to the
fullness of incongruity.
Phantasmagoria as Contradiction
I suggest that “contradiction” is better than incongruity to mark discontinuity.
This term captures both the subjective perspective of disjuncture and political economy.
In using the dialectics of Marx and Hegel, a scholar comes to focus on the movement and
patterns within the density of the world-human nexus. This is not to explain away the
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incongruous, as Roberts fears. Instead, it is to attend to the patterning behavior and
generalizing work of human thought—a remarkably consistent aspect across expressions
of humans within various social configurations.96 Viewing the human-world intersection
as a series of incongruous events, failed expectations, or overwhelming stimuli means we
view the conditions of existence as merely random, lacking any explanation or analysis,
and it thus negates human agency in generating our own conditions. While the world is,
indeed, dense with trajectories and effects that are too innumerable to calculate, humans
consistently look for patterns so as to order their lives and create stability for their
thriving. Marx’s work particularly accounts for both the moment of the incongruous and
the moment of patterning—both of which are necessary for an anthropological
perspective on religious activity.
Marx’s use of contradiction describes the conditions of existence more precisely
than what Roberts offers or what is available at first glance with the critical theorists of
religion. Instead of the incongruous or the dense phantasmagoria, Marx sets out to
examine the foundations of thought and existence from a dialectical movement quite
different from that of the Hegelian idea. Marx is persuaded by Hegel’s invitation to see
how the outside, opposite, or other of an idea is part of its identity, and thus, necessary to
include when tracking ideas and their movement into politics and philosophy. But Marx
names material conditions and political economy as the engine behind these movements.
Contradictions are not merely objects of thought desperate for resolution or “aufhebung”:
history moves by the gears of human creativity transforming unmarked landscapes into
96
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habital space and usable goods.97 The “resolutions” are through this fusion of human
effort and raw material. However, under capitalism, the contradictions of thought that
Hegel encounters are made of muscle, sweat and hunger. Marx never lets his readers
forget this.
Drawing on Marx’s analysis of changes in the modes of production, contradiction
emerges where there are ruptures within or between the conditions for existence and the
descriptions or terms of those conditions. Contradictions exist between modes of
production as different means of producing material goods and the social, economic, and
political structures that support and reinforce different means of producing and sustaining
human life. In the mode of production called capitalism, the smooth trajectory of
producing goods for one’s survival or pleasure is disrupted when the good becomes a
commodity and threatens the producer’s power to become existentially and economically
worthless in a marketplace beyond her reach. The worker is estranged from her own
productive capacity, unable to recoup her generative capacity for her own use.98 Marx
identifies this shift as a contradiction for a very specific reason: when the mismatch of the
forces of production are labeled a contradiction, political economy can be seen to infuse
thought itself. Where what is at first, with Hegel, the oppositions of thought systems are
in conflict at the level of ideas, with Marx, conflicts at the level of ideas are modeled on
97
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conflicts sustained within the ways goods and services are unevenly distributed between
their producers and consumers, leaving some with more and others with less.99
Contradiction, then, is both the unpleasant experience of cognitive dissonance of
incompatible premises and the disjoint of social organization that both sustains and
undermines society itself. With Marx in mind, there is no neat separation nor an elegant
parallelism of these two layers—no crude base/superstructural cause-effect mechanism—
but that they are only separable with the tools of analysis. Likewise, other common forms
or concepts developed to extend Marxian analysis emerge when looking at Marx through
his account of contradiction, especially those relevant to examination of religion and
society as developed by critical religious studies theorists. Ideology and history begin to
take shape through an understanding of Marx’s use of contradiction. Combined with an
appreciation of dialectics, contradiction shows itself as formulation of incongruity tuned
to materialism and political economy.
For Marx, every aspect of that production and path is possible through the
stratification of society and the assigned significance to persons, objects, and
temporalities. Thus, a good shorthand for the breadth of these contradictions that support
both uneven material distribution and ideological difference is to see them as social
contradictions. An example of a contradiction under capitalism is how the individual
human is paid individually, separated out for her effort and paid for it. Her wage is set up
as her means to survival, to procuring her means. She is independent. And yet, she is also
99
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completely dependent because of the divisions of labor and the complex systems that are
involved in food production and shelter. Her dependency on the complex system then,
further reinforces the necessity that she alone is responsible for earning enough to secure
her survival.100
Contradictions stall out thought and then activate it again, just as incongruity
does. However, calling encounters with otherness “contradiction” instead of
“incongruity” lends a set of vocabulary to the situation that shows how imbricated
humans are with the economic and political events around them. In contradiction, the
encounters and responses are crossed with all manner of relations that are too easily taken
for granted. If this means that humans and others are too easily “located” on a grid for
Roberts, it is only because the infinite number of social relations are too complex to even
think or write. As J.Z. Smith says, the map can never be the territory. The lived social
relations are too vast. Analysis steps in to give shorthand to the substance that are too
dense to serviceably share.
Historicization developed, in part, to manage the proliferation, to begin to track
the contradictions as they played out in social formations of subjects and groups.
Historicization locates. But it does so with the acknowledgment that these are relations
always in history, meaning always in process, always in between other moments that
played out in slightly other ways. In the next section, I show that historicization can be
produced in ways that lets the contradictions come to the fore. With experiences of
incongruity and encounter remapped as points of contradiction within history, the
immanent, fully social quality of subjective incongruity can be better perceived and can
engage ethically, as Roberts demands. What is needed to bridge the humanist and critical
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discourses is a subject aware of both its interests in theorizing and its limitations in doing
so. A critical scholarly subject will need to be able to account for her own social
formation within others as well as adequately describe the surplus—that
phantasmagoria—as something thoroughly historical that also escapes the grasp of the
theorizing human mind. If it can do this, it will be able to respond to the anxieties of the
loss of the surprising or normative aspects of religious studies. Or, to put it in terms of
Fong and Roberts, critical religious studies will need to show how messiness and
incongruity are historical social formations that cannot be reduced by them alone. I
propose that it is what lies at that point of the JZ Smith’s “incongruous”—in both its
categorical and existential senses – that one can begin to articulate what may be
missing—or one could say “desired”—in contemporary religious studies.
Historicizing "Religion"
Having considering the subject or the excess of experience/life as site of conflict
for critical methods, I want to consider how it is that these scholars have endeavored to
emphasize the constructed or artificial category of "religion" within modern scholarship.
By means of historicization and genealogies, critical scholars have retraced the
development of the field. Tracing its own investments and commitments, scholars have
sought a means to bring awareness to the process of scholarship itself, turning the lamp
on themselves. This method differs from an ideology critique strictly in that it talks about
the usefulness of these productions—of how categories are crucial to knowledge
production. This reflects an implicit normative claim that critical knowledge holds value,
at minimum to perpetuate scholarship itself, and at most, to affect some degree of
positive change. What historicization offers as a method is first, self-reflexivity about the
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procedures of scholarship, and second, a further means to lift off the naturalizing
language that sustains religion as the equivalent of "experience" itself. Historicizing
"religion" is another crucial method by which critical scholars have been blamed by
Roberts for excising the humanities from religious studies. I propose, however, that
critique can undo its own certainties, and that, as an artifact, can be examined as an
aesthetic production.
The category of religion is variously seen as “manufactured” (McCutcheon),
“constructed” (Dubuisson), and “invented,” (Masuzawa) by those of critical religious
studies. The crafting of religion as an artefact is noteworthy. In asking questions about
history of the category, one asks about the relation of ideas to materiality, with the
emphasis in critical religious studies to center on the materialist foundations of
knowledge and the institutions that legitimate, circulate, and reproduce knowledge and
their structures. By these accounts, the category also requires an ideological critique in
order to unmask its “modern,” “western,” or “Christian”—and even "Protestant"—
agendas. The value of such work is that it reveals the dynamics of interest, economics
and politics within the field, especially those built on Christian universalism,
Enlightenment reason, predatory capitalism, ethnographic method, and secularization. It
also shows the problematics of representation and thus, advances scholarship beyond the
power dynamics of modern scientific knowledge regimes. From these critiques, religion
emerges as a concept developed in situations of global contact and connects to concrete,
local concerns such as colonial systems of education, resource extraction, global trade,
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nation-state development, governance, law, and military actions.101 Analyzing the history
of “religion”—its formulations and applications in literature recognized by our field of
study—is a method and a theory that contribute to what I have been calling critical
religious studies.
These scholars do not begin with essence or with the claim that there is a sin qua
non that makes something “religious.” They do not query the origins of either
religiousness or even origins of the category of “religiousness” in order to seek its true
nature. Such historical methods are the target, not the practice, of the critical scholars.
Instead, the critical religious studies approach is to ask about how disparate elements
were collected and organized into what is now is recognized, misrecognized, or both—as
Wilfred Cantwell Smith brought forward as he began an insight into the category of
“religion.” 102 Historians of the category recount the contexts and biographies of
prominent scholars and pull at the intellectual movements that pressed out some terms
ahead of others.103 “Religion” as a category of analysis has emerged through historical
procedures and may be as a term, an artifice of the scholar’s workshop, but it can not be
erased. Indeed, critical religious studies depends on “religion” to assert itself as distinct
from the “political,” and so becomes a point of clarification for critical religious theory
101
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that sees religion as a sub-category of politics that functions socially in remarkable
ways.104 Using the category “religion” as an occasion to analyze history and society is
fruitful for interpreting the historical conditions of religious thought, the historical
conditions of religious studies as a discipline, and also, more substantially, the historical
conditions that promote different kinds of thinking and sees thinking and categories as
differentiated across times and place—thus self-reflective of a historical mode of modern
thought.
With these histories in mind, some propose alternative terms to religion, such as
“cosmographic formation” or a dispersion of religion into more specific cultural terms so
as to unhook the field from its history of colonialism, Christian imperialism, and
capitalist investments.105 From this urgency to discard the category "religion" in favor of
a more deeply-treated history, these voices within critical religious studies call out the
constructedness of categories, the violence committed in the use of category formation,
and the options available for scholarship in the midst of these problematic histories.
Roberts wants scholars of the field to proceed with caution and ask about the
“locative” effects of critical approaches. I can appreciate Roberts’s concern about too
thoroughly placing, labeling, and suspecting scholars for their hegemonic formations,
however, as I have argued, there are methods to use that would keep the uncertainty of
any analytic project within view. Without placing Roberts next to each of these projects, I
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step back to consider if histories generally are too conclusive, too occupied with
contextualization and situation. Are there examples of historical critical scholarship
which undo the confidence game that Roberts accuses social constructionist methods of
playing? How could such a history involve the subjective, experiential register of
uncertainty for both the scholar and religious person alike?
As mentioned above, a theory of social formation would make this possible if
widely and rigorously applied or if in part self-reflectively engaged by the author and
reader alike. To some degree, all scholars are ever within a stream of history that they
seek to examine, like embedded journalists in a conflict being waged in their name. But
this only further implies that one could extend this project ad infinitum. Without some
nuance of history and method, social formation turns to reification, losing out on the
existential conditions of contradiction that play up and dominate much of what
constitutes subjectivity.
History, as a theory and a method, offers up several options for troubling the toocertain means that Roberts implies. Genealogical methods and psychoanalysis have
broadly introduced into the field of religious studies a less locatable history. These
methods reproduce the friction of objective and subjective perspectives in history for
their readers. Roberts uses psychoanalytic frames for his own investigations to consider
how uncertainty is at play or involved in much of what counts as human thought.
However, this does not help at all for considering social formations, political
arrangements, and economic forces as constitutive of the subject. Genealogical methods
can preserve religion as a distinctive occasion of analysis. Through the situational work
of genealogy, the focus turns to the effects of analytic frames. Through genealogy, the
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scholar shifts from asking about how to let in or accommodate the strange or incongruous
to investigating the problematics of difference and otherness generally.
As anthropologist and genealogist Talal Asad observes, general “religion”
fractures when compared to particular religions, even proximate Christian ones like
medieval Christianity and Islam. In his explicit uses of Foucault, Asad marks how the
term “religion” has been applied across different material relations and other times in
which subjects were formed by different logics than those of modern colonial conditions.
While Asad has drawn criticism for his textualist methods that lean away from the more
tentative, particular, and immanent work of sorting reminiscent of field ethnography,
Asad tackles the power/knowledge grids that fund and instigate such projects.106 His
starting premise does not turn inquiry simply into a witch-hunt of colonial offenses, as
simply ideology critique might produce, but inspires scholars to analyze what is taken for
granted, especially the operative systems, and to see through to their constructed nature.
Asad applies this to his investigations of secularism and revises the linear narrative of
progressive secularization. Where some see the decline of religiousness and the rise of
Enlightenment values, Asad sees the shift toward the universalized nation-state,
developed across terrains where scholars mixed with merchants and bureaucrats. Asad
tends to say that different practices and sensibilities and habits are roped under "religion"
at different times and places, which doesn’t (for him) negate the term so much as
mandate a historical investigation of its "grammar."107 In his genealogy of the secular,
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Asad demonstrates that ‘religion’ is not to be held as secular’s opposite but that secular
can be seen to co-constitute religion—and religion with diverse interests and contents.108
A second example comes from Masuzawa’s history of the field of religious
studies traces how Europeans, in seeking unity for the diversity of colonial and economic
contexts, “invented” the category of “world religions.”109 This is the book that Orsi called
an “anti-history” in his review but, as I argued earlier, is an account of the rules and
principles of discourse and epistemology in the nineteenth century. Masuzawa shows
how universalism was first Christian universalism, translated through a universal
religious impulse, and provided a means for explaining diversity that still secured
Christian preeminence.110 This history which most notably plays itself out in the
sympathetic attitude these nineteenth-century comparativists extends into present-day
discourses of world religions and pluralism—a history that Masuzawa and the other
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critical religious studies scholars see as problematic. While Orsi criticized this text as
anti-historical, I see in it how genealogical methods set up the terms of strangeness and
“religious others.” Orsi and Roberts want these others to trouble or unsettle the locative
scholar. I see, instead, that they reimagine the positions of "scholar" and "other" straight
out of the gate. Instead of the “play of ordinary and extraordinary” where the religion
scholar and religious person share the unstable ground of wanting to explain but are
unable to do so consistently or with utter confidence,111 history as genealogy remarks on
how the extraordinary is teased apart from ordinariness as a procedure of history and
done so to various effects.
Historicized Desire: Origin as a Case of Ambivalence
In heeding the call to historicize, Masuzawa adds new dimensions to
historiography in critical religious studies when she takes up psychoanalysis as a critical
discourse available for social theory. The search for the/an origin of religion has been a
target for religious studies across the twentieth century, but while religious studies may
have outgrown its quest for the origins of religiousness, it still tells narratives of origins
such as creation myths and in etymologies. Masuzawa reads these parallel narratives
against the contemporaneous and imbricated discourse of psychoanalysis and finds
religious studies saturated with a desire for origins. Psychoanalytic allusions to a return of
the repressed permits Masuzawa to thread history with unconscious activity. Ambiguity
comes center stage. Unlike Roberts, however, she does not attempt a direct address of the
uncertainty of incongruity. Instead she watches as scholars use origin to modulate their
relationship to what cannot be determined. Where origin either can refer to a plenum or a
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nothingness, it settles as an “object of intense desire” because of its “hyper-cathected”
status, compensating for what is fundamentally unknown and unknowable.
It is understandable—one might say that it is structurally inevitable—that
origin, qua that which is at once everything and nothing, should be an
object of intense desire. At the same time, it follows with equal certainty
and necessity that such an hyper-cathected object should be subject to
strenuous prohibition. For, that which is most acutely and singularly
desired is also that which must be most stringently and energetically
denied. In short, the fundamental contradiction endemic to the concept
(qua everything and nothing), as well as this logical double-bind of desire
and prohibition that defines and determines its function, together make an
impossible object-idea out of ‘origin.’ This constitutional difficulty, it
appears, haunts every deliberation on the problem of origin, openly or
surreptitiously.”112
The “impossibility” of understanding origin, according to Masuzawa, seems at first an
overstatement. I see, however, this impossibility as a manner of speaking towards the
affective and libidinal conditions that surround contradiction. Origin questions stimulate
the anxiety—and thrill—of limit conditions, which Masuzawa signals with
psychoanalytic terms. She identifies the limit-issue of any inquiry into origin and calls
out that limit conditions fold over onto the limits of representational logic. From a
modern worldview, origin questions are speculative and are ultimately unanswerable. Yet
humans ask them anyway. Origins also propose the strange thought that answers to the
present are actually in the past. Again, another contradiction. With her example of origin,
Masuzawa introduces how objects of study attract attention because of the way words
and concepts cover over obstacles and gaps in thinking and in experience.
Masuzawa’s example of origin shows how modern knowledge production steps
into new problems as it seeks to solve other ones. In this case, the nineteenth-century
modern scientific approach and emerging knowledge-field of biology and evolution
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piqued interest beyond classification to explanation. This then led to a shift, through such
scholars as Eliade, to turn the tables of inquiry to remind scholars of the limits of
knowledge, generating a new, impeachable category labeled the “sacred.” Through
Masuzawa, religious studies scholarship shows how new territories and connections are
generated, layering new foundations on old structures of thought while applying new
technologies to erect more elaborate and nuanced perspective. Throughout, origin is not
wiped away or replaced but put on hold. Through Masuzawa’s account, the history of the
field is creased and glued, held together by the relationship of its objects, theories and
methods. Her project refers back to its procedures of historical method as it tells a
history, , denying while it speaks of denial, making contradictions as it undoes and
remaps other contradictions.
As a contributor to critical religious studies, Masuzawa historicizes origin and
also elaborates on the location of contradiction, not mere incongruity, within the field. In
her dialectical approach, she does not fall into the locativism that Roberts charges,
pulling out from within her discussion how scholarship trembles with ambivalence even
as it asserts. Her discursive analysis of the discipline’s archive leaves within it the
hesitations and decisions of its contributors. Where a more social-scientific reading
would treat a search for origins as an ideological claim about false unity for the purpose
of authority or simply as bad metaphysics, Masuzawa reads tension between renunciation
and gratification. But this is not only a psychological study: her investigations play out
across the backgrounds of colonial outposts and institutional relations. Thus, in moving
between political economy, cultural theory, and psychoanalysis, Masuzawa unfolds the
conditions for intellectual inquiry for Euro-Americans in late modernity. Her method
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produces an analysis of the material conditions of thought, and thus, situates the study of
religion as not only constructing objects for study but as an effect of specific conditions,
in this case, late modernity’s anxieties of verification and authenticity in industrial
capitalism.
Masuzawa positions desire as a major term for critical religious studies. How does
this square with other scholars? Subjective interests have been the primary term for
thinking about desire within critical religious studies. Craig Martin, in his introduction to
the critical study of religion, makes the clear distinction that socially-given identities
precipitate interests, and that, distinct from desires which are short-term, interests are
desires extended in time and space where those with more social capital are in positions
to satisfy more of their social interests. As he explains, “By ‘desire’ we simply refer to
the desires (in the colloquial sense) that subjects have—or, more precisely, are socialized
to have—and which they express both explicitly (through what they say) and implicitly
(through their behavior).” 113 Thus, desire is something that happens through socialization
and that one represses or maximizes to serve interests over time. One may desire to
comply with the social code in order to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the society, but one
desires this because it is in one’s interest—increase in social capital—to do so. Or it may
be in one’s interests to resist dominant norms to gain social capital in non-dominant
groups (one can think here of the increased acceptance of tattoos in society.) From here,
Martin moves to show that the subject needs to be viewed as one who is rewarded
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through the social and that scholars should be suspicious of these reward structures, but
also of who is rewarded.114
I agree with Martin that desires and interests can and should be analyzed for the
ways that each legitimate subject positions differentially and that these are scripted
through procedures of authorization that support hegemony. He pulls back to show that,
following Lincoln, the desires that one has are those put in place by the social and that
these should be seen as externally, socially directed—and that these make subjects desire
what is desired for them by others with more capital.115 Martin’s distinction of interests
as long-term and desires as short-term helpfully addresses the lived, historical condition
of decision-making. What discourages me from this interpretation of the subject under
social conditions is that first, interest-fulfillment is a complex, intensive process that
occupies considerable material, temporal, social, and affective resources and produces
substantial effects. These procedures, because of their complex operations and
considerable role in social life, are given little space in critical religious studies literature.
Second, as Martin says, these operations disproportionately constrain those of lower
social status.116 Critical religious studies theory would benefit from more attention to
unpacking the range of authorizing procedures, as Martin advocates, but needs also to
theorize desires as attachments that may or may not follow the logics of authorization.
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Scholarship in critical religious studies thus proposes this subjective level of
social analysis but rarely follows through with its prescriptions. By distinguishing one’s
research as distinctly critical or analytic and not religious, or by insisting on the scientific
or category-directed work of the scholar as distinct from religious others, scholars excuse
themselves from being objects of their own analytic tools. It is not impossible to imagine
such a critical study, but it is something that takes time—and interest?117 The gaze is
consistently turned outwards, or more precisely, constructs an outside through the motion
of separation of articulating the differences. Thus, scholarship is seen to have legitimate
legitimating practices while other forms are less legitimate, illegitimate, irrational, or just
controlling.118 As J.Z. Smith’s approach demonstrates, critical religious studies
scholarship does not need to set itself up as divisive in order to be incisive.
Attention to the social field need not dismiss the subject’s perspective within it, as
this chapter has argued. But neither does it depend on a concept of a liberal individual.
Desire, as I propose, bypasses the actor-agent dimensions implied by interests. It also
supports subject positions which are less able to maximize their interests. It could do the
theoretical work that is demanded of critical religious studies and support research into
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particular conditions—an approach advised but hard to follow through on.119 Desire can
be cast as a social construction, not as a private matter, and when defined through
political economy, can become a figure for which to further explore what motivates both
religion and scholarship in religion.
II. Desires as Subjective Social Formations, the Case for Utopia
This chapter has honed in on how to grasp and study the subjective perspective
within the layers of human thought and action, seeking a way to demonstrate that the
incongruity that Roberts sees as vital to an ethical life and responsible scholarship should
be viewed as created out of social life and the interactions of creative, productive forces
that are difficult to track, always interrupted by other productive forces. Psychoanalysis is
one way to figure these interruptions. Seeing it as a discourse rising out of the late
nineteenth century as a response to bourgeois European subject formation,
psychoanalysis becomes a means of redescription, alongside social theory, for the
ruptures or discontinuities of reason that have been coded as religious. Blending it with
historical analysis can be appropriate when considering subjective experience within the
range of modernity and capitalism—both contexts for the construction of religious
studies. I will consider more about the uses of psychoanalytic terms in chapters two and
three as they relate to material culture and subject formation. In chapter four, I will
extend Masuzawa’s query into the place of origin studies in religion and ask if the hunt
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into the past as the plenum or obscured source has a correlate in another distinctly
modern formation: Utopia.
As mentioned above, J.Z. Smith describes utopia as simply a “no place” to oppose
the locative impulse. He later modifies this formulation and shortly abandons the term for
incongruity and then, for difference.120 But in employing these two terms, Smith calls out
how both religion and religious studies are projects of orientation AND disorientation.
J.Z. Smith’s work shows how historians inherit and then revise or create the categories
that they use. This attention to categories has had an important role in critical religious
studies and also bears on how Utopia can become a conceptual tool for thinking about
religious studies as a modern category. This somewhat crude formulation for interpreting
religious phenomena is not striking for how it uses Utopia as much as it is for how Smith
sees interpretation, redescription, and categorization as necessary yet delicate tasks of
religious studies. As mentioned above, I am distinctly interested in the contingences of
categories, about how they are chosen and deployed. I depart starkly from Smith’s “strict
sense” of Utopia as “no place,” and instead, situate it within modernity as a term related
to a specific genre of literature that then has been expanded and taken shape over the
centuries since coined by Thomas More in 1516.
I take two ideas from Smith’s use of utopian here: first is the insistence of the
contingency for all categories, a theme that is more thoroughly unpacked in the final
essay of the volume by the same name, “Map is not Territory.” This is a guiding theme
for my own research and connects me to many important concerns raised through critical
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religious studies. Second is his caution about the literalness of the word utopia and how
this troubles the creation of the category itself on closer inspection. My dissertation takes
seriously this choice of “Utopia” as a category for religion and embraces Smith’s caution
that it holds multiple meanings and thus, needs careful definition.121 I will go on to argue
that Utopia is best understood as a uniquely western modern formation similar to yet
different from the modern formation of religion. Both can be seen as human social
categories responding to the political economic conditions known as modernity. This
dissertation argues that Utopian desire not only describes modern forms of religiousness
but also can be used to redescribe—to analyze and leaven understanding of—the
motivations within the modern academic inquiry of religion.
Literary critic Fredric Jameson capitalizes “Utopia” to signal this relationship to
modernity. I follow this convention. Utopia, as a literary genre, has several formal
elements that make it distinct: its image of the ideal commonwealth, of a harmonious
society, often removed or separated from a contrasting society that supplies characters to
visit and explore this enclave both similar and different itself. For Jameson, these literary
products signal a moment in cultural history coming to terms with the political and
economic conditions of exploration and the transitions within England and European
social life marked by transitions of trade, social organization, political institutions—all
signals of the shift to a capitalist mode of production.122 These productive contradictions
are figured as the juxtaposition of the Utopian society and the contrasting society of the
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text and then repeated by the contradiction within the name itself—Utopia as that which
is both the no-place (U-topia) and the good place (Eu-topia). Utopia is well-known to
trigger ambivalence as it paints a picture of a society that is enjoyed by its residents but
under suspicion by its visitors.
Constance Furey turns to the form of Utopia to investigate potentials for
practicing history with a critical frame, sensitive to the kind of locativism that Roberts
sees with some methods. Furey responds in her essay to Roberts, Orsi and Nancy
Levene—religionists seeking alternative historiography that responds to and includes
excess. In an effort to loosen historicism from its authoritarian posture, she follows the
turn from philosophies of history to situated histories of context, noting the influence of
Foucault and Joan Scott and an implied motivating logic that “telling a different story
about the past will somehow expand our options today” (mirroring a move in culture to
re-narrate the past i.e. Truth and Reconciliation Committee).123 Mindful of Derrida’s
insight that the past haunts the present and compels the retelling as a part of mourning,
Furey seeks a way into a transformative retelling, critical of the present, sensitive to the
strange, and productive of new conditions. For this, Furey turns to Thomas More’s
Utopia and Fredric Jameson’s dual commitments to utopia and historical materialism to
“illuminate the theoretical dilemmas involved in critiquing history.”124
What she constructs in this evocative essay is a method of doing “Utopian
history.” More’s Utopia is a satire, mixing the familiar and fantastical with no clear
signal as to which is which. This “dialectic of fact and fiction produces a distinctive kind
of realism that establishes a place for ideas that stand apart from society without claiming
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transcendence.” While Utopias are fiction, she sees that history, too, is made: “it is not an
object to discover but a learning process, the ongoing work of self-critique.”125. Furey
argues that when scholars regard history as a creative task like writing utopian fiction, we
can lift out how the unusual mixes with prevailing norms and this in turn stimulates the
immanent possibilities within present. She avows that using utopia might at first seem
“perverse,” with its association with stasis and an imperialism of an old philosophy of
history, where progress and teleology shunt difference. However, she holds out that the
fusion of criticism and construction, literalness and fantasy is a model for how history is
written and “lays bare what we have invested in history and does so in a way that is
formally analogous to history itself.”126
Furey roots her appreciation for the critical force of the Utopian literary form and
the unchartered potentials of history in Fredric Jameson’s work. Her essay weaves his
complex thinking expertly for her purposes of sketching a potent concept. By combining
her summary with additional explication, I want to begin to show how Jameson’s method
of interpreting cultural forms can lend nuance and texture to the aims of critical religious
studies and advance a dialectical engagement with the problematic of social and
subjective theories for religious studies.
The Utopian satire delivers the contradictions of History for readers as hyperbole:
in More’s Utopia, gold is worthless, monogamy is rare, and the rational treatments for
thieves were proposed by a fool. While not all Utopian narratives are so blatantly
satirical, the genre is recognized for its way of re-presenting the status quo via its
distorted or reformulated other. In working out the details for a sustainable social
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structure built on revised conventions, the Utopian genre hypostasizes a different status
quo, freezing the world and ending History’s contradictions. Furey sees in More’s work a
resistance to conclusions. In its structure, Utopia makes it impossible to take its
alternative society as a blueprint. The juxtapositions are too tightly woven.
Just as Utopias are restricted in what kinds of fantasies they can present due to the
ability of the reader to recognize society as still functional, as still inhabitable, writing
and revisiting history—historiography—runs up against what has happened, the archive
as it has been preserved. However, in its retelling by scholars, Furey suggests that history
be considered for the way it limits and defines what can be said, but also is opened up
again for its counternarratives for the present. When historians write about the past, they
would do well to consider at least two dimensions of the Utopian form: first, how they
are performing an immanent critique of the present, and second, how in juxtaposing the
present with the past, the familiar and the strange, one is also involved with a resolution
of the contradictions of capitalism. Furey turns to Jameson for this guidance on what it
means to include Utopia in doing historical work: that there should be a
"‘renewal of Utopian thinking, of creative speculation as to the place of
the subject at the other end of historical time, in a social order that has put
behind it class organization, commodity production and the market,
alienated labor, and the implacable determinism of a historical logical [sic]
beyond the control of humanity.'”127
Utopian history is twofold: it is immanent critique but also “creative speculation.” What
Utopia produces then, at its best, is what history, too should offer: an endurance for
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indeterminancy, with an endless dialectical movement of “immanent critique infused
with hope.”128
As I have shown, Furey’s “utopian history” is a lively concept that gives an
introduction to the wealth and possibilities within Utopia and Fredric Jameson’s thinking.
Jameson’s work spans six decades and is worth more attention within religious studies as
it provides a way of theorizing religious tropes as part of culture from within a cultural
studies/material culture method. It contributes by demonstrating ideology critique as a
immanent, self-critical practice that does not deny the appeal and constructive force of
culture on its critics. Jameson’s method of historicizing not only narratives or characters
but also the form that culture takes turns interpretation towards the constitution of
thought, again inviting the critic into her own historical moment, creating a type of
“metacriticism” for thinking the tools of scholarship as well as their objects, as critical
religious studies does. Furey’s essay invites further query into Jameson’s formal method
and specifically, the figure of Utopia within modern literature.
As Furey demonstrates, Utopia is a fascinating and relevant form that invites
reflection on the production of modern, Anglo-European knowledge and terms of
verification. This dissertation extends this conversation with Jameson for religious
studies and contributes in several ways. Utopia and religion have thus been conceived of
as versions of one or the other. My project proposes that instead of reading Utopias as
religious or religions as Utopian, I offer how their mutual engagement with concepts such
as human nature, idealization, transcendence and society can be remapped as navigating
the limits of representation. I am especially interested in Jameson's focus on aesthetic
forms that reflect moments of modernity. The Utopian literary form has a particular role
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for Jameson in that it figures the contradictions within capitalism. Where Furey treats
Utopia as a model for specifically historical projects, I want to say that Utopia is also a
frame for the scholarly category of religion. Developed within modern Anglo-European
intellectual history, both the Utopian literary form and the scholarly object “religion” are
responses to political, economic and social histories of global exploration, colonization,
and industrialization. In some ways, this dissertation performs Furey's account of the
scholar in its “willingness to take the energy of [my] desire for novelty and put it to work
in utopian history.”129 Perhaps literally here as I write a utopian history of my own.
From here, one can begin to see how the strange or incongruous that Roberts and
Orsi promote as necessary to religion overlap with seemingly secular forms such as
Utopia. As a representation of good but impossible social arrangements, Utopia has been
variously embraced and rejected over the last 500 years. Roberts’s search for an analysis
of religious phenomena that keeps theory open to the life of the particular can be
transposed onto the secular image of Utopia that resists easy location.130 The
particularity, however, is not in the unknowable about another as ethnographic subject
specifically or social formation generally, but in the Utopian literary text that attempts but
never completes the account of a total society. The contradictions of the social world may
at first seem resolved in the Utopian social order that removes various anxieties from
consideration but these are never absolutely managed in the questions that linger for both
Utopia’s visitors and its readers.
129

Ibid.
"In other words, 'knowledge' in the humanities is always disturbed by the reverberations of the
particular, which can never be fully subsumed by the concept or the explanation." My project, as I have
been arguing, sees this relation of a generalizable particularity as another kind of logical inconsistency that
religious studies coalesces around, problematizing this in its theories. In my project, I take this
generalizable perspective of particularity and look at how Utopia can help scholars notice these kinds of
contradictions and to question how they might relate to material relations. Roberts, Encountering Religion,,
115.
130

82
The lingering questions, such as the contradiction of the peaceful yet troubling
society, the ambivalence—these are signals of what I will develop as part of the desire for
Utopia—a subjectively experienced, thoroughly social encounter with contradiction,
referenced through a historical deposit that can be explored but never absolutely
captured. The incongruous that is central to Roberts’s reanimated, responsive religious
studies is first, not exclusive to only the religious imaginary but I agree with Roberts that
it is an important aspect of religious theory and method. As I have drawn out, incongruity
can be actively engaged by critical religious studies through appeals to social theory
where it provides access to various states of social formations, ones more proximate to
subjectivity than what some forms of social contradiction provide. Where ideology
critique is leavened with dialectical method and cognizance of the temporalities of
society-in-process, it functions both to raise both suspicion about formations and to incite
curiosity about their constitution. The creative, productive aspects of social forms reengage the humanism that excites Roberts without collapsing the affective into aesthetic
or psychological terms. Masuzawa’s use of psychoanalysis as a historical discourse draws
out how the conflicts of category formation are lived tensions that register as satisfactions
and frustrations.
While Masuzawa's work traces origin across the modern discourse of religious
studies, my own asks about the desires for Utopia within the modern study of religion: in
what ways does the figure of Utopia consolidate and redistribute the longing to resolve
social contradictions? How does Utopia, signaling the ambivalent aspects of all fantasy,
simultaneously resist and perform representation of social totality? This interest in
Utopia—what I want to call a desire for Utopia—emerges from the contradictions of
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political economy evident as cognitive uncertainty or frustration in the face of material
uncertainty and frustration. Utopias—as representations of ideal social orders—attempt to
resolve these frustrations but only do so in part, and always in a larger field of vision of
comparison with surrounding still-contradictory social reality.
Whereas Roberts wishes to propose that the religion scholar submit to the ongoing
undoing of encounter, I propose that the modern study of religion needs to see its
investments in a larger movement of Utopian desire. As I articulated in my introduction,
modern religious studies has been marked by a problematic of representation—a conflict
of how to form categories that are adequately descriptive and redescriptive of “religious”
phenomena, thereby adequatly signaling alterity (or difference) that always resides both
in the object of religion but also in the theory and methods of its scholars. My own
contribution to this conversation is to speculate that these questions of representation,
addressed through the study of religion, can also be articulated as desires for Utopia. By
this, I mean that what structures inquiry and what funds the affective, libidinal
investments of contemporary religious studies can be recognized as Utopian in the way
that they are pulled by longings for collectivities and schematics of totality. A concept of
Utopian desire speaks to the ambitions of these projects but also their ultimate failure.
Total representation is impossible, and the practice of collectivity is fraught and often
disappointing. Utopian desire sustains the ambivalence that both desire and Utopia signal.
Utopian desires are specific to social formations within capitalist modes of
production and disruption that are encouraged by Enlightenment knowledge productions
of reason and abstraction. I explore the figure of Utopia in the following chapters, tracing
its history and home as a literary form. I argue that Utopian literature formalizes the
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social contradictions of capitalism and intersects with other cultural forms that are more
readily referenced as “religious.” As I tease out how Utopia is recognizable from its
literary instances in modernity and how the literature is a cultural response to social
conditions, I advance my thesis that the overlap of religious topics and Utopia is due
more to the conditions and contexts of modern knowledge production broadly, since both
Utopia and religious studies are engaged in a problematics of representation, albeit
through different means. Thus, the concept of Utopian desire is my attempt to address the
problematics of representation of the study of religion by different means. The next step
in this process is to say more about Utopia.
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Chapter Two
Representing Utopia, Representing Desire: Utopia Theory and
Method Reconsidered
Religion scholars are not the only ones laboring under the incommensurability of
representing the subject's experience of her own existence and the society as a structuring
force of that experience. This chapter turns to Utopia Studies as a peculiar site of this
problematic as it repeats the dilemma of representing the two layers—self-and social—in
its object of study: for what does Utopia signify except a society of untroubled selves,
reconciled to the structures that have constructed them? Like Russian nesting dolls, a
theory of Utopia represents the representation of an irresolvable contradiction, resolving
in theory what has been "resolved" in aesthetic form. In this chapter, I show how theories
of Utopia tip into this tautological dilemma. By rereading the theories of Utopia critically
and comparing them to those of historians of the Utopian form, I show how they operate
as a kind of Utopian form themselves, performing the very fantasy they endeavor to
define. They are thus another iteration of the desire that Utopia represents—the end of
social contradictions, where self is fulfilled in its social life. Utopia is most precisely
understood as a form within modernity that represents not just a general "better way of
living" but an interstitial aesthetic figure used to fantasize a bridge between our
immersed, existentially-limned, individual selves in the social structure and theories
about how best to represent that relation. Theories of Utopia are thus instances of Utopia,
and intellectual projects confronted with tensions between representations of the self and
social—like critical religious studies— can be recognized as Utopian attempts to form
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such a bridge in themselves, even as they study the Utopian ideals of other social
structures..
Rather than being a generic, timeless fantasy of a simply better world, Utopia as
we know it has a strong relationship to the genre of fiction that reflects the conditions
particular to the political-economic-social transitions and conflicts of the North Atlantic,
Anglo-America-European setting—a distinction I regard as necessary to understand as a
category for analysis. I capitalize Utopia to signal this association with Western
modernity, and my analysis pivots on this distinction. Heretofore, theorists in the field of
Utopian Studies have depended too heavily on bland universals or generalizations, using
a lower-case "utopia" and defined variously as social dreaming, an anticipation of the
future, or a desire for a better way of being. Theirs is a busy, maybe too busy project,
attempting to bring coherence to the multiple contents and methods that proliferate
around the enigmatic and appealing occasions of utopias, utopianism, or utopian ideas
and projects. These generalizing theories of an ahistorical utopianism have encountered a
surprising lack of critical resistance and they can be critiqued for the way they erase nonWestern particularity or avoid much extra theorizing about the structures of fantasy.
Instead of immediately dismissing them, however, I want to use utopian theories as
evidence of a modern, western Utopian form.
I contend that utopian theories are a kind of Utopian form because they “resolve”
the plurality of forms, contents and function with a single phrase or formula. This is not
in anyway unusual for theory to do, and in fact, can be productive. However, in doing this
with Utopia, this approach privileges ideas over their expressions in material reality.
Utopia has the potential to stumble over its own shadow as it endeavors to represent
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society for the sake of its own theoretical understanding of society. A theory of Utopia,
therefore, develops as an abstraction of the abstraction—an abstract representation of an
abstract totality. I find this recursive feature of Utopia crucial for understanding how it
has been and can be used, as both a theoretical approach and a subsequent form, within
political and social theory.
This chapter on how Utopia Studies directs attention to Utopia as an aesthetic
figure—either through its faults or through its transitions in modern history—supports
my larger project of seeking ways to discuss the impasse of self and social that confronts
critical religious studies. It presents Utopia Studies as another instance of this dilemma
and proposes that Utopia is a figure found within modern western theoretical projects.
My argument is that Utopia is a consistent presence in the modern study of religion,
found throughout the forms that—falsely but fruitfully— represent social life as a totality
and resolve social contradictions through social collectivity. But because religious studies
doesn't recognize these forms as Utopian, treating them as pragmatic theoretical
applications instead of as instantiations of a valuable fantasy, we miss a crucial
opportunity for self-reflection and growth. To put it in different words: only by
understanding the nature of our favorite abstractions will we be best able to put those
abstractions to work for us.
Outline
Reading utopian theory generatively involves layers of critique and retrieval.
While I would argue these are imbricated processes, for the purposes of explication, I
present Part One as critique and Part two as retrieval. Part One takes up three widely-used
theories and shows how their appeals to human desire and fantasy mechanisms belie
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general habits of universalization endemic to Western theory. I argue, through familiar
critical routes, that universal approaches such as those proposed by Lyman Tower
Sargent and Ernst Bloch conflict too much with the critiques raised in Chapter One.
However, instead of using critique to dismiss them, I reinterpret them as symptomatic
residues of the "utopianism" they attempt to describe. I assert that these universal claims
are not conclusions but evidence of their own Utopian fantasy, resolving through theory
an anxiety about, or at least the perfusion of difference. I propose that the popularity and
use of these theories of a generalized utopia emerge out of this tautological satisfaction
that a Utopian theory provides: If humans desire societies where dissatisfactions are
resolved and conditions of lack fulfilled, then a close second to this fundamental desire
will be a representation of those resolutions and fulfillments, be it a fictional narrative, a
proposed social order, or a theory—itself an abstraction. I show how recursivity of theory
tightens when the definition of Utopia emphasizes desire, as in the case of Ruth Levitas's
work. Desire, I contend, contains its own proposal and deferral of satisfaction. To use
desire to define utopianism, in short, satisfies the more specific, western intellectual
Utopian desire by ending the contradiction of multiple definitions, in that competing uses
resolve into a neat yet endlessly deferring "desire." I see this conflict as, again,
symptomatic of a larger, more pervasive dynamic of representation and the problematic
of delivering an account of social totality as it constructs subjects and the subject's
perspective from within and lived as existence. I analyze this problematic by tracking
how the contradictions that inhere in these conceptual projects should be interpreted as
occasions for analyzing Utopia for its contradictory effects.
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In Part Two, I perform a retrieval of Utopia's contradictions by tracking back
through the historians and political and social theorists subsumed by the "utopian"
theorists in Part One. I revisit the history of the Utopian literary form and its transposition
into political and social theory. Here, Utopia capitalized signals its relationship to the
island in More's titular text. By revisiting the transition of Utopia from literary form to
abstraction for social change, I chart how Utopia becomes part of an emergent field of
social theory, taking on parts of political theory's normative edge. As Utopia is taken up
by social and political theorists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Utopia acquires
the freight of abstraction and becomes mobilized by social theory to counter ideology and
frame questions about the means of social change. I recover tensions about how social
theory hypostasizes and loses the movements and particularity of the subjects it
endeavors to describe and contend that the theorization of Utopia as "impulse,"
"dreaming," and "desire" signals how theory is invested with fantasies of closure and how
claims of universality is a stand-in for the Utopian desire for collectivity.
By reading Utopian theory through its own history, I uncover how the Utopian
theory is, in part, constructed from the fragments and failures of representation within
modernity, folding within itself its own concerns with reification. For this reason and
others, as I will show, Utopia should be treated as an aesthetic form or a figure. Such a
project shows how theory as a genre performs a type of Utopian closure, creating
shortcuts for the sake of explanation that, when put into use as abstractions, can become
reified and lose the particularities of the social life that the abstractions were created to
describe. The way out is by considering Utopia not as function but as form. Attending to
the Utopian literary form switches attention from social abstraction and social or political
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theory to commodity production and reception. As I will clarify in my last section,
commodity production and reception more accurately portrays what constitutes Utopian
desire than what is proposed through utopian theory.
I. Utopian Theory: Universalization
Scholars have responded to the overdetermination of Utopia across different
cultural sites with a variety of methods. The most common are the historical, aesthetic,
and philosophical, but within each of these is a kernel of theory, attempting to isolate a
Utopian essence, origin, or function. Considering the breadth of disciplines that publish
in the Utopian Studies journal—"American studies, architecture, the arts, classics,
cultural studies, economics, engineering, environmental studies, gender studies, history,
languages and literatures, philosophy, political science, psychology, sociology and urban
planning"—it is not surprising that there is a need for some robust theory to sustain these
multiple projects. (It is also interesting to note that authors from "religion" are not
significantly represented enough to warrant a mention on their website).131 In order to
manage the diversity of utopian forms, contents, times, places, and expressions, some
scholars of Utopia give it a broad definition and collect a multitude of examples beneath
it. Advancing a generalized understanding of human nature, these scholars go on to
compare cultural objects for their Utopian qualities across eras and places, labeling
Biblical, classical, and non-western cultural elements for their utopianism.
In this first half of this chapter, I critique the problematic tendency of these
approaches to universalize, a natural impulse of anticipation or desire for a better way of
living. First, I present two of these definitions on their own terms. Then, I track through
131
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critiques of universality from the methods of critical religious studies, reading them as
products of outmoded Enlightenment thought that generalize about human nature,
subsume religious contents within them, and erase particularity and difference. This
delineation of critique prepares the ground for my overall thesis: that "utopian theory" is
a symptom of the Utopian desire it attempts to describe. I argue that these two utopian
theories are evidence of their own claims: that modern Westernized scholars are
preoccupied with "social dreaming" or express a "utopian impulse" when they turn to
theorize society as a totality and fantasize a collectivity of "humanity." While Ruth
Levitas's formulation of utopianism as a "desire for a better way of being" attempts to
limit the universal prospect of utopianism with an assertion that those desires are socially
constructed, her definition buries the social in a generalized desire that registers only at
the level of the self, and casts Utopia as little more than private fantasies of selfbetterment. Though it is immensely common, even typical, to view Utopia as a universal
form of human thought and practice, Sargent's three "faces" or varieties of Utopia—
literary narratives, intentional societies, and Utopian social theory—each occlude aspects
of the real work that Utopia does in condensing the problematics of social representation.
Utopia as Social Dreaming
Defining utopianism broadly as "social dreaming," scholar and bibliographer
Lyman Tower Sargent scans archives and world history for examples of this tendency in
practices, literature, and theory.132 Ancient myths of paradises and speculative fiction
about future lands of plenty are bucketed together, along with intentional communities
and theories of social improvement. The result is an exhaustive account of fiction, non132
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fiction, architecture and film alongside examples of historical projects—all enacting
some dimension of “a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally
located in time and space.”133 The efforts at instantiation through projects within history
are utopian in that they are dependent on this fantasy, on the dream of the social. In
bringing such diversity under the canopy of utopia, Sargent endeavors to resolve
confusion about the words in wide use and to keep honest those who would like to say
that they know utopia when they see it.134 In other words, Sargent implies through this
cataloging process that the contradictions or diversity in the examples of utopia can be
handled by sufficiently broad definition and an effort at categorization. This pays off in
inclusivity, and makes sense of the popular use of the word: “utopias” are produced by
“utopianism,” the habit of social dreaming that is a part of both western and non-western,
ancient and modern worlds. It is an elaboration of hope and a part of changing society for
the better and as such, a universal phenomenon not exclusive to Judeo-Greek-Christian
lineages.135
Sargent privileges utopia as a universal habit and situates religious behavior and
projects within a larger, global work of social dreaming.136 The “desire for a better life,
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for order, unity and simplicity” has always been with humans and “the expression of
utopianism is the most basic strata of the human experience.” Even those who oppose
utopia hold out for a better situation by asserting that a utopian effort would make matters
worse. Sargent naturalizes utopianism by identifying it with maximizing need fulfillment.
This need fulfillment requires direction, however, and positive visions of society are
necessary to direct behavior that would otherwise be directionless. This expansive
reading of Utopia as ‘purposeful work to inspire’ has much in common with Joyce
Hertzler's earlier survey of utopian literature. Writing in 1923, Hertzler identifies utopias
as imaginary ideal societies that recede on the horizon and endlessly motivate human
action on behalf of social transformation. As in Sargent's work, Biblical prophets and
apocalyptic texts are considered to be outgrowths of human longing, and Hertzler's
survey profiles prophets, Apocryphal literature and ancient writers like Homer, Virgil,
Plato, and Cicero as examples of early utopianism. Thus, utopia is the tradition of
representing ideal conditions that, through the representation of social possibility,
becomes a means of transforming society. Hertzler highlights how these texts inspire
change in human behavior through the way they emphasize human effort, even if in a
horizon of divine activity.137
Among their contributions, surveys of utopian literatures like Hertzler's and other
more recent collections provide snapshots of significant texts of the Western canon that
encourage the reader to relate them contextually within history.138 However, these
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surveys take for granted and naturalize the world views and assumptions that shaped their
production. They make little effort to question or even to qualify the trajectories of liberal
humanism and secularization, where the "natural" human impulse is to fantasize
alternatives and the modern scholar's responsibility is to collect as many diverse
examples of this. Hertzler's is perhaps the most extreme example of this progressive
narrative, placing ancient texts in the stream of Anglo-American Christendom, thus
building a narrative of a modern man [sic] progressively developing and striving along
this axis of effort and ability. Sargent, writing after World War II, is more wary of the
effects of this motivation, cautioning that physiological needs can be misunderstood and
their social routes to satisfaction can in turn produce “social pathology, grotesques of the
imagination and of politics.”139 However, both the broad definition of social dreaming
and the form of the survey work support the notion that there is a general human progress
at work despite its temporary interruptions.
Sargent's definition that utopias are cases or instances of "social dreaming" and
are figured as "non-existent societies located in time and space" affords a narrow account
of Utopia, in that this definition circumscribes Utopias as fantasies that figure or
articulate social relations with specific conditions. But Sargent’s framework overreaches
by declaring these representations to be Utopia even when they are found outside of
modernity. The assumption in these cases is that ex-modern utopianism depends on a
generalized human nature which dreams in ways that modern scholars can recognize.
This spreads the critical and specific work of Utopia into regions that may or may not be
articulating a desire to reconcile social difference through a restructuring of social
Selection (New York: Modern Library, 1968); Gregory Claeys and Lyman Tower Sargent, ed., The
Utopian Reader (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
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totality, and likely attributes too much modern subjectivity to the authors and adherents
of pre-modern utopian narratives. Also, in extending social dreaming to individuals,
texts, or communities beyond modernity by way of a generalized human nature, Sargent
purports to construct a collectivity of human natures that spans diverse times and places.
This reflects what I identify as the modern desire for Utopia—the creation of a
collectivity of different humanities, all in cooperation with the same goal and
harmonizing difference. Sargent's definition and explication of utopia as "social
dreaming" is, therefore, is itself a dream of a shared human activity that finds sameness
across time and space.
Utopia as Universal Impulse
This claim of a universal human impulse that unites humanity is most strongly
articulated in Ernst Bloch's philosophical argument for a "utopian impulse." Bloch has
widely influenced scholarship on Utopia. Regarded as a lesser-known member of the
Frankfurt School, Bloch's weave of Marxist thought— with and against Freud and
Heidegger—generates an unorthodox materialism that turns towards the unknown future,
allowing for both a perspective of universal claims and an historicized aesthetics. Bloch’s
work impacts my analysis of Utopia at several junctures: first, in its universalization;
second, in its role in Levitas's understanding of desire, and three, as it contributes to my
own historicized aesthetics and category of Utopian desire developed in the following
chapters.
Bloch asserts a universal utopian impulse arisin gfrom the effects of temporality
on consciousness, which situate every person in a moment that is filled with an unknown
future— experienced in the moment primarily in terms of fear or hope. Within both of
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these orientations is recognition of the exposure to what is not yet to come into being.
This consciousness of anticipation is an “enormous experiment of mediated capability of
being other in process,” where the human fills in possibility with hopes and fears and
plans but ultimately is met with an incalculable uncertainty.140 Thus, the immediate
horizon has a disruptive quality to it. This moment, when filled with the positive possible,
is the impulse to hope, what Bloch refers to as a "utopian impulse," potential in ever
anticipatory moment.
The utopian impulse pulls embodied human sensations of hunger into a larger
schema of temporal expectation. The future starts in the present, where wishes derive
from hungers and cravings are centered in bodily survival. He tracks how anticipatory
consciousness constructs desires for better selves, better worlds, and the fulfillment of
time itself, culturally evidenced in both the personal wishes of fairy tales, travel
narratives, films, theater; and the social wishes of architecture, political plans, utopian
literatures, and even the industrial relations of the 8-hour work day. The fulfilled
moment-wish is evident in moral programs, music, images of an afterlife and death and
the kingdoms on earth brought forward through divine intervention. Bloch situates
cultural creation itself as an ontological argument, as a response to temporality. His
rigorous defense of anticipatory consciousness as a necessary and useful orientation to
time has been used to ballast humanist arguments within utopian theory, including
Levitas's claim that Utopia is mostly recognized as it functions to excite humans to strive
and achieve better conditions for living—a "desire for a better way of being."
Bloch's work is rich with allusion to the development of religion as cultural
expression of this fundamental utopian impulse, and his work has found reception in
140
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theologies and histories of hope.141 However, what is notable here is that both Bloch's
philosophical approach to Utopia and the more data-collective style of literatures and
expressions of social dreaming share the argument that utopianism is a universal or
fundamental human experience. It is a compelling argument in that it cooperates with a
perception that biological human necessity generates fantasies that seek resolution. These
surveys echo what has been said about the place of religion by Tyler Roberts: that utopia,
like religion, is a way for thinking the gap between the social world and individual
experience by using social dreaming for managing the limits and obstacles to
satisfaction—materially, structurally, and emotionally.
Universal Utopianism and the Erasure of Non-Western Particularity
While there is value in asserting Utopia as a fundamental human urge, this kind of
perspective is a therapeutic expression based on acceptance of a modern bourgeois
individual that obscures particularities when abstracted as a theory. The consolation of a
shared, human utopian impulse misses the mark and runs the risk of treating the condition
itself as a religious remnant, a “divine discontent.”142 Positioning utopia as either a
primal, inescapable human impulse or reading back through history and places to name
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texts or behaviors as of a single utopian fabric denies or comes into conflict with
historical particularities that critical religious studies have shown to matter.
Among these denials is the erasure of non-western particularity. Using social
dreaming or ideal social vision as the category for comparison, scholars can claim
evidence in writings from China that yearned for a past era or Taoist concepts of
harmony and equality that focus on social transformation through human effort. 143 Other
non-western utopias are identified as products produced from the impacts of western
modes of social reform, making local projects utopian in character. Japan and Latin
America have examples of these texts.144 Also, forms such as the Asian and African
cargo cults may fall in this line as expressions of plenty. Using them as examples of
utopian social dreaming, these cases lose an analysis of how politics are in themselves
wish-fulfilling fantasies. A further problem comes when an ahistorical humanism
displaces experiences of those within colonialization. With the broad label a wish for
better living, utopia is treated positively without necessarily examining the historical
consequences of this aspiration and how it is played out, especially for those in the
Americas. Such historians as John Mohawk and Miguel Lopez Lozano show how what
Sargent broadly calls “social dreaming” are sites of conflict. Mohawk specifically details
how Platonic philosophy of ideals combined with imperial Christendom to generate a
rationale for subjugating American natives and ravaging the land in the ways they did—
and still do. Lopez-Lozano’s Utopian Dreams, Apocalyptic Nightmares: Globalization in
Recent Mexican and Chicano Narrative gives testimony to how the colonizers used
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Utopia as a means to externalize the difference they encountered.145 It also shows how
writers have inverted the terms of western modernizers to reposition women, nature and
culture as the ideal that was trampled in the name of a Utopian ideal. Their work
highlights the negatives of Utopia and its violence to people and to the landscape for the
purpose of reimagining social relations.
It is this kind of anachronism that critical scholars of religion have warned of in
comparative treatments of religion. From this investigation of the “human nature” of
“utopian” ambition, thought, and products, through the surveys of Sargent and Hertzler
and the ontology of Bloch, I want to consider what I might call “the historical impulse to
universalize Utopia.” This impulse is a modern intellectual habit formed out of an
Enlightenment orientation to knowledge to generalize about human nature, coming to
terms with the differences witnessed through global contact. This kind of historical
treatment of utopian theory follows the work of the critical religious theorists presented
in Chapter One who cautioned against universal claims as being Christian in their
pedigree and assumptions. Collapsing all hopeful futures into utopia promotes the
Christian, modern liberal valences of progress, making hope appear normative. These
accounts do not adequately address the constitution of western scholarship and its history,
shaped by western experiences of space and time that are formed through imaginaries of
exploration and conquest. To a scholar of religion, they resemble the claims of universal
religious impulse that is then shown to manifest variously across history. Utopia, by this
design, looks like a perennial wisdom or an Eliadian universally-available Sacred, able to
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express itself under various historical conditions. Like Eliade who identified a modern
malaise taking away the enchantment of every day life and advocated for the value in
promoting a transcendence for its role in orienting human activity, “utopia” is a new
word for uniting diverse expressions. When posited as an enduring hopeful spirit,
“utopia” looks like a Tillichian Ground of Being, providing a depth to reality that is then
brought to the surface through its forms of planning and proposing alternatives to
challenge the disappointing present. To use a word from Chapter One, instead of religion
as the counter to incongruity, these scholars have found utopia. As I will show next,
Levitas endeavors to avoid the associations of a general utopianism with fundamental
human nature by instead associating it with desires for better ways of being. However,
her analytic method of uniting the diversity and superseding particular cases of content,
form, or function with a generalized desire displaces Utopia's contradictions to the level
of her claim. Thus, the ways that Utopia signifies the modern representational dilemma of
the self and social by figuring this resolution aesthetically as a harmonized collectivity is
subsumed simply as desire for something comparatively better. This displacement does
not negate her work but gives the occasion to analyze how utopian theory is, as I will
argue, itself a Utopian form and leads me consider form as the primary mode of
theorizing Utopia.
Utopia as Desire for a Better Way of Living
Ruth Levitas, in her widely-cited work The Concept of Utopia, recognizes the
fluid status of "utopia"—the lower-case version—in scholarly works and wants to take
account to bring some conceptual clarity to address the means and methods of social
transformation. Lower-case utopianism appears in a host of places but is rarely defined.
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She notes that utopia, colloquially, is seen as intrinsically impractical but widely used to
connote ideas about social change, thus rendering it an "ideological battleground" for
promoting or dismissing specific social programs.146 This effort to collect, isolate and
explain a constant among the variation leads her across nineteenth and twentieth century
terrains of surveys of literature, historiography and Marxist theory. She sorts these
projects for their general liberal humanist and Marxist orientations, noting how the
humanist strands tend to emphasize utopian programs, whereas the Marxist ones weight
towards a utopian function. Levitas's work centers on the Marxist commentators most of
all and the function of utopia, who have, over time, reimagined the word and its
potentials after Marx and Engels used it so pejoratively to dismiss the Utopian Socialists
and their local social arrangements. Having carefully read Marx and Engels for this
history, she moves on to recover the usefulness of dreaming for social change.147
Levitas's chosen Marxist commentators for her task are ones who have emphasized
utopia in their own writings. Organizing chapters around their works, she draws mainly
on Karl Mannheim, Ernst Bloch, William Morris, and Herbert Marcuse. She backs away
from the claims of Bloch and Marcuse that identify utopia as a part of a central human
nature but assures her readers that there can be a common aspect to all utopias without
"making claims about the universality of utopia or the existence of a fundamental utopian
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propensity."148 Seeing herself as one who can pull together the diversity, she finds the
functional definitions and uses of utopia more compelling but settles with a general
enough definition to satisfy the range she surveys, naming the constant element as
"desire—desire for a better way of being and living."149
Levitas's painstaking tracking of the ways scholars have utilized definitions of
content, form, and function lead her away from any one of these definitions, having
found each missing the other in some way. She holds out for an inclusive definition, to
avoid having to rank contents, to allow how utopia has escaped from its literary form and
ISseen in other expressions, and to consider how utopia may change in its function
historically.150 If utopia is seen to be drained of its politics, then she assures her readers
that utopia is only the desire, and hope is the proper name for what transforms wishful
thinking into will-full action, as hope is the domain of possibility. Levitas offers the
fullest statement in her conclusion:
The essential element in utopia is not hope, but desire—the desire for a
better way of being. It involves the imagining of a state of being in which
the problems which actually confront us are removed or resolved, often,
but not necessarily, through the imagining of a state of the world in which
the scarcity gap is closed or the 'collective problem' solved. This definition
goes beyond that of an alternative world, possible or otherwise.151
She insists that a desire for a better way of being should not be narrowly construed in
psychoanalytic terms as an erotic drive or a constantly manifesting impulse, nor as a
universal, defining universal in the sense of it being a foregone conclusion of human
existence. Such an "idea of an innate impulse to utopianizing is intimately bound up with
essentialist definitions of human needs and human nature," which are for her problematic
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for they way that they suggest a potentially single and ideal content.152 Wanting to
preserve the plurality, she defends the "socially constructed" aspect of all utopian
creations as opposed to their naturalness: it is not that it is natural or inherent to construct
utopias, but they are dependent on what the society wants or needs because each society
will construct from its own place and time its own needs. In such cases, if there is
scarcity, it is only because the society has decided that such-and-such a thing is needed
and thus may or may not be scarce. 153 She defends a kind of particularity that allows for
cross-cultural expressions of utopia in such diverse instances as Plato's writings, Cargo
Cults, The Land of Cockaygne with its rivers of milk, honey and wine and also in an
(orientalized) Shangri-La. However, she also includes the "individual" pursuits of
psychological states. She assures that a broad analytic definition, moving away from the
function of it to compensate, critique, or catalyze for change as the Marxist interpreters
favor means it does not have to attach to anything particularly but can apply to particular
things.
Contradictions in/of Utopian Theory of Desire
While Levitas's exegetical work with each theorist provides useful summaries of
major contributions to the study of Utopia, I contend that her method of harmonizing the
variety of utopia into a generic concept of desire is not a solution but a sign of the larger
problematic of representation generally that appears as contradictions in her method and
theory. Despite using explicitly modern commentators, Levitas attributes Utopia to non-
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modern locales. As seen above, this assumes a kind of generalizable utopianism that, I
have argued, creates a kind of anachronism that weakens its usefulness as a category. She
gathers her term "desire" from the Marxist commentators who focus on the function of
utopia, distancing herself from the "liberal humanists" who tend more to programs and
their content. Levitas gives a short review of the historians of the utopian forms, noting
that they primarily have used a general definition of utopia as the "the attempt to describe
in fiction or construct in fact an ideal society."154
In the first of three contradictory elements of her thesis, Levitas eschews Bloch
and Marcuse for their universalizing of a Utopian impulse via ontological or
psychoanalytically-explained rifts in consciousness, and goes on to develop a universallyapplicable concept for any historical site that demonstrates the generic desire for better
living.
Analytic definitions not only do not imply the existence and necessity of
boundaries, they suggest their irrelevance. The principle of addressing the
utopian aspects of different cultural phenomena implies that there are no
limits to the material that can be looked at from this point of view. A
consequence of adopting an analytic definition is that the issue of
boundaries ceases to be a theoretical problem.155
This limitlessness and "boundary"-lessness seems ironic in the case of “utopia,” first
known as an island bounded by the sea, remote, and only accessible through retelling. As
I will go on to argue, it is the boundaries that establish Utopia exist as a scholarly figure
and interesting as a limited category for use in considering how ordinary utopian
representations are themselves bounded and provisional, as are categories and concepts,
despite Levitas's claim. I defend the claim that analyzing Utopia as desire is indeed an
encounter with limitations and boundaries, but these are not confining or restrictive as
154
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Levitas says but are useful for analyzing particular conditions. As I will go on to explain,
Utopia is a distinctly Western, modern form, and its association with universality should
be recast along two different lines that neither Levitas nor the others have considered:
Utopia strides the universal and particular not as a human impulse nor a limitless concept
to be applied in particular places but as its placement within an Enlightenment habit of
analysis. If there is a universal aspect of Utopia, it is neither in its impulse nor in its
concept of desire, but in how modern claims of universality represents both collectivity
(plurality) and social totality (unity) at once—a shared humanity within an arc of human
history.
A second contradiction is in the case of opposition or conflict or contrast of utopia
that Levitas disguises with the more ameliorating or approximating terms of "desire" and
"better way of being." Levitas seeks to distance it from its more critical function because
she is concerned about prejudice seeping in and showing preference for some solutions or
too narrowly construing what someone's scarcity gap may be. Her definition aims to
recognize the neoliberal projects as well as qualitatively negative social arrangements, i.e.
fascism, to be seen for their utopian aspects as they, for their proponents, are "better ways
of being."156 She distances herself from these right-leaning views from personal,
politically practical perspective, but reserves that they are utopian because they reflect
aspirations. However, in qualifying utopia to include conservative, neoliberal, or the
radically right politics, Levitas waters down the disjunction that Utopia signifies:
There may perhaps be those who would exclude these on the grounds that
they are not genuinely believed in by those who propagate the views—that
the ideas of the New Right represent a cynical manipulation of politics.
But one of the features of ideologies (including utopias) is that their
proponents genuinely do believe that the social arrangements which are in
156
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their interests are also in the interests of the rest of humanity. This is not to
deny that utopian images may be used for manipulative purposes. Much
advertising uses images of the good life (the idyllic island, the
sophisticated life of leisure and consumption, the cosy [sic] nuclear
family) to sell products. Advertisements work, though, because they key
into utopian images which are already present among the audience,
reflecting their desires, their lack. Even at this level, the utopias current in
a society tell us much about the experience of living in it, because they tell
us in a way that we cannot directly ascertain where the felt absences are in
people's lives—the spaces, that is, the utopia offers to fill, whether in
fantasy or reality.157
There is indeed a utopianism in consumerism, of eliminating the "scarcity gap" of leisure
and rest, but to assert that proponents of neoliberal policies "genuinely believe" that "their
interests are also in the interests of the rest of humanity" ignores the Marxist project of
ideology critique she has carefully followed. I too want to keep the possibility open of
ideology and utopia as in cooperation, as related. However, I argue that Utopia, to speak
back to the scarcity gap it desires to fill, must take two aspects of this gap that Levitas
misses: the representational circuit of the Utopian "image" and the violence that claims to
"better" imply. Many paths to "better" have been paved with bodies, and this is missing in
her formulation of a general utopia. Thus, as I will argue, Utopia is not merely
ameliorating or a proximate improvement but draws attention to the formation or
constructedness of the scarcity that is funded by violence, viscerally experienced and
highly mediated.
A third contradiction in Levitas's method in conceptualizing utopia is the silent
insertion of a desiring, self-possessed individual within a stream of social constructions.
Levitas insists on the "socially-constructed" conditions for the desire to arise or be
enacted, that the "scarcity gap" is given by the specific conditions of specific social
arrangements and insists on a broad enough definition beyond any particular form,
157

Ibid., 189.

107
content, or function so that the analysis of this desire can be tracked for historical
changes. She is also careful to insist that utopia and ideology should not be separated, and
resists any essential human need, seeing all needs as socially-constructed and that appeal
to discrete, verifiable need would lead to an attachment to a particular content in utopia.
Her approach is thus strongly reminiscent of social constructionism in Religious Studies:
what makes all utopias sound like discussions of human nature is their tacit appearance of
happiness, when in Levitas's eyes, they are just one more case of an occasion to register
someone's values or interests:
Indeed, without the criterion of human needs and human nature we have
no objective measure for distinguishing the good society from the bad,
except the degree of fit between needs and satisfactions; and this does not
distinguish happiness in unfreedom, the happiness of the cheerful robot,
from 'real' happiness. The appeal to needs is made, in fact, to provide
precisely such a (pseudo)-objective criterion, rather than make explicit the
values involved in particular constructions of individuals and societies,
and present this as what it is—a matter of moral choice.158
As Levitas goes on to present the socially-constructed desiring subject, she
simultaneously assures her readers that these are "moral choices" directing particular
utopias and later, that agents with hope are the ones transforming the nascent utopian
wishes into action: "The dream becomes vision only when hope is invested in an agency
capable of transformation."159
This slippage of dependent subject and liberal agent is most relevant to my own
project of proposing how Utopia figures these two aspects of representation. Levitas is
aware of this problematic and registers it in her discussions of Bloch and Thompson, who
she says keep these two pieces—constructed subject and experience—in dialectical
relation. I will turn to her use of these figures for her own ends in Part Two. For my
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purposes here, it is enough to say that her conclusion does not sustain their dialectical
relation. Levitas's deployment of the term of "desire" unites the social and the individual
too easily. In her use of desire, Levitas substitutes a word signifying a personal
experience of contradiction—desire—for a representational contradiction—Utopia. In
emphasizing the "desire for a better way of being," Levitas lets this "way of being" settle
back on the individual who seeks his or her own fulfillment or expresses a "moral
choice." This shifts emphasis away from "being together" as the source of concern. It puts
the weight on an individual confronting society instead of a subject confronted by
society. Needs are likely to be "contradictory for and between individuals," she asserts,
but this contradictory condition does not trouble the coherence and confidence of her own
project—that of eliminating the contradictions which plague Utopia. Her method is
overall motivated by her own desire to rescue utopianism from obsolescence, arguing for
continuity between the Marxist and neo-liberal utopias by bracketing utopia from action
and assuring that its social relevance lies not in its ability to generate desires or represent
desires but in the longings themselves—that the presence of longing is enough to secure
utopia's status.160 This motive —has no interest in Utopia’s inherent conflicts with early
modern political authority and late modern subjectivities characterized for their rifts of
consciousness and the stakes of wage-labor capitalism. It is easy to understand her
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solemnity, writing in the late 1980s, wondering what to make of postmodernity and its
political apathy and social decadence. However, instead of applying a blanket of desire to
rescue agency, I will argue that periodizing Utopia for its ability to figure—narrate,
image, and represent—modern contradictions will do more for holding open the conflicts
of representing experiential and constructed registers that Levitas and I both notice as an
aspect of critical scholarship and its inheritance of Marxist methods.
Simply stated, Levitas uses a the concept of a gap to cover a gap, insists on a
better ‘way of being’ that really is only a different moral code, and hides social
construction behind a self-possessed desire. Instead of focusing my critique on these
inconsistencies, I argue for seeing them as an occasion to examine how utopian theory as
method performs its content by resolving formally the subject's existential perspective
and the social totality used to account for that perspective. To restate my claim
succinctly: If Utopia offers the fantasy of fulfillment and resolution of problems created
through social intercourse, Utopian theory is a fantasy that resolves the contradiction of
impersonal social and historical forces and the all-too-personal affective crush of those
forces. Sargent, Bloch and Levitas all rest on the fantasy element of utopia to direct their
definitions. Sargent and Levitas appropriate those theorists of desire—Bloch, Marcuse,
and E.P. Thompson—for the work of fantasy, imagination, and desire without laboring
with the archive of psychoanalysis. I contend that this insertion of desire performs a
Utopian desire—to resolve the incommensurability, the incongruity that the legacy of
social theory has left. By labeling Utopia as desire in this way, the existential dimension
of the play of differential social formations is reintroduced to social theory. Although
Utopia is indeed a desire, it is a desire played out on the level of form, be it theory,
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fiction, or other aesthetic products. Thus, a more appropriate method examines is its
formal properties—its history, its features, and its circuits of production, distribution,
reception, and reformation. The following analysis will show how the gaps constitute the
form and attend to the contradictions themselves while admitting that all attempts, in
fiction or theory, are fantasies. These are useful fantasies—and pleasurable—but
fantasies, nonetheless.
Treating Utopia as a universal, ahistorical human activity erases the differences of
others who scholars seek to know more about. Bloch's work in connecting art and culture
across historical time and place has been criticized for being overly expansive, and
ignoring crucial differences between his wide-ranging evidence for the ever-present
utopian impulse.161 Others have seen his universalism of utopia in all these corners of
human cultural life as ultimately useless for utopian theory, for “when everything
becomes an expression of utopian desire, to what degree does the category of utopia loses
its usefulness?”162 This is just as much in the case of Levitas's desire. As much as Levitas
endeavors to call out social construction, she too is driven by the impulse to universalize,
albeit more covertly. She codifies the tension that Utopia signifies with another word rife
with ambiguity—desire—but at the level of the body. Her analysis of the term “desire”
depends on Bloch's ontology and E.P. Thompson's description of Morris's work as an
"education of desire". Levitas's review of the historical methods of charting utopia argues
that, in focusing on form, the historians do not adequately account for what produces
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utopia.163 It will be shown below that the abstraction on which Levitas bases her
argument on comes about through a historical process—i.e., the literary form of Utopia
evolving into a social-theory abstraction—which elucidates how Levitas and others arrive
at their conclusion that Utopia is structured as desire.
Thus Utopia retains more value for analysis when historicized within EuroAmerican fields of intellectual, political, and economic contexts. To this end, I will show
how Utopia as a figure of an alternative political and social order distinguished itself
from other texts and figures that represent fulfillment, satisfaction or harmony around the
time of Thomas More's writing, and briefly describe how Utopia came to be associated
with political change and used as an abstraction or shorthand for "the good society." This
history demonstrates the seemingly mutually exclusive choices utopian theorists have
made to either occlude the personal experience level in favor of social constructionist
accounts; or excise political economy from experiential, descriptive methods. Levitas’s
lens of desire via Bloch and Thompson focuses the first horn of this dilemma, and I
harmonize it with the first by historicizing it via psychoanalytic and Marxist discourse, in
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the process establishing a more productive role for the figure of Utopia in Religious
Studies.
II. Retelling Utopian Theory through History
The utopian theories described above are not simply about generic, timeless
fantasies of better worlds, but seek to explain the genre of Utopian literature and the
conditions of its occurrence and popularity as a literary form. These conditions of
production and sites of popularity are thoroughly European and American, reflecting the
transitions of intellectual, political and economic modes, beginning with the Renaissance
humanism, oceanic exploration and the rise of nation-states through the revolutionary and
Enlightenment periods and colonialism into industrialization and the philosophical
projects from Hegel and Marx. I am not proposing to undertake a project of relating these
events to their textual counterparts. Instead, I want to demonstrate in Part Two that the
abstraction that is valuable to the theorists is more properly treated as an historical object,
seen as part of process of reception and manipulation of forms over time. I regard the
definitions that the theorists above have crafted to be formulations that function as a kind
of Utopian form in themselves—resolving the frustrations generated by their sociointellectual conflicts with a narrative fantasy based on a constructed, cross-cultural
collectivity of desirers and dreamers.
The historicization of these theories proceeds by introducing crucial moments in
the formation of Utopia as a figure within modernity. As shown in Chapter One, the
history of an idea can show not only who it serves and for what purposes but how it was
constructed. The advantage of this for the concept of Utopia is two-fold: one, it clarifies
both Utopia and fantasy/desire as they appear in the discourses above, and two, it
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establishes those discourses in their socio-political contexts—an aspect that Levitas
claims to value in her assurance of the social-constructedness of desires but ends up
complicating more than clarifying. My approach is thus genealogical—I confront the
formations of discursive regimes, and mark the possibilities and limitations of different
times and places and how subjectivities are differentially formed. My central theme is
that critical studies—in religion or other fields—need not turn all subjectivity into an
object but can instead turn to dialectical methods which respect the affective and libidinal
dimensions of social life as well as such categories as ideology, social formation,
legitimation, and hegemony typical of critical discourse. I implement this theme in a
novel analysis of Utopian desire, via representational forms constructed as responses to
the surges of political economy within modernity, where these two seemingly
incommensurable perspectives often come together. Part Two of this chapter supports
this argument by offering key transitions in the development of the Utopian form and into
an abstraction for use by social theorists to reflect on and theorize social change. By
showing a few of these transitions, I show that the concept of utopianism as it is widely
understood arises from a historical process which situates it, along with Utopia, as a
distinctly Western modern product.
To direct this argument, I unfold several key moments in the formation of Utopia
through historians and literary, political and social theorists. Through the work of the
historians and literary theorists, I show how Utopia is an aesthetic product distinct to
Anglo-European early modernity that was one of several responses to the social
contradictions of its time, giving shape to the intellectual currents of humanism, the
challenges to church authority, the formations of nation-states, and opportunities of
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oceanic travel. Then, I discuss how political theorists have described Utopia's role in
directing political programs and how Utopia came to represent itself as an abstraction of
the mechanisms of social life. I turn again in the next chapter to desire and aspects of its
history that were glossed by Levitas through a review of several social theorists Levitas
uses for her definition,.
Utopia as an Early Modern Literary Form
Utopia at the Renaissance
Historians Frank and Fritzie Manuel state in their “study for the continuities in
Western utopian thought,” that they “are acutely aware of the temporal and geographic
fractures and demarcations that separate one Utopian constellation from another.”164 For
them, the continuities are found in the historical conditions, not in anything universal
because, for the Manuels, anything universal—theological claims of cosmic dimensions,
reaching across times and human psyches— would turn utopia into more of a religious
than a properly historical phenomena.165 While this abandonment of the universal as
religious signals their own prejudices (and ignorance about the field of religious studies),
it is also a legitimate concern with the form of Utopia. Although they admit that there are
occasions of Utopia showing up in non-western settings where there are "paradises on
earth," their extensive survey shows that Utopias are primarily a leftover of PlatonicChristian ideals that emphasize human capacity and combine in various manners images
of an eternal or transcendent world. Where Utopias are secular, they are so in an attempt
to isolate practical behaviors for effective, satisfying social relations.
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Contra Hertzler or Sargent, ancient worlds and politics and are not Utopia for the
Manuels but the “vital prehistory” of utopia as a “hybrid plant” of Hellenic philosophy
and Humanist Christianity.166 Utopia's history begins with the combined conditions of
oceanic exploration and conquest, northern humanism with Erasmus and Rabelais, the
English Civil War, Italian Renaissance architecture, German Anabaptism and mysticism,
and seventeenth-century science. With the French Revolution, they see a major
adjustment to Utopian narratives that take up time as a factor, making for a parallel form
that might be called “euchronia.” New modes of production in the nineteenth century
produce new relations to work and love. Concomitant with this historical development of
the Utopian form, there is exploration of new scientific space, both within the micro
levels of biology and the macro of astronomy. As with other modern forms, Utopian
literature appeals to the Hellenistic virtues of perfection, transcendence and pastoral
harmony that are matched in the Renaissance with Judeo-Christian allusions to heavenly
and divinely-directed cities. These texts, along with an emergent interest in the human
capacities for manipulating political life, meet to form Utopia.
Narrowing to the moment of early northern European history, the Utopian literary
form can be seen to take shape alongside other literatures. The historian of early modern
literature J.C. Davis follows the texts of early modern writers to discern their allegiance
to a Utopian form and discovers that the writers of both major and minor texts between
1516-1650 do not adhere self-consciously to a model of Utopian text but devise their
own. Writers of ideal societies from this era occupied diverse social roles as lawyers,
diplomats, academics, country squires, administrators, merchants, soldiers and “political
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intriguers.”167 Commitment to a set of historical texts do not link these early modern
Utopian writers as much a shared “subjection to a common mode of social idealization
and its consequences.”168 Thus, while Utopias do not form themselves from reference to a
set of established texts, neither are they the umbrella construct for all of idealizations of
society. Marking the genre of Utopian literature at this time are their references to
particular idealizations that overlap conventions, such as travel and dialogue—that
facilitate this agenda. Davis’s synchronic historical mapping shows religion taking shape
within history, instead of serving as an archaic and unchanging deposit to be drawn on by
early and late moderns alike as the Manuels imply.
Early Modern Types
Davis identifies Utopia alongside four other ideal societies. Each distinguishes
itself for what it says about the human, its relation to nature, institutions, and its approach
to legal, educational, and bureaucratic devices. The types are, for Davis, heuristic devices
for sorting a common problem of the early modern period—the problem of collectivity
and the coordination of satisfactions of individuals within a community. The Utopia,
Arcadia, Cockaygne, Millennium, and Perfect Moral Commonwealth were less attempts
to solve the problem of unlimited desires and limited satisfactions than they were
articulations of the problem.169 Davis lists non-Western and non-modern texts and
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narratives that speak back to these distinctive forms but preserves Utopia for the case of
early modern Europe. I see in these forms how they differentially emphasize human
effort in achieving satisfaction. All five forms work to resolve the problem of “limited
satisfactions and unlimited human desires” but Utopia solves it not through a divine
intervention or a fundamental balance of social relations or an excess of satisfactions, but
by means of limiting satisfactions.170 As he summarizes:
The utopian’s concern is rather to control the social problems that the
collective problem can lead to—crime, instability, poverty, rioting, war,
exploitation and vice. None of these evaporate in utopias. They are
controlled and where possible, eliminated, and the utopian is concerned to
show how.171
Davis does not permit Utopia to be used as a blanket statement for all kinds of social
dreaming. Utopia does not produce myths of a golden age of paradise. Instead, the
broader term, "idealization," produces multiple forms for various social uses. Restraining
the use of Utopia for a type of text and not a universal impulse would be a misuse of the
term for Davis, who wants to restrict Utopia not to its lineage back to More but to the
medieval Europe. The Big Rock Candy Mountains sung of in American folk songs can be read as a
contemporary example. The richest allusions to utopia come from Davis’s third category of the Christian
Millennium—the 1000 years that, depending on one’s counting, comes before or after the return of Christ
to earth as promised in the Revelation of John in the Christian New Testament. Rising in popularity
through the rough and violent ruptures of both the German and English Reformations, millennialism
captures the intrigue of the past and future, the familiar and the unknown. Instead of simpler human needs,
the complexity of present humanity is pulled together and resolved into a new society brought about by
divine intervention. Whereas the Land of Cockagyne or Arcadia recede in popularity after the sixteenth
century, millennialism can be seen to expand, and the explicitly Christian label grows to include other
European movements such as modern Jewish messianism, Jewish and Christian apocalypticism, Christian
dispensationalism, and a secularized spiritual age of Hegel, Marx, and National Socialism. The appeal of
millennialism is to point the present as a special time preceding or already in the midst of upheaval. It is
form common through the modern era as social change brought on by colonial contact, migration, and
technological innovation created new social climates. The fourth of Davis’s categories of ideal society is
the perfect moral commonwealth—a pagan inspiration that leans on the image of ancient city as a construct
of rationality and order. Whereas the millennium takes the disorder of the present and reorders it through
drastic reconstruction, the moral commonwealth hedges on the thread of reason within the Renaissance
worldview of humanity as reconstructed through the Greco-Roman tradition. The commonwealth of the
medieval period was secured by a just landlord-tenant relation that preserved duty loyalty, charity and
virtue.
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concerns of More’s era: disorder in an emerging capitalist society with and nation-state
formation in relation to an expanding globe.172 In separating out utopia from other ideal
societies, Davis allows for its rigidity, its closed qualities, and its totality of change to
exist without the seemingly apolitical world of the pastoral or the gustatory indulgences
of a Cockaygne. So for Davis, "Utopia" is not genre or universal impulse but a specific
kind of text that emerged within modernity.
Adding to Davis’s list of ideals, Krishan Kumar constructs a sixth category—the
ideal city.173 Here is the pagan influence again but in the image of the Greek city-state
that becomes an inspiration for More. The ideal city preserves geometric balance and
lends architectural structure to its social forms. The social hierarchy of the ideal city
comes to reflect a divine hierarchy of the cosmos. Utopia does not simply recombine the
elements of Hellenism and Christianity but has its own inventiveness.174 This Hellenistic
influence carries a preference for balance and order into the Utopian project.175 Order
may be variously sourced or located, either in transcendent realms, such as in
Augustine’s City of God or the transcendental realm of Plato’s Republic, but Utopia itself
is focused on instantiating order by humans on earth.
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As other historians have noted, this link of order to an ideal and its possible
proximity undergoes revisions soon after More in the work of Francis Bacon's The New
Atlantis (1624) where order is no longer the static but dynamic and progressive. 176 The
ideal in Bacon, then, is not what is unchanging form but is in process. The Utopian form
in this era reveals an interest in city-state organization and its attempts to balance the
competing authorities of King and Church, evidenced in Tommas Campanella's City of
the Sun, where a theocratic monarchy provides the structure for the ideal city. Order for
these early modernist Utopias revises but never quite sheds its spiritual valence.177 It is
more than their visions of Platonic city-state ideal forms that unite these early Utopias—
each is structured as a travel narrative with a place reached by an ocean vessel, an
isolated land that requires a reporter for relaying, through dialogue with a local authority,
the wonders that are found far away. This formal feature of distant travel and narrator
reflect More's text and becomes a central feature of this nascent genre, one that Kumar
argues is delineated within modernity for the way that texts reference and repeat features
like dialogue, travel, and quotidian details relayed through a mediating narrator.
As noted above, Davis recognizes that Utopia distinguished itself for addressing
the problem of collectivity and the coordination of satisfactions of individuals within a
community by the tools of politics, law, resource production and resource distribution.
One mechanism for coordinating satisfactions in More's text is an egalitarian model and

176

This break by Bacon is described by Davis and Donnelly alike. Robert Applebaum argues that
seventeenth-century utopia is a disposition towards “earthly paradise, the millenarian future, the ancient
Age of Gold, the happy constitutional democracy, the world turned upside down, the primitive church, the
ideally munificent court of the ideal monarch.” Robert Appelbaum, Literature and Utopian Politics in
Seventeenth-Century England, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1–2, 5.
177
“Even in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when human reason had, in different places and in various
area of speculation, strongly reasserted its independence of the concept of religious order, the underlying
assumption remained, for many thinkers, that the order of the universe is, finally, divinely ordained. ”
Donnelly, Patterns of Order and Utopia, 10.

120
the elimination of money. Belonging and shared resources were not novel to Thomas
More, who had many examples of collective activity in the monasteries of his time. But
instead of leaving the collective behavior to the cloister, More’s Utopia situated it in the
broader society, applying the forms of shared resources and activity to the realm of
families and secular life. Literary theorist Phillip Wegner argues that More's narrative
shift from cloister to public square produces a person-society relationship that we now
recognize as endemic to the modern nation-state.178 In More’s Utopia, the former castes
and classes are wiped away in favor of a subject in more regular relation to the social
totality via a flattened hierarchy, which Wegner sees as parallel to the subsequent
emergence of the European bourgeoisie.179 The hold of the church and the feudal lords
are replaced by the monarchs which, in turn, become the republics of Europe. Emerging
from More is a foretaste of the modern individual who is identified with political entities
through adherence to practices and allegiances to principles, instead of through fealty to a
God or King.
This identity of the bourgeois subject as one wedded to others through European
nation-state affiliation shaped subsequent renderings of Utopia. As the years passed and
the European nation-state was naturalized as the premier social totality, the power of the
once-novel bourgeoisie grew. The growing hegemony of the bourgeoisie within the new
nation-state led to what Wegner calls 'operations of neutralization' to resist the inevitable
counter-hegemonic attacks from emergent classes, ethnicities, merchant groups, and
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religious bodies.180 These operations within Utopia are recognizable as the uniformity of
taste through clothing, restricted interests, or schedules, which came to be regarded in the
twentieth-century as potential threats to the unique expressions of the individual human
spirit, whereas once it may have been simply a means of tempering vice that threatens
that same spirit. As the new nation states emerged, the Utopian narratives that were
produced from within them sought through their narratives a resolution to their
burgeoning internal sub-communities. Thus, one can see later Utopian narratives carry
through them a strong message of cohesion and willing collective belonging as a
response to both the reality of nation-state formations and its fragility. If there is a
resistance to the Utopian collectivity—as is so easily seen in dystopian narratives, but
also signaled by the iterations of Utopias and their reformulations of social life—then it is
the queasy unease with the violence that founds and supports the nation-state. If Utopia is
laced with the quality of the nation-state, as Wegner argues, then this direct connection
with state power exacerbates the anxiety of moderns all the more as they contemplate the
bloody beginnings of most states. More’s founder, Utopus, for example, merely arrives
and sets up his ideal society.
Wegner's analysis contributes in several ways to my own argument about the
importance of placing Utopia and tying it to European history: not only does More's
text—and subsequent Utopias in their presentation of ideal social organization—draw on
the material conditions of their time but they also displace these conditions into text and
represent them in ways that more than simply inspire desire. Utopias hold and represent
social contradictions at the level of form, delivering the striations of social life as
harmonized fantasy. I argue that Utopia's contradictions should be held front and center
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so as to deliver the shock of their proposal simultaneously as that of their wishes. If there
is a wish for harmony, it should also be registered under the lights of the violence of the
nation-state. If there is a wish for collectivity, it should be scrutinized alongside the
subjectivating forces of liberal legal apparatuses and the isolations of bourgeois
individualism and its alienations.
Excluding pre-modern and non-European forms, Kumar insists, “Utopia may be
nowhere, but historically and conceptually, it cannot be just anywhere.”181 More's text is
a touchstone for considering the relationship of the literary form and its social setting, of
how the conditions that surround the text give rise to the text. While Levitas would like to
consider the contingent conditions of Utopia, she does not recognize either the
distinctiveness of More's text or how it reflects the material conditions of an early
modernity. This brief survey underscores that diversity of forms such as Arcadias,
Millennials, and Cockaygnes should not be presumed as all examples of social dreaming
or desires for better ways of living, but rather shown as distinct ways of solving a
problematic of living collective life, and that Utopia is a version of that, which resolves
this as a fantasy of political and economic arrangements. These arrangements, however,
were distinct to the moment that we now call "modernity"—a complex historical and
social shift that effected deformations of European Christianity into power heterodoxies
of humanism and politically-charged millennialism.182 Utopia consolidates and represents the violent reforming of social life into nation-states, simultaneously disavowing
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the constitutive violence of that same nation-state, and displacing it into discussions of an
"imperial other." The social differences were being newly marked as modernity
developed, taken further away from the hierarchies of the faithful and the heathen as
constructed by Christian orthodoxy and moved into national identities. Contacts with
difference—what will be in modernity variously known as heathens and then
primitives—will be coded differently as Enlightenment paradigms of human nature take
shape and give rise to new areas of study, new disciplines. I turn now to consider how the
aesthetic form of Utopia concentrates this process, especially around the development of
the abstraction of "society" as used by European political theory and adopted by social
theorists.
Literary Form for Political Theory
Utopia, in signifying radical social change that is desirable but also impossible,
coincides historically with political theory with the optimism and failure of modernity's
two grandest proposals: liberalism and Marxism. The historical node of the French
Revolution marks a change in the meaning of Utopia from a more classical mode in the
Renaissance to its late modern associations with radical change. In this section, I rely on
political theorists for their interpretation of their field and its relationship to the Utopian
form. As they recount the history of Utopia for political thought, they note how Utopia
shifts in signification as it is used by philosophers to both interpret their moment and
direct its course. As producers of their time, these philosophers take up "society" as an
abstraction to describe and predict their conditions. As I show, this philosophical labor
situates Utopia in a matrix of constructs signaling both the mood of change and its
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mechanisms—a history that will come to give Utopia its association with lack, longing,
and satisfaction at the level of immanent social life.
Political philosopher Judith Shklar explains how the early modern period drew on
a contemplative practice of philosophy that situates Utopia as a part of a classical mode
of political engagement. She points to the image of the “virtuous pagan” that was held up
to reproach the Christians of this era. Thomas More is a main voice in this era, and his
Utopia focuses on rationality as the securer of public goods, where laws produce social
harmony, not consolidated religiousness. This should be seen in contrast to the
apocalyptic tone of such revolutionary visionaries as Thomas Münzer in Germany, whose
religious fervor consolidated people, not laws. Shklar suggests that perhaps the
contemporary ambivalence to Utopia in the late twentieth century is due to a harboring of
nostalgia for the pensive mode towards alterity and alternatives from the classical era,
instead of the revolutionary urgency from the revolts of the French and the Americans
that have turned the intellectual mood of Utopia into a call to action.183 Utopia is seen
within Shklar as a vital aspect of modern political theory that reflects the models
throughout the modern era for maximizing human virtues, the role of government in
facilitating this, and what methods and means are best for promoting this. Shklar’s work
holds out for the imaginative mode to not be dismissed as rhetoric, but to be considered
alongside the normative mode of political theory.184 Thus, in Shklar, we see that what
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constitutes Utopia is rooted historically in the early modern period and, particularly, its
reading practices. The distinctive mental operations that can be recognized as "Utopian"
depend on contemplation and rumination that does not foreclose alterity or possibility.
Shklar also notes also, however, that there was a shift between the classical and
modern moments that turned Utopia into a call for action. Tracking this change, political
theorists Barbara Goodwin and Keith Taylor examine Utopia's relation to political theory
through space and time. The influence of liberalism and Marxism on Utopia turn it from
its spatial representations of a place outside of here to a time outside of now. Prior to the
Enlightenment, there was a surge of non-Christian utopias that narrate travel to distant
places. Utopias here emphasize a distant people and their exquisite cooperation, making
use of the exotic enticements discovered through imperialism and colonialism to enact
another level of experimentation: fantasy projections of alternative political orders,
pulling at the similarities and differences of the European traveler and the distant Utopian
resident, emphasizing the day-to-day lifestyles as they are influenced by the varying
principles of these other places.185 However, with the influence of the Enlightenment's
focus on progress and perfectibility within an earthly realm, heaven comes to earth, so to
speak: the ideal is brought within reach through human progress. Encounters with
primitive groups through travel were now plotted along a timeline, with influential
thinkers such as Rousseau interpreting these groups as reflecting the essential morality of
humans.186 The French Revolution furthered the positioning of alternative social orders
Utopia?" in Heterotopia: Postmodern Utopia and the Body Politic, ed. Tobin Siebers, (Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan Press, 1994), 55.
Her work connects to Seyla Benhabib on the matter of the need to move from normative, theoretical
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within a future time instead of a distant-yet-parallel space. Revolution, according to
Goodwin and Taylor, made progress more immediate with an emphasis on temporal
eruption. The revolutionaries were headed into a place in the near future, not a distant
future nor a distant place.187 The future of Utopias from this point on is literally the future
of Utopias: no longer is Utopia a physical space, but spaced in time.
The shift from spatial to temporal utopias is heightened in the work of Marx and
his reactions to utopian socialists. Marx focuses on Henre de Saint Simon (1760-1825),
Robert Owen (1771-1868), and Charles Fourier (1772-1837) who each responded to the
social and economic upheaval of industrialization and how traditional social values were
being lost or were dissolving at the beginning of the nineteenth century.188 These
solutions attracted enthusiasm because of their ability to integrate previous norms under
new conditions. Traditional families were reimagined with more permissive family
structures that were larger and happier, transferring familial love to the larger group of
Rousseau's position that modern society could be improved by studying these distant groups, emphasizing a
“natural” human that could be realized once again through repositioning the human in principled ways.
Goodwin and Taylor, The Politics of Utopia, 44.
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society. The lack of harmony among communities impacted by industrial work was offset
by programs that buffered these changes. Utopian socialists regarded politics as function
of administration, not government, promoting reason and science while refusing liberal
individualism. The liberal individual brought out the competition of interests and
contributed to the tensions experienced all around. The end of guilds and loss of
bargaining power with industry left workers without enfranchisement. Social utopias
responded to the social and cultural conditions brought about by capitalism,
industrialization, and movement from traditional social relations and modes of
production. The three most well-known—Fourier, Owen, and Saint-Simon—agreed on
the goals of harmony and cooperation but not how to get there. Each took different tacks
on integrating industrial models of production, of private property versus common
ownership, and place for religion in making this work.189
Utopia as Abstraction for Society
As shown above, Goodwin and Taylor draw attention to how Utopia transitions
from literary form to political tool. Through their work, I point to how modern
philosophy took the conditions of global exploration and turned them for thought and
reflection. What I also pull from them is the way political theory found in Utopia a means
to abstract politics from historical context, contributing to the formation of the discipline.
189

Religion worked in favor of the socialist utopian movements. Religious groups, especially Christians,
were attracted to those leaders and organizations that countered the selfishness and individualism seeming
to undermine the common goods of harmony, community and cooperation. As Goodwin and Taylor note,
religion was seen as an ally to the movements because it “created a sense of attachment without which no
movement can endure for any length of time.” Christianity was the main force behind this connection,
however Judaism helped in the Saint-Simonian movement after 1835. Other bonds were exploited: Fourier
used anti-Semitic teachings to attack commercial classes. The religious liberties and new land available in
the growing United States brought out the most of the religious experimentations with novel societies.
Religion hinged utopian socialism to the past, be it through coloring science with religious quality, the
social mysticism of Saint Simon, or reforming Christianity to be more counter-cultural and radical, in such
cases as millenarianism of the US. Goodwin and Taylor, The Politics of Utopia, 133.

128
While some would like to see political theory emphasize the positivist and empirical
modes, Goodwin and Taylor highlight the role of abstraction in any theoretical endeavor.
Because Utopia is formed through speculation and imagination, it is also a form of
abstraction and thus, connected to political theory more than political history or the study
of political institutions. 190 As they see it, Utopia plays a role in political theory where
there are alternative proposals that extend or emphasize an aspect of the present, such as
John Rawls’s ideal of justice as driving political life or the contest of anarchic groups
within an open context of mutually beneficial associations as articulated by Robert
Nozick.191 Reviving a past golden age, however, is not Utopian, nor can it simply be used
to justify the present. Instead, constructive political theory that both criticizes the present
and provides it with a replacement can be called Utopian. Both political theory and
literary narratives address human problems and harmonize conflict through novel
political and social arrangements.
Goodwin and Taylor advance my analysis of the transposition of Utopia from
literary work to abstract concept—from Utopia to utopia—by way of articulating
political theory's co-optation of Utopia's formal features and its representational dynamic.
Utopia is not merely an alternative social order en total that provides a blueprint for an
ideal social order or even just a workable adjustment. Instead, Utopia provides a heuristic
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"nowhere" from which to gather and perceive what is otherwise too close. By this
argument, the unreality of Utopia is not an impediment to political theory, but integral to
its imaginative work. This imaginative labor is the intellectual work of abstraction:
The academic separation of utopianism from ‘realistic’ political thought
proceeds via the challengeable assumption that imaginative
representations do not convey truth, whereas an abstract account of reality
does so. But often the necessity of abstraction, which distinguishes all
political theory from political history or the study of political institutions,
a priori removes it as far from reality and verifiability as does the
invention of an imaginary world.192
To restate: abstractions—categories and concepts created to tie together, re-describe, and
explain phenomena in other terms—are themselves not real things. They do important
work, however, in that they are constructions that can be used for interpreting and
perhaps even predicting. Like an abstraction, Utopia is not a real thing but provides a
different position from which to view and test.
Such an insight further extends Utopia and its overlaps with theoretical endeavors,
ones that have brought forward not only the work of Bloch and Levitas, but also, as I will
suggest in Chapter Four, theories used in the study of religion. As political theory
depends on abstractions to distinguish it from political history or the study of political
institutions, one can also say that critical religious studies makes use of abstractions to
distinguish its projects from its descriptive and historical counterparts. Connecting how it
is that theories of religion overlap with Utopia in other ways will need further discussion.
What is important at this moment is that Utopian forms are leveraged for political thought
specifically in the way that resemble other "no-things" like theoretical abstractions that
collect and re-describe data so as to perceive the present from a different—and hopefully
more precise—vantage point. This homology of theory in general and Utopian form in
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particular is not to be globally applied. Instead, as I argue in Chapter Four, the Utopian
form relates specifically to the development and use of the abstraction of a social
totality—the fantasized construct of a bounded, coherent system known through its
differentials.
In sum, Utopia, as I have discussed, is affected by these intellectual and historical
streams of Europe. Utopia signals a change in relationship to political futures and
possibilities, from spatial examples that create self-reflection and contemplation of
current conditions, to temporal logics of transformation. The meaning of Utopia changes
to reflect its orientation to political alterities. This first occurs with the possibilities
created through liberalism and the French Revolution, with time stretched into an
alternative, progressively available society located in the same place but in an “out there”
future. Utopia shifts again in the nineteenth century as industrialization concentrates labor
and production in cities, spurring both utopian programs and political and social thought
on the political role and welfare of the worker. The criticism of liberalism and the utopian
socialists by Marx and Engels inaugurates another era for utopia and utopianism, one that
develops a perspective integrative of politics and economics and religion, and one that
refracts utopia and harnesses the appeal of totality, practice, and abstraction and deploys
it for what comes to be known as social theory.
Having considered how Utopia becomes a mobile, modern concept formed from
reflection on revolutionary events, Enlightenment philosophy, Marxist historical
materialism, and the emergence of political theory as a discourse, I now consider several
sites of its transposition into social theory. Social and political theory shows how mobile
Utopia can be, how its operations are a part of a more general kind of intellectual labor of
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comparison and contrast. This intellectual labor, however, enjoys a distinctly modern,
post-Enlightenment style of abstraction, category formation, differentiation, and
evaluation. These operations are in many ways related to what happens within the process
of reading Utopian literature—comparison, contrast, and evaluation. In the following
chapter, I will say more about how the Utopian literary form consolidates and
miniaturizes society, and thus colludes with other imaginative projects and fantasies that
give Utopia its particular charge by relating the subject and the social totality. Yet, before
turning to the particular literary form, I want to further expand how social theory has
adopted social totality for its own uses of describing and effecting change at the level of
structure and how, in this project, it gets caught, in ways as religious studies has—
between a static version of society for the benefit of tracking, authorizing, and
legitimizing practices in ideology and an active, open-ended logic of the subject's
experience of unfolding time and possibility.
Historicizing Social Theory for Utopia—and Vice Versa
The relationship of social theory to Utopia has both historical and thematic
connections: social theory emerges from the nineteenth century to correlate the complex
relations of economics, politics, and culture to individual experience. Society, for
political theory, is an artifact for manipulation. In social theory, society is an object of
study. The normative claims on political theory subsume Utopia under the work of
improving political relations. Social theory’s normative work is more ambiguous. The
emphasis is on charting the elements within society to show their relationships. Social
theory shares with Utopia this ambiguous relation to normative claims, its abstraction as
theory, and its interest in mapping the social as a totality with intricate moving parts.
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Goodwin and Taylor claim that, if Utopia has waned at the end of the twentieth century,
it is in part due to the rise of social science and its modeling of society as a totality
working in harmony. Ralf Dahrendorf, writing in the middle of the twentieth century,
calls on sociology to move on from this kind of utopian treatment of social contents.193
Where sociological theory fails to see the disruptive elements of society, it lapses into
treating society as a static entity with its elements in too-tightly bound cooperation to
reflect social process properly. While Dahrendorf, Michel Foucault, and others have
transformed sociology and its concepts, the ties of abstraction, representation, and
critique remain to link Utopia and social theory. These links play out in interesting ways
for social theory and Utopia, as well as for religious studies, with its methods influenced
by these theorists. In reviewing Levitas's sources, specifically Karl Mannheim, Ernst
Bloch, and E.P. Thompson, I find cases of how scholars struggled with the analytic tool
of social totality and its reifying effect as they sought to use social theory for social
transformation. Through revisiting these thinkers and their concerns, I raise up how
Utopia, cast as a conceptual operation of desire, attempts to suture the problematic of
representing the subject as both self-knowing agent and as effect of social process,
leaving the word "desire" to perform a host of functions of loss, comparison, and
aspiration in the face of an awareness of the structuring force that social theory attributes
to a historical entity called "society."
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Mannheim
An early and influential social theorist, Karl Mannheim, charted Utopia within the
social sphere, naming it as a force of novelty within social change.194 Mannheim is
consistent with Bloch and Manuel’s conception of "utopia" as a broad impulse to
betterment. He also notes the comprehensiveness of utopia and its investment in what not
currently in existence. Where he departs from them is his Marxist language that names
ideology as the force of sedimentation and contrasts this with Utopia as a force of
disruption. As mentioned above, Levitas sees how this puts Mannheim in line with others
who see Utopia in its function, not in its forms or functions.195 Mannheim is seeing that
social movements, in working towards better social conditions, use representations of
ideal social conditions to motivate their causes. Utopia is an idea that shatters the present
ideological frame. If ideas seem revolutionary or even authoritative, they will be tested
against the social givens and ideas of the time: wishes will rise and fall until they are so
bursting with urgency that they supersede the order around them. According to
Mannheim, they take over because the wish overwhelms with so much promise of
connecting people to the levers that power their existence, from an interpretive frame to
the actual material controls of their conditions of existence. Mannheim sees the root of
utopias within the alienation and oppression of their current systems.
Paul Ricoeur’s interpretation of Mannheim highlights not just the relation of
ideology and utopia, but also what distinguishes the form of utopia—its literary roots—as
a means to deliver its uses and roles within social processes. This becomes important for
what is possible for society. If utopia is confusing or too heterogeneous to categorize, it is
194
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because of its role of representing either what is outside of society or alternatives to what
society has to offer. This is not a single alternative but is often quite diverse. The debate
then begins about whether or not this alternative is actually better. The consistency of
contents—the revised family order, the organization of political life, the distribution of
material goods—can be a distraction for an analysis of utopia, Ricoeur claims, for first
identifying how utopia is structured to produce a position from which to analyze the
dense relations established within society. In order for any alternative to be registered as
better, it first must construct itself as a meaningful, significant difference. “Nowhere” of
utopia gives it this position of difference from which to launch a legitimate alternative. It
then becomes subject to judgment.
It is this approximate distance provided by utopia that engages it within the gears
of ideology. Ideology, as defined by Marx and expanded by Ricoeur, fundamentally
functions “to pattern, to consolidate, to provide order to the course of action." If ideology
distorts the real relations of existence for the purposes of a ruling class, it does so to
enable the current authorities to continue. Thus, ideology has a conservative function.196
Utopia is disruptive to this conservative function where it subverts not only present
authorities but also undermines these authorities’ claim to legitimacy. Utopia challenges
power, both those with power and, more substantially, the ways power works without
resorting to violence. Ricoeur expands Mannheim’s theorized relationship between
ideology and utopia with this emphasis on how utopia inspires and, paradoxically, can
produce violent revolution. Ricoeur also adds to Mannheim by exploring how utopia’s
pathology corresponds to ideology’s pejorative valence of manipulation: both are most
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destructive when they distance themselves from the material conditions. The dysfunction
of ideology is distortion and dissimulation; utopia loses its potency for exposing the
operations of power when its images detach into regressive nostalgia or a distraction for
acting, or, in Marxist terms, the praxis of lived existence. Ideology and utopia are thus
connected through their roles in indexing different moments in the social imaginary. Both
traffic in the symbols of the culture, in the representations, ideas and conceptions that
preserve social relations within material conditions. They compliment each other in the
ways that they stand in as figures at different points in the concealment and critique of
real relations.
Levitas revisits Mannheim—and Ricoeur's reading—in her final chapter and
concludes that, for the purposes recognizing the human desire for better living in its
fullest sense and as still active in the present day, both Left and Right politics can be seen
for their ways of better living, even if they are conservative in their direction. I think this
a correct reading of Mannheim, but, by losing the Marxist critique in her definition by
proposing a comparative "better way of being," Levitas loses the oppositional force that
Utopia signals, especially at the level of social totality and the way that Utopia signifies
social reorganization as the source of that improvement. Also missing in Levitas's reading
is the representational economy that Utopia is embedded in. I can understand how Utopia
and ideology can collapse into one another, however both maintain their life through
material culture as the source and destination for the imagination and this is not sustained
by Levitas's definition towards impulse or desire. Levitas's use of desire, in uses of
Mannheim, Bloch, and others in the Marxist lineage implies this representational lineage
but then centers back on the affective or energetic level. While desire may be aligned
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with more affective registers via Luce Irigaray or Gilles Deleuze in reaction to the
psychoanalytic discourses of desire, these thinkers are not in her genealogy.197 I agree
that Utopia and ideology need to be seen in their cooperative work, and that Utopia
cannot alone be thought of as a novel insight or novum that refreshes social life and
motivates social transformation; it does still carry alterity to the status quo that is more
than a comparatively better condition. As I argue in the next chapter, Utopia is best
analyzed as a historical figure, not as a concept, and both ideology and Utopia carry
within them the social contradictions of their historical contexts and, to different degrees,
formulate solutions and satisfactions of better ways of living. What distinguishes Utopia
from ideology is how it images the social totality through representation and offers the

197

Levitas's engagements with the discourses of desire comes up in the new preface to the reissue of The
Concept of Utopia in 2010. In responding to critics and interlocutors, she reports: "Others have been
puzzled by the category of desire, wrongly assuming a Lacanian reference, and this too would have merited
further explanation, or at least a disclaimer. Lacanian psychoanlaysis makes me lose the will to live, which
seems a dystopian rather than utopian effect; and the Blochian of desire, hunger, longing has a broader
existential reach." xiii-xiv. She nods to Deleuze here, saying that "Lacan's theorization of desire can be
brought to bear on questions of utopia, and the work of both Gilles Deleuze and Slavoj Zizek is important
here." xiv. However, she stays with Bloch and Marcuse, not broaching either Deleuze or Lacan to clarify
her position. As I see these genealogies, Deleuze and Irigaray both are arguments against Lacanian
psychoanalysis with emphasis on affect, materialism, and intimacies whereas Lacan's (and Jameson's) route
is with narrative, language, and structuralism. To link Utopia to these discourses, as I am arguing, requires
an account of form, and not only impulse. Lucy Sargisson connects Iriagary and utopia via theme of
transgression in Contemporary Feminist Utopias but as I propose in Chapter Three, the connection is better
mapped by form than theme. As for Deleuze and Utopia, Deleuze's remapping of desire is an extensive
revisioning of power (of the Foucaultian kind) and affect. This would be a fruitful exploration that could
easily include Bloch's temporal, anticipatory ontology. Deleuze's desire fits well with Bloch's impulse but
in a less universal way. Deleuze offers this definition in an interview: " But why? For me, desire does not
comprise any lack; neither is it a natural given; it is but one with an assemblage of heterogenous elements
which function; it is process, in contrast with structure or genesis; it is affect, as opposed to feeling; it is
'haecceity' (individuality of a day, a season, a life), as opposed to subjectivity; it is event, as opposed to
thing or person. And above all it implies the constitution of a field of immanence or a 'body without
organs', which is only defined by zones of intensity, thresholds, gradients, flux." Deleuze, section D in
"Desire and Pleasure" trans. Melissa McMahon, editorial forward Francois Ewald,
www.artdes.monash.edu.au. accessed 01/16/2012.One path connecting Deleuze and Utopia is through
Bloch's use of process and open temporality, mapped by Susan McManus in "Fabricating the Future:
Becoming Bloch's Utopians," Utopian Studies 14, no. 2, (2003): 1-22.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20720008. For my own treatment of the potential relationship of Delueze to
Utopia via the constitution of collectivities, see Holly White,"Desiring Utopian Subjects: Collectivity and
Its Discontents," in Hope and the Longing for Utopia: Futures and Illusions in Theology and Narrative, ed.
Daniel Boscaljon (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2014), 58-78.

137
"better way of being" through a proposed collectivity that can disarm the antagonism of
the self and its situation. To reorganize Levitas's formulation, what distinguishes Utopia
is that it calls out the scarcity gap as socially constructed and satisfies the subject through
a reorganized society. As always, this is a fantasy, an impossibility, but, in its proposal
and formalization, society does change, if only in the way that it reflects on its own
construction and sees possibility where there was once nature.
Bloch and Thompson
As mentioned above, Levitas makes the most use of Bloch and E.P. Thompson for
her own theory of desire and utopia for reasons that relate strongly to my own project of
clarifying the representational dilemmas of social constructionist and existential
dimensions of subjective life. Levitas is aware of this problem and registers it in her
discussions with Bloch and Thompson, but most forcefully in the conclusion of her
chapter on William Morris. Here, Levitas sifts through the arguments left over by E.P.
Thompson, Perry Anderson, Paul Meier, and Michael Lowy about the reception of
Morris as Marxist. The concerns run along the lines that claiming Morris for both
Marxism and Utopia leaves behind a legacy of Marxist antipathy to Utopia. In a moment,
I will explain more of what is at stake in these exchanges about Morris for my own
reading of Utopia specifically. Levitas's closing paragraphs, however, gesture to what I
regard as central to Utopia and its relation critical religious studies: the problematic of the
obstacles scholars face in representing self and the social world.
In these paragraphs, Levitas raises sets of pairs that seem not to resolve: Marxism
and Utopia, Romanticism and utilitarianism, knowledge and desire. Levitas presents that
these are just formulations of another question: it is not a choice between Romantic and
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utilitarian, or a problematic relationship between "Marxism" and "utopia." "The real
problem,” she explains, “is how we should think about the future and, specifically, how
we should think about feelings and about experience." Any effort at synthesis—or claim
of synthesis—is misguided:
In the form of knowledge versus desire and the cold and warm streams,
Thompson and Bloch propose their dialectical relationship, stopping short
of a synthesis which overcomes the difference and tension between them.
If some writers manage to synthesize the two it is a fragile synthesis,
constantly in danger of disintegrating into its component parts.198
The route through is a dialectical relationship provided by Thompson and Bloch who stop
short of a synthesis. But here, as in the end of her work, Levitas truncates the movement
of the dialectic. As I argued above, she does not provide enough ballast for her use of
desire and leaves out the role of representation in this construction, ending on the side of
a humanist self that she, in other ways, so carefully frames as constructed. Her own use
of desire could do more for “thinking about feelings," depending, from what I can tell,
too much on aspects of Thompson that exceed her discussion. I posit this dependence
because of her rejection of the psychoanalytic streams in Bloch and Marcuse. I will first
discuss her presentation and rejection of Marcuse's and Bloch's psychoanalysis, then her
hesitant use of Bloch, and finally the arguments that sit behind Thompson’s own
dependence on desire to frame the problematic that Levitas and I are both addressing.
Psychoanalysis: Marcuse and Bloch
While Levitas appropriates Bloch and Marcuse's Freudo-Marxist language of
desire, she disavows the erotic, libidinal components of their projects.199 She gives only
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eight lines to Bloch's re-reading of Freud, an argument that hinges on reworking
daydreams, night dreams, and fantasy as not part of a repressed unconscious memory of
unacceptable sexual fantasy but as a part of the filling in of consciousness with
anticipation.200 The more sustained attention to psychoanalytic language is through
Marcuse, but even after a chapter-length treatment of his promotion of Freudian drives
and their surfacing in commodity culture and repression through wage labor economy,
Levitas denies any association of libidinal or erotic force to her use of desire. After
raising their use of desire as it relates to utopia, she strikes out the claims to
psychoanalysis as used by her sources of desire by how they have associated utopia with
an essential human impulse: "The ides of a utopian impulse is, however, both
unnecessary and unverifiable. The idea of an innate impulse to utopianizing is intimately
bound up with essentialist definitions of human needs and human nature, which are
themselves deeply problematic." While I agree that an essential utopianizing is
problematic, and separately, that a Freudian account of innate drives is problematic,
Levitas does not offer a better account of the mechanisms of desire other than that they
are socially-constructed and not unrelated to ideology, as discussed above. She shifts to
associating the lack of an innate utopian impulse with an anxiety about its contemporary
expression, not offering any hint how desire has anything more to do with sexual
difference, conscious and/or unconscious processes, or repression. Desire, here now
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attached to utopia, emerges untroubled, consistent, and directive, offered by social
conditions, disconnected from the body but attached to subjects.
Levitas situates Bloch in a stream like William Morris that flows with both
Marxism and Romanticism, finding trouble with the places that Bloch veers in and out of
his materialist commitments and relies too heavily on the satisfactions that aesthetics
provide individuals for both their experiences of fulfillment and as outlets to express their
hopeful futures. Where her uses and criticisms of Bloch most intersect my questions
about the problematics of representing self and social registers in critical work are in her
characterization of him as insufficiently materialist for her own sensibility. Levitas avers
that Bloch depends heavily on a Marxist historical materialism for his analysis of utopia
that directs towards a future of an un-alienated society where equality and fraternity
become available after a revolution towards socialism and then to full communism.201
She is skeptical that this Marxist teleology can really be so associated with the broadly
available anticipatory consciousness that is within all wishes, and sees where his
argument would be helped by delineating the contents and forms that divide the lesspurposeful abstract wishing from its more explicitly practical political concrete "will-full"
projects towards those ends.202 Where Levitas's criticisms grow cloudy are where she
identifies Bloch's way of endeavoring to weave together what Bloch himself calls the
"cold" and "warm" streams of Marxism—the cold stream of analysis, of a "science of

201

Levitas, Concept, 96-97.
The slide first moves from wishes to actions, and then from abstractions to concrete: "All wishful
thinking thus draw attention to the shortcomings of reality, a necessary step on the way to change. In
addition, the Not yet is intended to convey not just the interdependence of want an satisfaction, but the
drive from one to the other, towards change—not just wishful, but will-full thinking." Her discussion of his
abstract and concrete distinction proceeds in the next section and later his failure to give more specifics of
content that would distinguish the abstract and concrete utopias. Levitas, Concept, 88-90, 100.
202

141
conditions," and the warm of the "passionate pursuit of un-alienated experience."203
Levitas argues that Bloch too heavily depends on the warm stream for his position of
utopia, focusing on aesthetic works as a broad expression of utopianism that he
disconnects from the processes of material production and his emphasis on subjective
experience.204
While I agree with this observation of Bloch's work, I do not think that her own
work does much more to escape this tendency towards the liberal-humanist pole that she
keeps pressing as the alternative to the Marxist formulation. Her introduction of his
chapter lifts from his Principle of Hope that "dreams of a better life" –from daydreams
escape to religious forms—are what direct actions that go on to transform the future.205
The chapter's concluding sentences also hold out his utopia for the way it "involves
fundamental questions about the human condition and its future" and his refusal to
"abandon faith in that future.”206 As mentioned in Part One, her definition of desire relays
a more individualized "better being" than the collectivity and coordination of
satisfactions of individuals and community that I see operating in the historicized form of
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Utopia. Also, it makes no use of the relationship of Utopia to the abstraction of "society"
as a fantasized social totality that enables scholars to derive a socially-constructed
subject. Instead, it leans back on the work of desire, yet an anti-psychoanalytic formation
of it.
Education of Desire: E.P. Thompson
Thus, Levitas's use of desire derives most from E.P. Thompson's description of
William Morris. In her chapter on Morris's role in English Marxism, Levitas lifts from
Thompson's biography of Morris a phrase that originates with French critic Miguel
Abensour: the "education of desire." In claiming Morris as both a writer of Utopias and
not just romances, and also as a visionary for a socialist society of England with proper
revolutionary credentials, Thompson follows Absensour in recognizing a new kind of
Marxism with Morris, one that resisted a Marxist tradition that "was becoming enclosed
within a self-confirming doctrinal circularity" and instead had a more heuristic, Utopian
discourse, one that rejected Engel's strict scientism and the classical Utopianism of
"juridico-political model building."207 What was released with Morris's New from
Nowhere was precisely something romantic and archaic—sounding of fantasy—to
present "alternative values sketched in an alternative way of life."208 In detaching from
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naturalism, from precision, Morris offers a "challenge to the imagination to become
immersed in the same open exploration.
And in such an adventure two things happen: our habitual values (the
commonsense" of bourgeois society) are thrown into disarray. and we
enter into Utopia's proper and new-found space: the education of desire.
This is not the same as "a moral education" towards a given end: it is,
rather, to pen a way to aspiration, to 'teach desire to desire, to desire better,
to desire more, and above all to desire in a different way."209
This is Thompson quoting Abensour, who will then be quoted by Levitas with the same
formulation. I repeat this as both recognition of the archaeology of this idea—which is
repeated often in other texts about Utopia—but also for its potential in contributing to my
own analysis of the role that the figure of Utopia has as both aesthetic object and its
signifying position in the problematic that I have been addressing throughout my
dissertation—the obstacle of giving both a social constructionist account and what is
more casually called a "humanist" version of the subject—incremental spatiotemporality,
immediacy, or the strike of affect that feels like and goes by the name of "just living life."
Thompson's concern with Morris centers on just this question: "Was Morris a
Marxist or a not-Marxist?" Here, Thompson reflects in his text a question that
biographers of Thompson have pegged to Thompson's own position within English
Marxism and an argument that Thompson had with both the stricter materialism(s) of the
socialist party in England from the 1950s and with Althusser's structural Marxism in the
1970s. The argument, as Anderson portrays it, is that Thompson opposes "desire" to
"knowledge" and then privileges "desire," which Anderson rejects as a "fashionable
philosophy of Parisian irrationalism." Anderson associates it with Deleuze and Guattari's
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Anti-Oedipus and "the expression of a dejected post-lapsarian anarchism. Intellectually,
the category operates as a license for the exercise of any fantasy freed from the
responsibility of cognitive controls."210 Andersons' own analysis moves between Morris's
and Thompson's Marxisms, but Thompson is Anderson's ultimate target in the way that
Thompson's Marxism has more than enough romanticism of its own, calling out where
Thompson overcorrects for the structuralism around him, linking “values” with
“feelings” against “ideas” in The Poverty of Theory (1978). Levitas work wades into
Anderson's evaluation, coming out on the side of Thompson in her concluding
paragraphs, as mentioned above: Thompson wins the day because he does not attempt a
synthesis of feelings and thought, but allows them their dialectical relation.
This dialectic of Thompson's work is not explicit in Levitas. But reading more of
Thompson shows how his method of social history weaves the "cold" and "warm"
streams. One of the most famous passages from The Poverty of Theory addresses how
crucial human experience is in Marxist history and Marxist praxis:
Experience walks in without knocking at the door, and announces deaths,
crises of subsistence, trench warfare, unemployment, inflation, genocide.
People starve: their survivors think in new ways about the market. People
are imprisoned: in prison they meditate in new ways about the law.211
In this particular polemic against Althusser's "irrational" and "theological" Marxism,
Thompson makes vivid what is at stake in his own commitments to social history as a
method: to draw out what in Marx made Marxism necessary. Resisting what he saw as
rigid materialism within both places of Marxist practice and theory, Thompson set out to
articulate the formation of a class as a process of both conditioning and agency, and that
210

Perry Anderson, Arguments Within English Marxism (New York: Verso, 1980), 161.
The Poverty of Theory and other Essays (London: Merlin, 1978), 200-01. Quoted in Scott Hamilton, The
Crisis of Theory: E.P. Thompson, The New Left, and Post-War British Politics (New York: Manchester
University Press, 2011), 199.
211

145
while the productive relations of capitalism might create the contours of class, they did
not offer how the consciousness of class would be particular to different social
locations.212 Seeing the formation of class in motion, he highlighted the cultural and
psychological resources that factory workers drew on for their own consciousness,
specifically the discourses of birthrights and freedom of expression from the British
Enlightenment.213 Thompson, through readings of Giambattista Vico and William Morris
together, saw how human actions appeared simultaneously free and unfree, and that there
was a dialectical relation of particular individuals to their social locations that could not
be accounted for in Marxist materialism.214 In a biography of Thompson's intellectual
work and its relation to his nuclear activism, Michael Bess summarizes that for
Thompson,
Human agency, therefore, was alike a form of play taking place within
limits—limits whose evolution the players could consciously influence
over time. Each individual possessed a finite yet open-ended opportunity
to contribute to the shaping of culture.215
Thompson resisted the reduction of humans to abstract categories, using close readings of
specific historical circumstances as his method to draw out how individuals synthesized
both the structures that impinged on them and their own role in interacting with and
potentially changing their structures.

212

A close reading of Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class is put to use for analyzing his
perception by other English Marxists in Theodore Koditschek, “The Possibilities of Theory: Thompson’s
Marxist History,” in E.P. Thompson and English Radicalism, ed. Roger Fieldhouse and Richard Taylor
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 71.
213
Koditschek, “The Possibilities of Theory," 72.
214
In his chapter on Thompson, Bess recounts the risks and oppositions that Thompson held that
distinguished his intellectual work as reflecting his political commitments to social life of people and how
Thompson's resistance to structural Marxism was because of how it failed to address the needs of those he
studied. Michael Bess, Utopia and the Mushroom Cloud: Four Activist Intellectuals and Their Strategies
for Peace, 1945-1989 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 122.
215
Bess, Utopia and the Mushroom Cloud, 122.

146
This background of Thompson is imported into Levitas, not made explicit. But,
by rejecting explicitly psychoanalytic, erotic desire, in focusing on the "cold" and "warm"
streams that Bloch highlights, and in referencing the arguments in British Marxism over
Morris's legacy, Levitas suggests this archive is what is guiding her formulation of desire
as common to places where scarcity gaps, constructed under particular historical
conditions, generate interest in making life better. Levitas wants utopia to exceed any
form, to be known as experience itself:
Utopia does not express desire, but enables people to work towards an
understanding of what is necessary for human fulfillment, a broadening,
deepening and raising aspirations in terms quite different from those of
their everyday life. Thus News from Nowhere, as a critique of alienation,
does not just ask us to think about an alternative society, but invites us to
experience what it would mean to be fully in possession of our own
humanity—an experience which Bloch claims is offered to us through
artistic works in the ‘fulfilled moment.216
I agree with Levitas that Marxism—or more generally critical, social constructionist
approaches—struggle to work with human experience in their texts and that desire is
related to this articulation. I, however, argue that there are ways other than hers, more
inclusive of the ruptures that Thompson endeavors to include that are theoretically tuned
and methodologically coherent with critical theory. This is my figure of Utopia that
interprets Utopia for its contradictions, for its explicit appeals to fantasy, and for its
address to the affective, libidinal dimensions of collectivity that Bloch calls forth but that
Wegner warns of as dimensions of a nation-state subjectivation and individualization that
excludes as it includes—a process still underway. I argue that staying focused on the
Utopian literary form delivers something of the experiential that Levitas wants to capture
with "desire." Theory is here to play a role in this labor, but differently than her more
216
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straightforward analytic directs or the affective charge that is carried in
Abensour's/Thompson's "education of desire" that too easily is wrapped in its own
tautological vortex. The materiality she endeavors to insert with desire too quickly
disintegrates with her formulation, and what might be a generic fantasy becomes
indistinguishable from something properly Utopian.
This chapter argued that the weaknesses of a generalized utopian theory, rather
than failings, are evidence of the presence of another valuable discourse struggling to
hold up the subject and its particularity within structural methods of analysis. Utopian
theory brings these two points of view together by defining Utopia as a dream, an
impulse to fantasy, and as desire. These efforts, I contended, are displacements of two
orders: one, of the structural dilemma of sustaining both of these perspectives at once—
the concrete relation of subject to society and the fantasy of a perfect and total society—
and two, of Utopia's role in signifying contradiction, specifically the contradiction of
sustaining those two in perspective to one another. Simply said, Utopia both enacts and
represents the enactment of this contradiction. Thus, naming Utopia as fantasy is not
"wrong," but the theoretical labor in collecting social diversity and contradictory
elements under one heading that is, itself, a label for the rifts of social contradiction,
creates itself as a Utopian form. This is not merely another case of another modern
malady, however. Utopian theory holds insights to its own formation that can be attended
to through its history. When Utopia's history is engaged, Utopia is seen not only for how
Utopia (it, or, the genre) reflects the abstraction of "society," but also how the genre
inflects this abstraction, shaping it as it is used in the study of religion, carrying in it
intonations of collectivity and oppositional logics as residues of its Utopian history. As I
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retraced Levitas's use of desire through its particular locations in twentieth-century
European and English Marxism, I found more to recommend that Utopia and desire are
more suitably understood through this history—the one that shows the conflict of
representing raw existence and the productive fantasy of social totality as a part and
parcel of critical theory. From this point, I want to pursue how this dilemma—the
problematic of representation—is figured by Utopian narratives. There is much that is
consistent between my understanding of the role of Utopian literature and Thompson's—
something I will develop next. I want to show, however, that psychoanalytic discourses
have a role to play in understanding the desire for Utopia as it affects modern life
generally and critical projects specifically.
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Chapter Three
Utopian Literature: Formal Conventions and Figuration
This chapter continues my argument that critical approaches in Religious Studies
can be supported in their dilemma of representing the structuring forces of society and the
subjects structured by these forces by considering how the figure of Utopia signifies this
diremption. As I argued in the previous chapter, theorists of Utopia dissolve historical
and social differences in attempting to create a more widely applicable, generalized
"desire." In seaming the contradictions of Utopia, they collapse into unity what is better
viewed for its differences. This leaves unexamined some suppositions about coherent
subjectivity of desire—a critique that is immanent to the use of desire and dreaming but
that go unexamined. In short, scholars such as Sargent and Levitas propose that Utopia is
about desire, but lack a theory of desire. I have proposed that by historicizing Utopian
theory for these investments, critical scholars can make better use of Utopia by naming it
as a figure that displaces the contradictions experienced by western, modern subjects into
an aesthetic, delivering a pleasure of a temporary resolution. This chapter further
examines Utopia as an aesthetic figure within modernity and its role as a deposit for
modern fantasies. By analyzing the Utopian literary form and how it consolidates and
represents self and social through the dual expressions of social totality and collectivity,
critical scholars of religion can consider how intellectual projects may reflect dimensions
of a desire for modern Utopia. I will make these applications to Religious Studies explicit
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in Chapter Four, considering there how the Marxian desire for social transformation is
predicated on representations of social totality and collectivity.
In this chapter, I will further explain how I derive my category of Utopian desire
from modern literary form and the Marxist literary criticism of Fredric Jameson. As
explicated in the previous chapter, scholars of Utopia should not subsume its violent
aspects into a well-modulated desire, but instead interpret it as a historicized, modern
figure. Here I continue with these Marxist approaches and argue that, in representing the
idealized society, Utopia is more precisely a formal resolution of social contradictions
that offers a means to analyze the material conditions that form subjects and inform
subjective perspectives. I first consider how the genre of Utopian narrative fiction, taking
its cues from More's inaugural satire about a distant island, figures itself as a genre of
boundaries. I argue that the Utopian literary form suspends both the fantasy of
satisfaction and the blunt reality of social contradiction simultaneously through its
conventions of travel and boundary crossing. I then consider, through Jameson's Marxist
and psychoanalytic frames, how modern literary forms generally, and the Utopian literary
form specifically, hold together the desires that inflect and accompany modernity and
capitalism, particularly those that speak to the anxieties that arise from social
contradictions. Jameson regards literature as a repository of ideological and libidinal
investments that can bring into view the pleasures of analysis as well as put the
interpreter into contact with conflicts of analytic and existential perspectives with which
modern humans wrestle. Literature holds the ideological wish fulfillments of their
communities, yet also can be sites for confronting the ways that society delivers those
ideological fantasies to the reader through their place in symbolic and imaginary
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networks. Jameson, I contend, offers a robust historicism along with a means to consider
the existential, lived dimension of social life, inclusive of that affective and libidinal
attachments that limn and contour that social life and give off the impression of "personal
experience." I conclude from Jameson's formal method that Utopia develops as a figure
within modernity for holding together two, entwined desires: one, of representing social
life as a totality for analytic and explanatory purposes and two, for ending the
experiences of incongruity or conflict that appear as generated from the production,
distribution, and organization of material and social life. As such, Utopia is a fantasy of
the fulfillment of the self through the social—a cognitive fulfillment of social totality and
an affective fulfillment of collectivity.
I am particularly drawn to how Jameson's formal method bridges the immediacy
of the present with the difficulty of thinking this present and how critical thought is an
extension of this difficulty. He notes the obstacles to formulating thought under the
conditions of western commodity culture—specifically American-style—conditions
which include the "techniques of mystification practiced by the media and particularly by
advertising in its enormous expansion since the onset of the Cold War" in the 1970s.
Since that moment, he perceives a further expansion, an "invincible universality of
capitalism." Even with social gains on the left, socioeconomic alternatives to capitalism
seem not only unviable, but unthinkable.217 The most recent (2016) of his published
writing, an essay called An American Utopia,218 answers his own challenge to think
Utopia under these conditions, offering both diagnosis and prescription with a large dose
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of self-conscious humor.219 His keen attention to the present cultivates a type of
historicism that tracks present knowledge production as consciously modern in its
formulations of history, change, and abstraction for the service of analysis and
postmodern in its awareness of the faults, failures, and inadequacies of the project of
thought—all within micro and macro climates of capitalist reification, commodification,
and instrumentalization. Out of the present tense, Jameson looks around and understands
the moment as marked by a crisis of representation. In postmodernity, representation is
not conceived as a dilemma, but as an impossibility; "reason, turned cynical, has been
displaced by art and the multiplicity of images, none of which corresponds to 'truth.'"220
He observes how this is distinct from modernism's own crisis of representation that took
on "heroic formal invention and the grandiose prophetic visions of the modernist
seers."221 The present tense of postmodernity does not lead to or excuse relativism; it
demands new commitments to history and to praxis with the awareness of these as always
incomplete and both useful and longed for in the face of the proliferations of social life
into more and more forms due to reification and commodification.
By interpreting the Utopia as a modern figure within a postmodern moment, I
identify Utopia as providing the pleasures of an imaginary social wholeness along with a
potential interpretive satisfaction of glimpsing the saturations and sedimentations of the
social on the subject. I conclude that Utopia can be a means for critical religious studies
scholars to investigate these twin desires—one, of representing social totality through
219
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social construction and two, of the attunement of the self to the social as collectivity and
the possibilities of the end of social contradiction. Interpreting Utopia for these aspects
generates perspectives relevant to the critical study of religion for the way that the
Utopian form is itself a "social construction"—a constructed society. This overlap affords
a momentary glimpse of the scholar's affective attachments to analyzing society for its
constructedness.
Outline
In Part One, I claim that Utopia develops as a figure for thinking social change
and difference by way of its status as an aesthetic object—specifically modern literary
fiction. If Utopia has come to signify a desire for a better way of living (as Levitas avers),
it does so by the way that modern readers have encountered narratives of travel to
isolated communities that function smoothly and present happy inhabitants. When Utopia
is seen through its literary forms and conventions, it removes Utopia from the category of
philosophical concept to one of aesthetic figure and directs attention to how thought—
especially thought about Utopia—is a matter of comparatives, sustained by a logic of
spatial relation. I advance these claims by first discussing some of the issues that are
raised by isolating Utopia as a genre of literary fiction and discover the homology of
Utopia and genre: that both are made possible by their boundaries. Like in Chapter Two,
Utopia again is mired in representational problems related to its own form. I untangle
these threads by describing some features of Utopian literature, turning specifically to
how the narratives themselves are constructed out of differential space and assert new
spaces for thought because of the traveler or narrator. Utopias, then are travel narratives
of alternative, self-sufficient societies that move the reader dialectically between worlds,
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generating a mix of familiarity and unfamiliarity that ultimately propels the reader to
recognize their own social world and its complex problems. Utopias are and are not like
other narratives: they rely on structures of narrative satisfaction but present them spatially
instead of through a temporal resolution of plot. Here, I note some closely related genres
like dystopias and Science Fiction and compare them for how they differently figure the
crux of the Utopian form—spatial difference—and how difference is both a register for
otherness as social groups but also, in the postmodern turn, differential subjectivities.
Thus, claims of a Utopian future are more precisely understood primarily through an
aesthetic logic of spatial and not temporal difference.
In Part Two, I (re)turn to Fredric Jameson from Chapter One. Jameson's analysis
of modern western literature highlights the role cultural products have not only in
circulating and expressing ideological contents but also in relaying historical shifts
through diverse literary forms. Jameson's thought affords both a materialist-historical and
Lacanian analysis of cultural production that supports my argument that Utopia can be a
useful tool for framing the problematics of representing attachments and affections that
afflict and comfort, at the same time as proposing these as social constructions to be
analyzed as aspects of a social totality. I relate Jameson's broad Marxist formalism to
Utopian literature specifically. Jameson underscores how narrative Utopias frame and
consolidate the social contradictions of capitalism for those in Western Europe and North
America. Their attention to quotidian details and revised human political and material
intercourse are representations of societies both similar to and different from those of
their authors and readers. Jameson adds dimensions to historical materialism and formal
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analysis that permit a historicization of thought and categories themselves, not just the
works he analyzes, making him a particularly rich addition to critical methods of religion.
I. Utopian Literary Form—a Genre of Boundaries
A common or conventional understanding of Utopia is that it represents a perfect
or an ideal society. In this section, I argue against this traditional definition of Utopia to
privilege the boundaries of Utopia and to argue that recognizing the constructedness of an
alterative, fictional society catapults one to consider the constructedness of thought itself.
In the previous chapter, I argued that Utopia has historical connection to a particular
moment of European nation-state building and becomes abstracted as something more
general through its use by political and social theory. In this section, I continue with this
argument by showing how the political realities of modernity get translated through the
literary form of Utopia and then, in the ways that thought can be considered as a spatial
operation. I contend that fixations or fantasies of satisfaction in the modern era are
signified through wholeness or totality, especially as it can be characterized as a humandirected society. First, I discuss this wholeness as it presents in anxiety of boundaries of
the genre of Utopia itself. I present three theorists of Utopian genre, each of whom
demonstrates for me how intellectual claims have material and political dimensions.
These are the historical conditions of nation-state formation, differential category
formation in modern scholarship, and sexual politics in the late twentieth century. I
reference how theorists have defined the Utopian genre of literature and in so doing,
demonstrate the inherently historical and political dimension of all category formations.
These topics are particularly relevant to my questions of the critical study of religion in
that each reflects a different dimension of the problematics of representation inherited
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from modernity now more evident within our late capitalist, postmodern situation: the
necessary but limited nature of category formation; the political and economic material
realities as informing these categories; and the assumed modern, masculine liberal subject
of knowledge production that has been challenged by psychoanalytic interpretations and
feminist restatements.
I determine from these discussions that several Utopian literary conventions can
serve as a means to investigate these problematics because of the "wholeness" that Utopia
represents. I identify several conventions for discussion: Utopias are travel narratives that
have boundaries that people cross, moving the reader dialectically between worlds and
generating a mix of familiarity and unfamiliarity that ultimately propels the reader into a
realization or recognition of estrangement while simultaneously satisfying the reader
through the double closure of a narrative ending and the Utopian society. Said another
way, the fantasy of satisfaction, fulfillment, or wholeness is given shape as a bounded
society that redirects attention to material, lived, social reality. After discussing these
conventions and the reading protocols that they demand, I consider how Utopia
transitions from literary form into cultural signifier or figure. Drawing on the work of
Louis Marin, I propose that the heightened drama of estrangement propels Utopia into a
figure that ties its signification back to an aesthetic form more than to a philosophical
concept. Through this analysis of the Utopian literary form, I clarify how Utopia, when
recognized for these mechanisms of its literary production, is in a longer line of
representational logics that wrestle with the presence/absence of signification. Thus,
Utopia is layered with several kinds of satisfactions and deferrals which are, in Lacanian
discourses, the movements that constitute desire itself.
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Utopia Literary Genre
Deciding the boundaries of a genre is, in some senses, a reflection of the
boundary-making projects across modernity. This can be seen in three discussions of
Utopian genre. The first is with how the effort to claim a territory of a specific genre of
"Utopian literature" is an intellectual mirror to the material history of European nationstate development. Phillip Wegner makes use of the homology of Utopian genre and the
form of Utopias as discourses of boundary in his argument for interpreting Utopian
literatures as reflective and constitutive of modern nation-state, where the double move of
bounded collectivity of place and people—a nation— and the "abstracting social
mechanism, the state" combine to form a contradiction of a universalizing move and a
contracting, particularizing gesture.222 Wegner relates genre formation to modernity and
Utopia: genre itself comes into being through its crossing of boundaries—national
culture, temporalities and canons or sets of other literatures, forming and reforming like
an institution with its own sets of conventions and practices. As the genre becomes rigid
enough to be recognized, it then becomes "portable" in the sense that its conventions can
be picked up by other literatures and reference other places.223 Wegner claims that the
development of the Utopian narrative and the institutionalization of the nation-state each
are reflections of this kind of movement and formation of genre: genre disseminates like
a nation-state and also is a vehicle of nation-state dissemination.
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Utopian fictions reproduce the spatial logics of nation-states by the bounded,
isolated and organized groups they encounter through some travel escapade, reflecting
geographies of the maps available in the real worlds of their authors while at the same
time producing interior space of imaginative production in the readership developing
within these colonializing contexts—readers at home reading of abroad and developing
new horizons of interior subjectivities. Referencing Henri Lefebvre's The Production of
Space, Wegner points to how the reified Enlightenment conceptualization of space as a
static construct is more precisely "an open-ended, conflicted, and contradictory
process."224 Thus, the genre of Utopian narratives results from larger political
contradictions: the extension of rights and privileges to citizens of states when the
dominant understanding of these same rights is constructed out of exclusions and
otherness. Reflecting on specific Utopian literature, as Wegner shows, is an occasion to
consider how the author-readers of particular places articulate the contests of who
belongs, how they belong and where belonging occurs as ambivalences of the violence
necessary to secure belonging. Like the time traveler Julian West in Bellamy's Looking
Backward (1889), returning home from the idyllic future is a nightmare—a terrible
outcome. Thankfully, it is only nightmare: West wakes up again, restored to Boston in
2000. And like his middle class Americans he is addressing, they too should learn to
forget their European immigrant pasts and come into assimilationist ideology. Wegner's
spatial analysis of Utopian genre directs attention to the ways in which the material
conditions—in this case, spatial markers of national identities—are reflected in the texts
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themselves at both the level of a formal convention, e.g. a traveler, and the sentiments
expressed through these forms, e.g. belonging.
A second means for considering Utopian genre for modernity is the way that
genre allows the reader to move dialectically between worlds. Asking this question of the
division of literature from non-literary Utopias, Gary Saul Morson resists the collapse of
fiction and non-fiction for the genre of Utopia where political tracts cozy up to satires and
Science Fiction, as in the case of J.H. Hexter's More's Utopia: A Biography of an Idea.225
Morson distinguishes Utopia's fictional aspects as part of a "contract" for the reader that
does not present a plausible sequence of events like a novel but yet, has a realism—that is
still different from realism as a genre.226 Utopian fictions propose, claim and assert in
ways that novels do not and thus require different reading protocols than novels—a
distinction I make below. His larger argument, however, is to situate Dostoevsky within a
field of Utopian genre, despite the Russian writer's notably anti-Utopian texts such as The
Brothers Karamozov. His proposal moves to advance Utopia with three neat criteria:
written with a nod or in a tradition to previous Utopian works, depicting an ideal society,
and advocating the realization of that society when viewed as a whole text.227 His rereading of Dostoevsky's The Writer's Diary is a larger project than what my own research
undertakes, but Morson's challenge to view Utopian texts "as a whole" so as to consider
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them for their polemical role raises the question of the relationship of the category of a
genre and the conventions of that genre. Is there something about the "whole text" that
relates to the wholeness or completeness of the society that it represents? This slippage of
the tools of analysis and the form of the work are framed within Fredric Jameson’s
theorizations as a case for historicizing critical approaches—attending to how arguments
and analytic tools reflect particular concerns of historical moments and resemble their
aesthetics. Jameson does not make an explicit point about this collusion of wholeness at
the level of analysis and form, addressing instead another register in Morson on irony,
modernity and Utopia, but I want to hold out that Morson's association of Utopia with
wholeness can offer insight into the general social reception of Utopian literature and
help to understand its ability to generate a particular kind of desire that is recognizable as
Utopian.228
The third account of the Utopian genre comes from a consideration of late modern
and postmodern feminist Utopian fiction, introduced by literary theorist Lucy Sargisson.
Sargisson argues against a traditional reading of utopianism that makes it about closure,
perfection, and blueprints and emphasizes instead its subversions of status quo and
foregrounds process, imperfection and uncertainty.229 She develops Utopia for its logic of
transgression and argues that this applies to the way that late twentieth century science
fictions cross the boundaries of Utopian genre, as feminist theory resists the conventions
228
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of philosophy.230 This argument for heterogeneity as a fundamental feature of the genre
of Utopia serves, in Sargisson's work, to focus on how Utopia can "anticipate the
possibility of radically different 'nows,'" to "explore alternative states of being to those
presently existing—to stretch and expand our understanding of the possibility, thus
making a multiplicity of radically different futures not only desirable but also
conceivable."231 I do not disagree with her valuing of feminist discourses—fictional or
philosophical—to challenge and critique hegemonies, but I find it more relevant to
consider that Sargisson retrofits a definition of Utopia specifically for the political work
of feminism so as to include a range of fictions within the second half of the twentieth
century. The debate to preserve "Utopia" for feminist politics is countered by standpoint
theories that, as Sally Kitch argues, avoid the lure of the idealized in all its forms.
Realism, not Utopia, makes use of the "gaps between human beliefs and practices" and
though Sargisson's redefinition of Utopia promotes complexity and ambiguity, it does not
easily work with the contradictions that will appear in all desires for political change:
Utopias have few strategies for combating such inherent contradictions.
Acknowledging the difficulty of achieving perfect consistency should
make realist theorists humble about [their] suggestions and analyses. It
should alert [them] to the many cases in which social change should be
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pursued incrementally, provisionally—in jagged rather than in straight
lines.232
Kitch sees little achieved for feminism in this move to redraw the genre of Utopia for the
concrete, practical work of feminist politics. Utopia is too invested in fantasy, too rooted
in a metonymic fallacy that reduces social complexity to a single or small set of problems
to fix. The language of Utopia is too redolent with leaps. Realism believes in social
change but starts with the premises of variation and complexity. Feminism can be
optimistic and action oriented without being Utopian.233
What I want to preserve from Sargisson's Utopia-of-transgression is both the
concern about what is feminist in Utopia and the implication of her term "transgression."
She argues for a broad definition of Utopia as transgressive in its function for its
provision of heterogeneity and multiplicity at the place of the subject away from the
oppositional logics of representation—a binary of is/is not—that have too long held sway
without account for their construction from exclusions. What I want to press from a
contemporary feminist standpoint in analyzing Utopian literature is how the Utopian
literary form—be it an early modern version like More's or a contemporary feminist
science fiction of Ursula LeGuin's like The Dispossesed (1974) with its contrasting
planet/moon societies—is the construction of a total society where subjects are in
harmony with that society. With LeGuin, however, the harmonies are incomplete, in
varying stages of discord. From this moment of history, after the labors of many kinds of
feminism in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, harmony is decidedly not the
case for subjectivities within modern, class-based societies. This is more radically stated
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with psychoanalytic terms, especially in Luce Irigaray's critique of Lacan, where the
Phallic subject is ever deriving its confidence from an Other who appears to hold the
secrets of the self, an Other that is the position of Woman and thus, is barred from
subjectivity itself.234 Sargisson's main contribution is not in her preservation of Utopia for
feminism as much as in raising how philosophy and psychoanalysis had excluded, written
over, or further removed the category of Woman from registering as a legitimate social
subject, different from a masculine, white, able-bodied, western bourgeois or middleclass subjectivity. The contributions of feminist critiques of the perfections, wholenesses
or fullnesses of modernist aesthetics has yet to (and may never) be written through
theories of social construction. My own project, while not so explicitly referencing these
contributions, is indebted to them, regarding the figure of Utopia as an occasion to
analyze the limitations of all theoretical projects while acknowledging their conditional
usefulness.
While Sargisson treats transgression as a function of Utopia, as its goal of
transformation through its disruption of normativity, I regard the transgression as
something that is first recognizable through Utopia's literary conventions. If there is a
desire or interest in transgression, it is a postmodern response to the closures of
modernity, and thus, has become a rallying cry, its own new postmodern norm. This
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reasserts the distinctly modern character of Utopia and its production of boundary for
some purpose, some use, and to ask this as a question—about what and who boundaries
serve. In this way, I ask how it is that Utopia presents society as a construction, reduction,
or reconstitution of the multiplicities of its functions to socialize—to educate implicitly
and explicitly—into its orientation. Thus, to consider Utopia at this moment is not to
contrast it to perfection, blueprint, or idealization but how it signals modern
preoccupations with totality or wholeness—of functional completeness—that mirrors in
the satisfaction of its subjects a relation to that totality. "Feminist" Utopias may earn their
label from their address of sexual difference or multiple sexualities, their reimagination
of kinship relations or reproduction, or their risks of hospitality. 235 However, I argue that
they are Utopian, not for their emancipatory potential explicitly, but for their formal
features of enclaves that sit at a distance that both require some traveler and some world
en total to generate questions about the constructedness of subjectivity, of social
relations, and of "society" as an abstraction. Their political value may be in their contents
as they achieve satisfactions or pleasures from these relations but also may not hinge on
these contents.
To summarize, a question of a genre of Utopia will pulse with other generic
delineations—parody, satire, romance, myth, political tract, realism—without necessarily
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settling easily. I pull from Wegner's identification of Utopia with "scaled space" in
contrast to character or setting descriptions in other genres such as modern novels or
romances to give a handhold for grasping some elements of political economic conditions
of the production, reception and analytic moments of Utopia.236 This includes the present
moment of my analysis in 2017 where the transgressions or boundary markers of Utopia
echo a present political economic contradiction of the refugees and the reinforcement of
national identities while capital flows unimpeded. Utopia is rife with these kinds of
contradictions: it suspends the possibility of a good place while at the same time saying it
does not exist; it holds out an image of peaceful co-existence while offering only
memories or traces of the violence of its foundations (even Morris's telling of the
revolution that brought on the epoch of rest is not in the minds of his primary hosts); and
it suggests itself as the ultimate social arrangement while simultaneously depending on
Utopian literatures to make it recognizable as a Utopia.
I will further unfold other contradictions that mark Utopia later in this chapter.
What this genre discussion holds into view for my argument is that what is recognizable
as Utopian literature is the particular way that it presents narratives of boundaries and
crossings, reflects how modernity has variously thought itself through this formulation of
geography and spatial relations, and references particular histories such as nation-state
formation and liberal subjectivity (as differentially formed and unevenly distributed or
even actively withheld). Utopia—when seen first as a literary form of boundary
crossing—forces into its definition political economy and subjective forms. This makes
Utopia a commentary on how the lines of "society" are drawn to include and exclude and
that these boundaries have conceptual use and existentially experienced effects.
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To repeat from my earlier investigation into critical methods in the study of
religion: representing social life means drawing boundaries around a thing called
"society" that then allows for describing and explaining behavior particular to groups of
people, permitting scholars of religion to point to how religion functions ideologically.
Utopian fiction is a process of boundary-making in many similar senses in that it depends
on a construction or fiction called "society"—a miniaturization of social life and
condensation of complex relations—so as to reveal insight that would otherwise be
difficult to describe or relate. But isn't the society that religion scholars describe real,
whereas the Utopian one is not? Neither are real in the absolute sense, a fact critical
religion scholars would do well to remember, since they are forever in the process of
boundary creation in their formations of categories. In this simple sense, social
constructionist approaches are built on the desire for Utopia—to represent social life as a
totality, depending on a kind of objective status, that miniaturizes the vast and intricate
social field into a bounded and isolated whole that is also, visible and available to the
traveler/scholar who returns to deliver news of the peculiar yet fascinating ways that
others function that is, at all times, a reference to and recognition that the source or
present society of the traveler/scholar is also summoned and related to these operations.
Naming social constructionist approaches as, in part, a desire for Utopia can offer a
means for critical scholars to catch in their view the affective and libidinal dimensions of
social construction, all the while seeing them as particular to modernity, weighted with
political and economic concern. I turn now to describe these literary conventions—of
travel narrative, social totality, and boundary crossing—as formal features of the genre
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that excites questions about the influence of institution, organization, and order on the
existential, affective and cognitive dimensions of human existence.
Convention of Travel after the "Age of Discovery"
As the Renaissance enjoyed the new access to the "old world" of the classics, it
also enjoyed the surprises of the "new worlds" coming into view through ocean
exploration.237 As mentioned above, More's text is in two parts— Book One, a
commentary on the state of affairs in London and Book Two, a travel narrative to the
island Utopia. This text has inspired many commentaries as to its form of satire, its
structure, its historical conditions, and its proposals—all of which situate it as a product
of its esteemed author, its specific audience of Erasmus and friends, and its unique twopart form.238 It earns this attention, however, mostly from the other texts which borrow
and extend its formula of a distant land discovered by accident by a curious explorer who
returns to tell of not just a community but a fully complex society with similar-yetdifferent methods of sustaining itself materially and through a social order. It is also
relevant to consider how the narrator functions as a literary device to make the
comparison to another society explicit. A century after More's text, Francis Bacon pens
New Atlantis (1629), disguising a more scientifically advanced England as another island
in the sea. John Harrington's The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656) presents a
government balanced across several centers of power but not as a fictional narrative,
whereas Thomas Campanella's "The City of the Sun" (1623) recapitulates the travel
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narrative and dialogue form of More's text, along with the account of the fantastic land
with unusually named sub-groups that say something of their type—a convention picked
up and carried on as part of the satirical travels of Gulliver in Jonathan Swift's popular
eighteenth century tale.239 The travel narrative form continues, but with a shift from
spatial exploration to time. Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward (1888) and William
Morris’s News from Nowhere (1890) reflected the late nineteenth century's progressive
attitudes with a focus on the future as the traveler's destination. This movement to
temporal distance is captured with H.G. Wells's The Time Machine (1895) who added the
machine to the leap made in sleep by Bellamy and Morris. As the twentieth century
Utopian form morphs into its dystopian cousin and is displaced by the more prolific and
imaginative genre of Science Fiction, travelers and their tales persist as the convention
for encountering alternative, self-sufficient societies.
This convention of a distant land visited by a mediator is crucial to appreciating
how Utopia comes to be compared with political treatises and deployed as a rhetorical
tool for promoting social change. As literary theorist Peter Ruppert explains, the reader
occupies a vital place alongside the other places of the Utopian narrative: the place of the
Utopia, the home of the traveler, and then the empty place that is generated in the mind of
the reader.240 These places are set up by the boundaries—walls, trenches, moats—that are
indispensible features on the maps of Utopias. Utopias produce a critical effect through
the dialectic of the familiar and unfamiliar, similarity and difference. By providing a
"shocking mirror," Utopias and other forms like science fiction, myth, fantasies and
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folktales do not merely mirror but deflect the source world as strange. While permeable
with its boundaries as a genre (like each literary example of Utopia has permeable but
meaningful boundaries), the category of Utopian literature is a "heuristic device"
permitting insight into forms of alienation and injustice.241 Ruppert wants to pull the
dialectical form of Utopia—its back and forth between the multiple places—into the
dialectical procedures of both reading for pleasure and reading for analysis.242 The reader,
then is pulled into imaginative work:
Once we recognize the deficiencies within the boundaries of utopia itself, then
reading utopias can no longer be simply a question of accepting or rejecting
utopian values: in rejecting utopia we are left with the intolerable social reality
that it has exposed, and conversion to utopia implies that we can get outside of
time and history—a possibility that, even in utopia, exists nowhere. Unable to
simply convert to utopia, the reader is also unable to return unchanged to the
actual world of strife, conflict and history. Thus, suspended in the gap between
history and utopia, or between 'now' and 'nowhere,' the reader is provoked to
engage on her own terms the problems, aspirations, and the potential solutions
that constitute the inspiration of utopian thinking and of utopian activity.243
In Ruppert's frame, the text activates the reader to engage the "intolerable social reality"
of her own world, "the actual world of strife, conflict and history." These conditions are
the social contradictions in the life of the reader that have been raised to a cognitive level
through the defamiliarization procedure of the Utopian text—a text that renders society as
an object with more porosity, more mutability than formerly thought.
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The Utopian Form as a Figure for Representational Logics
Literary Utopias, then, are neither dogmatic nor programmatic as once thought
but sites of openness for thought ironically produced by the closure of a fictional society.
The enclosure of the society is replicated in the closure of the Utopian literary form.
Thus, Utopia not only signals the lived contradictions of material inequalities in the face
of the promise of equality within liberal democracy, but also sustains cognitive
contradiction. French philosopher Louis Marin investigates Utopia for the way that it
signifies the gap within modern representational logics. Marin distinguishes Utopia for its
way of making finite—bringing into space—modern semantic geographies such as
"horizon, frontier and limit."244 Marin takes the slippage of Utopia as a Greek neologism
as his point of departure for considering Utopia for the way that it "defines certain modes
and modalities of literary, political, and philosophical imagination and thinking in
modern times, modes and modalities themselves related to specific historical and
ideological contexts in Europe"245 For Marin, Utopia is a figure in discourse that rests
over a gap, what Wayne Hudson in his interpretation of Marin calls “utopian sublime,” a
place of “the other of any place: the gap between two frontiers, neither this nor that.”246
According to Marin, Utopia plays out a neutralization of the negative and positive of
Hegel. The juxtaposition that More invests in his Utopia appears as a Hegelian
contradiction to Marin. Thus, Utopia is not a concept but a figure—a textual product that
is a practice of signification. As it refers to its negation, its own absence, Utopia marks
the indifference to its difference.
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Marin takes Utopia as the occasion to analyze language’s differential features and
its inherent contradictoriness as it makes visible what is already present and hides what
cannot be seen. Thus, the importance of Utopia is not its standing as one kind of literature
or narrative alongside others within modernity but the fact that the Utopian aesthetic form
displays the representational logic of language in ways that structure a response to what is
not present and not presentable.
Actually, every text performs an equivalency between space and
discourse. The utopic text, however, is a remarkable form of it because it
places the performative definition of text in general next to its own
project, its own specific signified. The ‘content’ of utopia is the
organization of space as a text. The utopic text, in its formal makeup and
operational procedures is the constitution of a discourse as space. In other
words utopia brings about an interesting equivalency between its
referent—that about which it speaks, its particular project—and its
emitting, receiving and transmitting codes. The content of its message is
not the transmission of the message but the code of transmission.247
Utopic practice is, then, spatial play that signifies in a textual system. It is about
representation and the limits of representation, the differences between an icon and a
schema, a reconciliation of the impossibility of representation, where no-thing can be represented. Thus, for Marin (and Jameson) all fiction is "utopic," at the level of ideology
and representation and also in self-referencing its place as non-place. Marin’s
deconstructive, linguistic interpretation of Utopia as a figure for language’s gap in
representation is a radicalizing of Utopia within a post-structural moment. The burden
that Utopia bears is related to the fictions' forms and the ways that they make visible the
divisions that make for language.
\
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Narratives of Space, not Plot
Because of these representational logics of Utopia, the literary form depends on
different satisfactions than do other narratives. Theologian Paul Fiddes finds Utopia in
line with other more religious forms that substitute a plot ending with an end-of-history
ending. Using literary theorist Frank Kermode, Fiddes maps how the ends of narrative
unify the whole and express the ultimate ordering factor.248 Utopia can be confused with
messianic and millenialist religious texts because of the temporal “end of history” aspects
to each of them. Narratives have a surplus of meaning, provided by the structure of
metaphor that displaces one image for another. Because narratives structure to organize
human experience into time, their ends are particularly important. Christianity, especially,
has made use of narrative’s powerful ordering properties and has thus, impacted western
historical methods in treating all stories as like a Christian drama of redemption.249 The
western sense of time has integrated both Christian and Jewish traditions of time’s
fulfillment, not just its passage, seeing fulfillment through an end. Fiddes exploits the
poststructuralist linguistic turn to discuss the metaphoric aspects of language and how
meaning is displaced at the level of all signification. In the spacing of language, he finds
an immanent space for the irruption of transcendence.
Fiddes advances my discussion of Utopia by showing how the immanence of
Marin’s deconstructing figure of Utopia relates to the general narrative form. Fiddes
displaces Bloch’s impulse to Utopia with an impulse to narrative. While I disagree with
Fiddes’s conclusion where he leaves behind the deconstructing Utopian figure for an
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immanent instance of Christian apophasis in a Derridian differential spacing of language
and time, I appreciate how he emphasizes that segmenting time and space is satisfying.
Fiddes separates Utopian narratives from others by how unmotivated they are by plot.
The closure is not in the end of the narrative as much as it is the "closure" of the society.
Thus, closure is constructed along a different axis: the temporal closure of plot is still
present in the return of the traveler, but the satisfaction is found on a register of spatial
and social organization, where social contradictions are resolved by way of the relation of
the Utopian subject to her society, yet left unresolved or open for the traveler in the
narrative and for the reader. Marin's more philosophical register delivers how the Utopian
formal convention of travel and the closure of the society generates a particular
subjective formation—a reader—prepared to confront her own unknown by the
confidence supplied by the textual return and the boundedness of the textual object itself:
Any travel is, first of all, a moment and a space of vacancy, an
unencumbered space that suspends continuous time and the ordering of
loci. The ideology of the travel implies a departure from a place and a
return to the same place. The traveler enriches this place with a large
booty of knowledge and experiences by means of which he states, in this
coming back to the 'sameness,' his own consistency, his identity as a
subject. The utopian moment and space of travel, on the contrary, consists
in opening up, in this ideological circle, in the tracing out of its route, a
nowhere, a place without place, a moment out of time, the truth of a
fiction, the syncopation of an infinity and paradoxically its limit, its
frontier.250
Utopian literature distinguishes itself, then, for the ways it generates a particular kind of
reader—a subject "satisfied," ironically, by an encounter with a nowhere. In Part Two of
this chapter, I will return to examine the ideological dimensions of this identification with
the traveler and will relate this to Jameson's method, for reading Utopian literature for its
ways of reflecting modern desires. For now, it is relevant to consider that it is aspects of
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the Utopian literary form that hold aspects of the appeal of Utopia and generates desires
particular to modernity in the way that thought and political, social and economic
conditions co-constitute one another in ways more complicated than any simple Marxist
base-superstructural account would have it.
In addition to the closure of the Utopian enclave, the porosity of the traveler, and
the narrative satisfaction displaced onto the reveal of the society itself, Literary theorist
Northrop Frye notices how the Utopian narrative form bears a mythic quality for its
condensations of complex social connections. Utopia often features in-common property
where leisure and movement are minimized and the individual is perceived as part of a
social whole. The pastoral at the center of Utopias is, by Frye's account, the relief of
anxiety through simplicity, through nature, and through an anti-intellectualism, such as
the eighteenth century collision of nature and society reflected in Rousseau, the
nineteenth century's break from the industrial age city with a retreat to the woods at
Walden Pond, or Morris's Thames tour and hayfields in News from Nowhere.251 Utopia
is, at root, a simplification and in this way, is a genre of Romance for Frye. Its potency
and appeal is in surfacing social procedures and the latent potentials of society,
simplifying them, and thus becomes a myth that connects certain social facts together.
Using the terms of the layers of consciousness, Frye labels the residues of
unconscious material coming into consciousness through the Utopian form, growing in
popularity around times where there is greater social transition, such as in More's era and
in the nineteenth century. Thus, Frye is able to account for the rise of interest in Utopia at
different moments of modernity: Utopian literature emerges where there is change and a
collective, social compulsion to reacquaint with and reassemble the practices of social
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life. Utopia appears on occasions of swift transition where, in Frye's terms, the "ritual
habit[s] necessary to life" intensify and bring to consciousness the operations of life that,
over time, are habitualized and return as background.252 This can be used to explain the
shifts in genres around Utopia, such as the political tracts of the eighteenth century or the
passing of Utopia and the rise of Science Fiction in the twentieth century. In sum, Utopia
is not a perfect state of freedom but an imaginative practice in ‘visualizing possibilities’
for the purpose of seeing ritual habits and their formation compelling insofar as they
address latent aspects of a social contract and make evident the commitments that bind
the society.
The psychoanalytic language is strong with Frye's work, and his layers point to, in
some part, how social material is buried and manifested structurally. This attention to the
psychoanalytic interpretive potentials of literature draws a comparison to Jameson who is
also keen to recognize the latent and manifest dimensions in literature. While both are
useful for thinking how literature can be read for its function for culture to figure and thus
negotiate its transitions and arrangements (what Marxists generally think of as
contradiction), Frye does not have a way of sustaining this in the language of subjects in
relation. Instead, he reinscribes literature's appeal—and the reader's desire for it —for the
way literature reminds readers of a singular, transfigured body.253 Jameson can abide that
Utopian literature may have some appeal in this way, but it is more about the relations of
bodies, relations of subjects, and their coordination through political economy.
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Dystopias and SF—Similarities and Differences in Texts of Difference
These generic features explored thus far—of a total society with a permeable
boundary that enables passage for a traveler and a reader—have offered how the
juxtaposition of social orders raises to the cognitive level social contradictions and
features them as representations. The location of the satisfaction is not in the resolution of
the plot but in the contentment of those citizens of the Utopia, a projection of a desire of
the reader, as Ruppert might explain. What happens when this contentment is
unconvincing or even repulsive? These have earned the reputation of dystopia or antiutopia. Literary theorist Krishan Kumar combines these two in his reading of the modern
Utopian form.254 Kumar traces this literary sub-genre to H.G. Wells, especially The Time
Machine (1895) which mocked socialist hopes that he saw in his fellow socialists of
Bellamy and Morris whose Utopian visions were positive. As two sides of the same
literary genre, Utopia and anti-utopias are to be seen through their reactions to one
another as they figure social relations, integrating new technologies and political events
coming down the pipe of late modernity.
But Kumar’s analysis centers on content, not necessarily on form, to construct
the genre. Literary theorist Tom Moylan's expansive studies of the distinct but
overlapping forms of utopia, dystopia, anti-utopia, and critical utopia, and critical
dystopia extend beyond the scope of Kumar’s project.255 Kumar's anti-utopia is for
Moylan (and Jameson) brought under the resisters to Utopian thought tout court. Like
Kumar’s, Moylan's work is deeply committed to the texts themselves, but Moylan tends
toward the formal aspects that connect the diverse literatures whereas Kumar's is more
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towards the texts’ reactions to socialism. Moylan's larger project is focused on the
marginal Utopian forms—specifically the critical utopias of the 1960s and 1970s and
then, the dystopias of the twentieth century that have much in common with Science
Fiction. Moylan reads Jameson closely throughout, agreeing that Utopia and dystopia are
not opposites as they both stage a social totality but that they differ more at the level of
form—that it is the narrative quality of the dystopia and its focus on a dissatisfied, misfit
protagonist that distinguishes it from its pair.256 Because the dystopian's trope towards
more conventional fiction with its protagonist and plot, I will stay closer to the
strangeness of the Utopian form with its more spatial than syntagmatic logics.
It is worthwhile to note another tree in this forest of genres of social totality and
difference—that of Science Fiction, or SF. Darko Suvin characterizes the genre for the
way it produces a "cognitive estrangement"—a dislocation that produces a question about
epistemology that tests the limits of recognition. 257 Philosopher Rosie Braidotti
summarizes that SF defamiliarizes the "here and now" both reflecting and provoking
unease.258 For its force in producing unease, Braidotti separates it from Utopia for its less
uncanny, more hoped features, whereas Suvin puts Utopia as a socio-economic sub-genre
of the larger SF, a convention followed by Moylan and Jameson both.259 All agree that
SF has displaced Utopia in postmodernity, where alterities are reformed, and as Braidotti
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has described, the human is decentered and remapped as continuums of animal, extraterrestrial and technological becomings.260 Braidotti's reading of SF with Gilles
Deleuzes's nomadology and Julia Kristeva's abject bodies shows how SF calls for
representation of and resistance to the traumas and fears of global capitalism: there
affirmation in SF that is more than nihilistic.261 Her work is highly suggestive that SF is
the more precise cultural form for analyzing the conditions of postmodernity.
My own project does not contradict Braidotti's but takes on a narrower task in
staying with the modern critical discourses of social construction and psychoanalysis still
widely used by scholars of religion. SF may have surpassed Utopia in popularity and
thus, bears the marks of the particular struggles of the political, economic, technological
and ecological crises of the present. However, when situated within the field of literary
fictions—as literary texts and not a wider claim about film or postmodern culture
generally—the shared material culture of the fictional text is still in operation and crosses
both SF and Utopia. Citing the SF and literary criticism of Samuel Delany, Moylan notes
how both Utopia and SF demand a similar "reading protocol"—where the author delivers
substantive pieces in sequence, not through summary but through emerging patterns,
demanding that the reader make sense along the way.262 This is necessary because of the
dominance of space over time in both Utopia and SF, though it is severely more
260

Braidotti, Metamorphoses, 183.
Braidotti's chapter "Cyber-teratologies" referenced here is as good as any to draw on for her overall
critical-ethical project of sexed bodies, materialities and political economy. Her final sentences to this
chapter offer something of her appeal to how the grotesque instructs on the unwelcome aspects of
biological life: "It is against the contemporary forms of nihilism that that a critical philosophy of
immanence needs to distoxicate us and to re-set the agenda in the direction of affirmation and sustainable
subjectivity. In this project, the metamorphic company of monsters—those existential aristocrats who have
already undergone the mutation—can provide not only a solace, but also an ethical model." Braidotti,
Metamorphoses, 211.
262
Moylan, Scraps of the Untainted Sky, 8. Samuel R. Delany "Some Reflections on SF Criticism" Science
Fiction Studies, 8, no. 3 (1981), 235. Moylan also draws on Delany's "Reading Modern American Science
Fiction," Richard Kostelanetz, ed., American Writing Today, (Troy, NY: Whitston. 1991): 517-528 for his
appreciation of the technologies of reading SF.
261

179
pronounced in SF. These texts parallel features of an aesthetic sublime that is
thematically linked to romanticism, where the text supplants the reader with a "secular
sense of magnitude that displaces and relocates the individual in a process both terrifying
and satisfying."263 Comparing this to the aesthetic sublime of Marin's neutralization is
subtle but distinct: the alterity of SF and Suvin's estrangement does not force open empty,
disorienting space in so much as an initial disorientation that the reader then puzzles out,
accepting the estranging details as inadequate knowledge, not the aporetic structure of
Utopia. This inadequate knowledge is carried out through the lack of syntagmatic
sequence in the text: "Writing within the fictive culture, the [SF] writer sets the level of
relevant information higher than a reader’s actual knowledge, since no actual reader can
actually know that world. "264 These subtle differences are significant but derive from the
same convention: the extreme encounters with other-worlds in the SF genre and the
human-scale worlds of Utopia both center the society as a protagonist. Moylan pursues
Utopia and SF forms in tandem for the way they both deliver the political through an
aesthetic form. SF, like Utopia, is engaged with the registration and treatment of identity
and difference, but SF makes further demands on the reader to assemble society from the
scraps of an alien world.
The Narrative Form of Utopia—A Genre of Representational Logics
To summarize, Utopian fiction relies on the traveler's movement to generate a
movement of thought in the reader—to consider her own social location and its
conditions in light of those of the conditions encountered vicariously through the
narrator. The new attention to the present draws out the social contradictions experienced
263
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by the reader who then, is activated to consider how her own situation may be differently
ordered. Utopia refracts the historical conditions of its production, connecting not only
the specifics of the Utopian society—its contents—to the societies of its reception, but
also the mechanisms of comparison and how it stimulates thought and action. These
mechanisms are its representational dynamics: of how the cognitive contradictions
encountered in the Utopian literary form project and reconfigure the social contradictions
of historical existence. In Ruppert's words, the Utopian literary form, through the
dialectical relation of the text and reader, reveals the contradictions of her present
condition but also "some genuine utopian content—the yearning for community, social
harmony, more authentic human relationships"265 It is worth noting here that these relays
of social and cognitive contradiction contribute to another dimension of representation —
Utopia's transformation into an abstraction for use in social and political theory. 266
Thus, Utopia develops as a figure within modern Western (Anglo-European)
thought that signifies the idealized social arrangement and the fulfillment of the modern
self through its development initially as literature. As I have argued, to appreciate the role
of Utopia in modern Western thought is to understand first its formal conventions of
travel and representing society as a functioning totality—of social life condensed and in
miniature. To desire Utopia, then, is not just to desire a better way of living. It is, in part,
to desire the ability to represent social life in its totality—to be able to communicate how
society constructs subjects. That raises the desire for Utopia as a cognitive capability. The
ability to represent social totality is not the only desire that the figure of Utopia offers:
Utopia also offers the ability to show that subject as reconciled or "happy" within this
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social world. Happiness is what Ruppert refers to as "genuine utopian content" and what
Levitas found in her study: that of the "better way of living," meaning the end to the
chaffing, the friction, and disappointments created from social inequalities, misuse or
abuse of resources, or whatever it is that is seen to be the cause of strife that could be
addressed by a different social arrangement. This happiness or harmony is, as I defend,
best understood as collectivity, or the recognition, acceptance, and appreciation for the
subject's place within a particular social group. In sum, the desire for Utopia is both the
desire to represent society as a totality and the desire for collectivity, or the end to
conditions of social contradictions and thus, experiences of friction or mismatch at the
existential level. I regard these desires as twined with one another, registering both as
ideological pleasures but distinct for the position of the subject. While the desire to
represent social totality shows the subject as the knowing subject—the one with the
perspective to explain and describe, the desire for collectivity is the perspective of the
subject within the social relationship where the particularity of the individual is matched
and in cooperation with the others of the collective.
In the following chapter, I will show more of how these two desires can be seen
operating within the critical study of religion. Before that, however, I want to further
expand on how Utopia, as a figure is best referenced through cultural production. Using
the Marxist interpretative work of Fredric Jameson, I discuss next how cultural products
become repositories for and redistribute these twin desires for representing social totality
and collectivity. Through the Marxist and psychoanalytic frames of culture offered by
Jameson, I will be able to better account for how Utopia moves from the settings of
Utopian literature into the realms of culture more broadly. As I overall argue, critical
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religious studies struggles with its remit to present both "self" and "society," favoring the
pole of a reified society that allows scholars to explain and compare the ideological
dimensions of religious behavior and forms. As referenced through Jameson, this
difficulty is not exclusive to Religious Studies but is developed out the critical
approaches of distancing and objectivity more generally that sit alongside capitalism's
reifying work. However, these reifications elide the particularities of subjective
perspectives—the lived or existential dimension of social formation. I propose that
Jameson's formal analysis of literature brings better into view the anxious and pleasurable
dimensions of social life and how these are both constructed by culture and lived—what
is, in a word, desire.

II. Fredric Jameson and the Figure of Utopia
By way of an overview of Fredric Jameson's Marxist and psychoanalytic
methods, I continue my argument that critical methods are caught in a problematic of
representing both the existential, lived dimension of social life alongside their projects of
outlining how social life structures subjects. Jameson's reading of cultural artifacts as
"symptomatic" of the conflicts and motions of capitalism offers a means to consider this
problem. His complex account of how cultural forms absorb and redistribute the libidinal
connections that give the quality of attachment and desire in social life is a thicker, more
nuanced alternative to ideology critique as it has been thought of in critical religious
studies by those addressed in Chapter One. In addition to adding to the discourses of
dialectical methods, ideology critique, and historicization, I introduce Jameson as a
theorist who raises the figure of Utopia in modernity as a particularly rich site for
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investigating how social theory struggles to represent the existential, lived dimension of
social life as it focuses on society's structuring forces. Utopia, as a figure that reflects the
optimism and ambition of social life outside of capitalism, has various roles in Jameson's
work across his fifty years of writing. In reviewing Jameson's distinctive method of
cultural theory, I address several dimensions of his use of the figure of Utopia,
specifically how its literary form can be read as a symptom of the conflicts of capitalism's
social contradictions across modernity through its representational conflicts and its
signification as social life "solved" to the satisfactions and happiness of Utopia's
inhabitants.
Dialectical Method, Ideology Critique, and History in Jameson
American cultural theorist Fredric Jameson has not been used much by critical
religious studies except as a justifying voice for the broad call to "[a]lways historicize,"
as recited by Russell McCutcheon or in Constance Furey's interest in the political use of
renarrating history.267 In analyzing cultural products from American and European
contexts, especially those of the nineteenth and twentieth century, Jameson is most
recognized for his periodization of late-stage capitalist culture as "postmodernity" and his
innovation of "cognitive mapping" as a modification for postmodern Marxist thought
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where full explanation is foreclosed.268 Though mainly treating the narrative forms of
literature and film, he submits theorists and philosophers to equal critical attention,
historicizing their projects within their own locations and concerns.269 Jameson
emphasizes the "ideological and situational nature of all thought" and draws on the
dialectics of Hegel and Marx, noting how both are self-conscious of their production.
Though cognizant of both influences on historical analysis, Jameson favors the Marxist
dialectic for how it regards the contradictions as not only logical inconsistencies that need
reformulating but also as processes that stratify social life into groups or classes.270
Jameson's method highlights one strain of the "superstructure"—modern literary forms—
to reflect on the ways that ideology is codified and redistributed in narrative form. He
resists any such bifurcation of the economic from the cultural dimension,271 as both are
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concretely lived, particularly as recognizable in and by the middle-class.272 This does not
exclude the working class (or other classes, for that matter) from his analysis: only to pull
forward how cultural forms and their ideologies show the relationship and antagonism of
classes and that the discussion of culture never can be separated from materiality and
individualized bodies—a feature of Marxism that Jameson stresses throughout his
work.273 This aspect of Marx—the lived experience of ideology—is evident in Jameson's
increasing references to Freudian and Lacanian interpretations of the relation of the
individual psyche to the social world.
Jameson's dialectical criticism is anti-systematic, reflecting a Marxian 'permanent
revolution,' and thus resists systematic presentation.274 Unfolding the questions of the
present, Jameson characterizes contemporary intellectual conditions as inhospitable,
demanding both immanent thought AND consciousness of class conditioning.275
Dialectical criticism is self-critical in its structure and reflects the movement of thought.
If thought does reach stasis, or an abstraction abandons its empirical roots, it can be
challenged by seeing this abstracting tendency as itself historical, an "idealizing
methodologically useful when taken as a starting point for questions and problems, rather than as a solution
of any kind. Base and superstructure are in other words a beginning and not a conclusion, a laboratory
experiment (whose results are often very different from each other) and not the tenet of some quasireligious belief or orthodoxy." Jameson, An American Utopia, 44.
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tendency" that has settled into disciplinary domains which reflect the division of labor
itself. It is within this modern knowledge production that dialectical thought and method
intercedes:
In this sense the anti-idealistic thrust of Marxism simply aims at breaking
the spell of the 'inverted world' of conceptual thought. The dialectic is
designed to eject us from this illusory order, to project us in spite of
ourselves out of our concepts into the world of genuine realities to which
those concepts were to apply. We cannot, of course, ever really get outside
our own subjectivities: to think so is the illusion of positivism; but, every
time they begin to freeze over, to spring us outside of our own hardened
ideas into a new and more vivid apprehension of reality itself is the task of
genuine dialectical thinking.276
Jameson's attention to the present of historical thought reflects the dialectic of Marxian
praxis. Simply said, Jameson shows thought at work.
Jameson's method differs in slight ways from the kind of criticism that constructs
an implied narrator or reader, such as that popularized by Wayne Booth in his influential
Rhetoric of Fiction, which treats the novel as a single cultural communication.277 This
method is consonant with Ruppert's literary Utopia discussed above and its ability to
generate an "outside" of the text for the reader. Jameson cautions against this approach,
however, for how it too easily presupposes "a class of reader" that wants a uniform
message from a text.278 This impulse should be, in Jameson's terms, read historically
itself, as a symptom of its own era or class.279 Jameson's dialectical method moves across
the abstract and existential, constructing them as positions to be occupied and abandoned.
Attention to the form of art, especially the literary form—which is primarily the novel for
moderns—is a way to track the positions, to gather together distance and proximity, the
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infrastructure of society and the individual. Classes and conflict come in and out of focus,
depending on one's position in relation to the novel but the never disappear from view.
Such an approach to reading literature positions Jameson squarely within the historicizing
methods of critical religious studies but situates this scholarship as aesthetic production.
Through this close attention to Marxian dialectics, Jameson can attend to cultural
production primarily as historicized aesthetics. This is his style of ideology critique.
Through this, he counts critical scholarship as cultural production, averring that theory
yields its own pleasures of production and consumption and is also subject to ideology
critique. As discussed in Chapter One, critical religious studies shares this project by
including religious studies scholarship in their purview of how culture legitimates and
authorizes particular social formations—especially those that preserve and reinforce
moneyed interests. For Jameson, the dialectical nature thought in modernity means that
ideology critique cannot be swiftly and simply dispensed.280 Jameson is consistent with
critical religious studies scholars in that ideology promotes and demotes social groups,
legitimating some while delegitimating others. Also, ideology produces social formations
where there is not only relations between the “base” and “superstructure,” but also
relations between points of production.281 Thirdly, following Althusser, Jameson sees
ideology as a part of a necessary illusion, one that interpolates and thus, is crucial to
subject formation. Through this lens, cultural objects can be seen as elaborations,
distortions, and transformations of their historical circumstances, and are a part of a field
of abstractions—including conceptual categories—of the concrete conditions of
existence. Altogether, Jameson treats his objects tirelessly to historical analysis:
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everything, according to Jameson, is political and historical where the history of class
struggle is all of history.282
His work can add to critical methods in religious studies by presupposing the
pleasures of ideology and by explicit inclusion of theory as aesthetic production. The
cultural critic is allowed to enjoy her cultural products at the same time as she links them
to their historical conditions. Instead of distance, Jameson's cultural criticism embeds him
and his readers in the fields of cultural consumption and production that simultaneously
inscribes his theorists both in history and then, in the sphere of cultural productions
themselves. His approach takes on the contrariness reminiscent of Adorno and
Horkheimer and their inheritors and turns it to ask: what about negative critique was
historically necessary or conditioned, and what made their approach to commodification
a political intervention into the blindness of leisure so dominant in the mid-twentieth
century?283 Jameson does not imagine that those conditions of terror of fascism have
disappeared since the 1940s and 50s, that he and others are somehow free to move on, but
he does question the authority one claims in railing against the culture industry or how
the outside of capitalism has all but evaporated. Suspicion of cultural products, in the
form of ideology critique, is not over or complete; however, the investigations are more
precise, more situated, more historically located, when they take into account the appeal
that cultural products have to "us" as critics as well as "them" as consumers. Jameson
dissolves this model of critical authority, of lording insight over the duped masses,
replacing the other effects of ideology critique with the immanent critique of
historcization. The pleasures of critique are for their explanatory authority—an authority
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that is also ideologically situated and constructed. The historicization of the critic
presumes legitimation but with some cognizance of the procedures of ideology. How
thoroughly the critic can examine her own location—or would want to delegitimate her
own authority—is a self-critical position that dissolves ideology critique. Jameson avoids
this distortion with his turn to history and then, to psychoanalysis for this limit conditions
of analysis.
As becomes clearer, Jameson's injunction to "Always historicize"—echoed by
McCutcheon for critical religious studies—is a thorough and layered process. 284 It is an
injunction that brings together the urgency to think the present with ideology critique
through monitoring and inciting the dialectical procedures of thought. It is not
historicism, where the stages of political economy are reductively applied within a
totalized schema for history.285 However, this does not leave totalizing narratives out, as a
glib poststructuralism would conclude. Jameson insists it is not so simple to abandon the
modern interpretive frameworks: they are too thoroughly baked into modern thought and
also are useful. Jameson transposes the term mediation from the register of literary and
cultural analysis of aesthetic forms to the larger, historical register where mediations
become
a device of the analyst, whereby the fragmentation and autonomization,
the compartmentalization and specialization of the various regions of
social life (the separation, in other words of the ideological from the
political, the religious from the economic, the gap between daily life and
the practice of the academic disciplines) is at least locally overcome, on
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the occasion of a particular analysis.286
Taking this account, then of history and its mediation, the unity from a totalized history is
a "merely formal and empty one" except insofar as it permits more concrete and local
mediations which are themselves the stuff of history:
Such momentary reunification would remain purely symbolic, a mere
methodological fiction, were it not understood that social life is in its
fundamental reality one and indivisible, a seamless web, a single
inconceivable and transindividual process, in which there is no need to
invent ways of linking language events and social upheavals or economic
contradictions because on that level they were never separate from one
another.287
While concrete and finite, it is also not easily grasped, except through its cultural forms.
"History can be apprehended only through its effects, and never directly as some reified
force."288
Jameson falls within a peculiar fault line of contemporary historical methods by
staying close to the Marxist materialist history in the midst of more Foucaultian models
of discourse analysis that scholars such as Tomoko Masuzawa and Talal Asad
demonstrate. Noting this shift towards power/knowledge analysis in religious studies,
Constance Furey draws out how Jameson’s approach at first appears anachronistic
compared to the disruptive retellings of particular histories that operate with “the (usually
implicit) conviction that telling a different story about the past will somehow expand our
options for today.”289 Jameson abides in the philosophy of history camp that persists in
concerning himself with teleology and materialism. Yet he does so through a
radicalization of what he means by history. It is not "History, in the bad sense—the
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reference to a 'context' or a 'ground,' an external real world of some kind" that is treated
as 'linear history'.”290 Instead, as he unfolds over his introductory chapter of The Political
Unconscious, Jameson offers a History that is akin to the Lacanian Real, complete with
capitalization. Influenced by Althusser, Jameson sees History as an "absent cause" of a
synchronic system of social relations as a whole. "History is what hurts, it is what refuses
desires and sets inexorable limits to individual as well as collective praxis, which its
'ruses' turn into grisly and ironic reversals of their overt intention."291 Or, in Furey's
words, History is “what we cannot escape, should not want to escape, what we hope fully
to embrace by foreswearing fantasy or promises of transcendence.”292 Jameson does not
promote a legible history but a History that is always in need of reading, forever in
surplus of what can be interpreted but yet, sets the impulse for interpretation. There is
simply too much reality—of persons, intertwined with social identities, desires,
consumption and production patterns, intricacies of biological life interacting with inert
matter and other lives to produce what is modern society and its subcultures, spanning the
globe—to be codified or managed through any conceptual map or descriptive enterprise.
And yet, humans persist in this effort. History is both the social contradictions of capital
and the response to these conditions—the cultural aesthetic products and intellectual
formulations made in response to these conditions, which then, in turn, reproduce the
conditions.
History, then, for Jameson, is a dense material process not readily accessible to
any one mode of interpretation, be it Marxist, psychoanalytic, humanistic, or social
scientific. This is, as I introduced in Chapter One, an important dimension of Jameson's
290
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historicization: that there is both the history of synchronic and diachronic relationships
and then, how these are read as a part of a Lacanian Real—that "which resists
symbolization absolutely."293 Having considered Jameson's use of Marxist critical terms
and his relationship to the critical methods of religious studies, I want to now show how
it is that Jameson's use of psychoanalytic terms makes way for the discussion of Utopia
as a figure that speaks to the representational dilemma of the subjective, existential
perspective in critical modes that is elided in favor of these critical formations. It is from
here that I now want to consider more deeply how psychoanalysis plays out in Jameson's
reading of literature, how the Lacanian Real of "History" in Jameson connects with this
elision and how representations of Utopia confronts the dilemma of "experience" for
religious studies.
A Marxist-Psychoanalytic Aesthetic Method
Because of his historicizing focus, Jameson's project coincides with social
construction but does so in ways not taken up thus far in critical religious studies. His
employment of psychoanalytic discourses, especially Jacques Lacan, is particularly
relevant to my overall argument that critical discourses struggle to maintain perspective
on the so-called "experiential" dimension at the same time as they deploy tools to point to
social forces. Whereas Ruth Levitas—through Ernst Bloch and E.P. Thompson—wants
to call out the "warm stream" of Marxism against the structuralist "cold stream"
caricatured as Althusserian, Jameson takes a different path. He, like Levitas, recognizes
that there is habit of or preference for determinism or social analysis within Marxism but
does not lift, like Levitas, only the words of psychoanalysis. As discussed, Levitas uses
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"desire" from Bloch and Thompson but dismisses psychoanalysis as ahistorical, too taken
with instincts or a universal collective unconscious. Jameson's use of psychoanalysis with
Marxism generates a method distinctive from the Freudo-Marxisms of Bloch and
Marcuse mentioned in Chapter Two. Jameson's psychoanalytic uses are historicized for
their role in describing bourgeois life within industrial capitalism and for the way that
Freud and Lacan after him can be treated as products of their time, speaking to their
times. Since those conditions of bourgeois family life, of indvidualization by capitalist
reification, and of the material cultures of novels, historical analysis, Enlightenment
scientific reason, and image reproduction are still active aspects of contemporary life
since Jameson's earlier works in the 1970s to the present, psychoanalytic terms have
relevance for critical religious studies, despite their passing from popularity. In this way,
psychoanalysis is like Utopia in that it is a vestige of modernity that is activated within
and alongside of postmodernity's material conditions.
The greatest value that Jameson's discussion of psychoanalysis offers my own
argument is its own foregrounding of the elision of subjective perspectives from within
Marxist critique. In an essay from 1977 that Furey refers to for her category of "Utopian
History," which is revisited with citation through both his 1981 The Political
Unconscious and in his 2005 Archaeologies of the Future (and thematically in his most
recent 2016 An American Utopia), Jameson leverages the discourses of Jacques Lacan for
addressing the crisis of the subject in Marxism. As he sets out in the beginning of his
essay,
The attempt to coordinate a Marxist and a Freudian criticism confronts—
but as it were explicitly, thematically articulated in the form of a
problem—a dilemma that is in reality inherent in all psychoanalytic
criticism as such: that of the insertion of the subject, or, in a different
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terminology, the difficulty of providing mediations between social
phenomena and what must be called private, rather than even merely
individual, facts.294
As is evident, Jameson struggles what to call this dimension, having so thoroughly rooted
himself within the Marxist analytic of social totality and its affordances of social and
historical contexts. He refers in a footnote to Hegel for help for the "classic description"
of the "unique experience of the individual subject" burying yet further in parentheses the
qualities of this dimension: "sense-perception, the feeling of the here-and-now, the
consciousness of some incomparable individuality".295 If psychoanalysis is construed for
its "pre-verbal, pre-social facts" or archaic unconscious experience, Jameson wants to
arrest this interpretation.296 He also wants to separate his own subject from that of AngloAmerican individualism or Deleuzian assemblages, wanting to think the subject as that
which is inserted within ideology, which can see itself as constituted by its social
surrounds and which yet, knows something of its own distinctive perspective.
Jameson does not propose to resolve the problematic of representation but raises it
for consideration and demonstrates how literary interpretation permits perspective into
this dilemma uniquely. He is not set on decoding literature through Marx or Lacan but
transcoding it—showing how literature, Marxism, and psychoanalysis are each
separately invested in similar-yet-different ways. Each is invested in narrative and
necessitates praxis of interpretation. What compels the relation of these three is how they
each afford a means for Jameson to develop a "materialist philosophy of language."297
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Marx has a well-known materialist method that connects the changes of production and
society, giving a case for how language as ideology is imbricated with materiality. What
Lacan adds is to shift the western philosophical notion of opposing dumb matter/nature to
consciousness/culture by regridding this language imbued with materiality.298 Lacan's
schematic of the three sectors or orders (the Imaginary, Symbolic and Real) are the terms
he uses to show the materiality of language as it registers for subjects. Each is an
occasion where language links and makes available dimensions of perception—both at
moments of developmental achievement and throughout life. I will discuss these orders
briefly in a moment. What is important to mark at this moment in my discussion is to
consider how literature functions for Jameson as a peculiar means of considering the
problematic of representing the subject's perspective. Literature stands in for the way that
it can be interpreted as a repository or distribution point for wishes and fantasies—
aspects of that particular "individual" dimension that Marxist critical discourse speaks to
but struggles to speak of.
Literary Texts as Objects for Psychoanalytic Interpretation
Modern literature, specifically novels, present a fascinating case for a discourse
that delivers the connections of social life while also generating or producing affects that
seem wholly personal or private. Jameson uses Freud to unpack how it is that aesthetic
products like novels offer pleasure in their production and reception both. In a text on the
connection of daydreams to the creative process, Freud describes how daydreams
distinguish themselves from nightdreams: nightdreams in Freud's system are only known
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through their "afterwork" of retelling and interpretation in the analytic setting.299
Daydreams, however, are the gratifications of a narcissistic ego, frequently self-pitying or
self-aggrandizing, and eminently uninteresting, embarrassing, or even repulsive to reveal
to others. Yet, Freud contends that literature and other cultural productions are just
disguised narcissistic wishes, dressed in the images available to the author, made
palatable by disguise. Narcissistic pleasure then is found in two dimensions: the
expression of the wish and the formal pleasure of its disguise. Like a joke, there is a
discharge of psychic energy by way of the shortcuts and displacements of the aesthetic
work.300 To use an example relevant to my argument in favor of Utopian literary forms,
Utopian literature could be seen to abide by this process, where the peccadilloes of the
author—e.g., William Morris's narrator's constant remarks on the edifying architecture—
are cloaked with broader cultural appeal, i.e. a proposal of an epoch of rest where
pleasures are widely available and reflected in the health and happiness of this account of
life along the Thames. Jameson’s insight into this scenario is that Freud's transposition of
narcissistic fantasy to aesthetic object depends on the ideological contents of the era for
its reception and popularity, and that the "private" fantasy itself was only ever first
available because of the social economy and its particular formation: "There are no
personal ideologies, except by a metaphorical transfer in which the function of purely
private associations and symbolic images in the psychic economy of a given individual is
compared to the dynamics of the social economy generally."301 This relation of private
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wish to ideology is, I would propose, what is happening with Levitas's use of desire,
where the social world provides the "wants" that are yet experienced as privately held
"desire."302
Jameson wants to further account for how it is that novels package wishes under
heavy disguise and thus, become compelling enough for circulation and in turn, circulate
fantasies as ideology. It is under these conditions that Jameson turns to a "symptomatic"
reading of cultural objects, whereby all cultural artifacts are to be read as symbolic
resolutions of real political and social contradictions. This formulation is Althussers's
imbued with Lacan's terms, showing the debt of Lacan in his analysis in The Political
Unconscious (1981) that he carries into his later work on Utopia. Jameson cautions that
the political unconscious is not a solid or coherent story, not a “master narrative,” but a
construct: "it exists nowhere in ‘empirical’ form and therefore must be re-constructed on
the basis of empirical ‘texts’ of all sorts, in much the same way that the master-fantasies
of the individual unconscious are reconstructed through fragmentary and symptomatic
‘texts: of dreams, values, behavior, verbal free association, and the like."303 The
reconstruction begins with the cultural products of our time, especially fiction, which
with its investments in narrative, are privileged sites for the history-becomingconscious—historicity itself.304 What one finds in this unconscious are the remnants of
life lived outside of capitalism, memories of belonging to something other than the
apparatuses of the state. To summarize: the stories that groups tell themselves, left in the
fictions that are written and read—should be looked at not for what they say just about
themselves but how they say it—what structures they use to tell. This leads Jameson to
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focus on the forms that different cultures use: fairytales, epics, detective fictions, realism,
romance, or Utopias. Each of these can be looked at for how they are residues of the
"private" wish that was never actually privately held. The fantasies that are distributed in
fiction, while registering affectively and consumed "privately," are social, ideological
objects. However, because literary fictions use aesthetics to generate affect, they are also
mostly distinct from treatises from Marx or even psychoanalytic case studies. And these
differences from and similarities with the contemporary analytic discourses of Marx and
Lacan give a means to reflect on the whole scene of language use, albeit from different
angles.
The scene of language use—broken out into three distinct but interrelated orders
of Imaginary, Symbolic and Real— is brought into fuller view through Lacan than what
Freud could say in his time, according to Jameson. 305 These three dimensions of
language are not easily summarized but their evidence in literature helps to make my
point that literature is useful for accessing desire and libidinal aspects of social life.
Different than the interpretation of dreams or the decoding of the meaning of symptoms,
Jameson details Lacan for the way that art is not just a repressed social life but is more of
a symptom for considering the "perpetual alienation" that conditions subjectivity as
such.306 This alienation occurs in all three orders and each traffics with language: the
Imaginary in the dualities and oppositions of identification, the Symbolic with the
differentials and the abstractions of language, and the Real with the limits of language.
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Less differentiates the various discourses of fiction from social constructionist terms than
the critical scholars mentioned in Chapter One would have one think. Literary fiction,
however, has more ready access to the Imaginary register or order of language, offering
more descriptive accounts of objects that appeal to the perceptual associations and hold
these in spatial relations that center a perceiving "self." Objects are affectively charged
and valorized as their connection to the body as part-objects—a relationship that is first
seen (but repeated in life) in what has since, in Lacanian terms, been called "the mirror
stage." This translates into fiction where there are objects in fuller description. Adding to
this, literature also presents the social worlds and characters to chart a path through,
which readers identify with. Said another way, cultural objects—Marxism and
psychoanalytic interpretations, along with literature and other discourses—do not signify
the self's wishes but are all lines of fiction—"'dans une ligne de fiction,' which
underscore the psychic function of narrative fantasy in the attempts of the subject to
reintegrate his or her alienated image."307
To review: the unconscious and desire are not the instincts or drives, nor should
they be discussed as expressions of a better way of living that is either repressed or held
privately, as Levitas has described. Language pervades and constructs subjects at levels
of materiality, from the part-objects of libidinal attachment that are given by way of
language as discrete objects during language aquisition and then, as the otherness of
language itself, that is never one's own private cipher but held by a social system that also
holds and orders subjects in relation. This perspective holds for Jameson in his recent
writing in An American Utopia that also shares with the concern of envy alongside
desire:
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The primacy of desire in Freud remained essentially personal, and
included the 'otherness' of the family in a merely casual fashion. Lacan
was able to insert otherness into the heart of Freud's path breaking
conception of desire, and to offer a picture of desire from which the
presence of the Other—big or small—is never absent, so that in a sense,
or rather in all possible senses, individual desire is the desire of the
Other, is the Other's desire. This socialization of desire itself now at one
stroke renders the attempts to build a bridge between Freud and Marx,
between the two great scientific discoveries which characterize
modernity unnecessary. For now the psyche is already essentially social,
and the existence of the Other is at the very heart of the libidinal, just as
all our social passions are already drenched in the psychic. But we must
grasp the originality of this view, whose power is negative rather than
positive, for the universal envy which is necessarily at the heart of all
social life is not some positive desire, but is rather envy of the jouissance
or satisfaction of the Other.308
This concern of the negative, less savory feelings when confronted with others' desires
was notable to Jameson in his first articulation of Lacan in 1977. Nothing is so simple as
an expressed desire, but this is then immediately challenged by the "envious rage at the
gratification of others" disguised as a larger or more commonly-held sentiment and the
formal play of language.309 Thus, what sets Jameson apart from both critical religious
studies scholars and utopian studies scholars is raising the representation of "experience"
as a problematic, holding out that this is visible in contrast to cultural products such as
literature, and that desires are subtended by others and their desires, configuring a subject
caught by and carried through language that is not always pleasant.
Widening the view of the novel and revisiting the ideological dimensions of
Jameson's interpretations of literature resituates Lacan for use in Marxist analysis of
literary form. As mentioned above, the stories that groups tell themselves (be they
fictional or theoretical!) should be considered for not only what they say but also the
forms they take. Fairytales, epics, detective fictions, realism, romance, or Utopias—each
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can be looked at as residues of the "private" wish that was never actually privately held.
Here is a case for the different genres that appear and succeed under different conditions,
be they shifts in the novels of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries or across other eras
and their concomitant modes of production. The text, a social-symbolic act, is
efficacious—it serves the community it is written for both by guiding it and also figuring
what is otherwise unrepresentable. Jameson imports the structural logics of Claude LeviStrauss's analysis of myth for his interpretation of the modern literary form.310 Jameson
points to Levi-Strauss's analysis of Caduveo facial decorations and their design, one of
duality and symmetry, for how they reflect or enact the social hierarchy. This is different
from their more egalitarian neighbors. In the Caduveo, the "real social contradictions,
insurmountable in their own terms, find a purely formal resolution in the aesthetic
realm."311 From this example, Jameson extracts an interpretive model that is able to
cooperate with his particular definitions of ideology and History. For ideology, the form
is not just shaped or informed by ideology but the aesthetic form itself is ideological: its
characteristics, materials, and situation all playing together to make the imaginary
resolution to the social problem or the contradictions which cannot be surmounted in the
intercourse of resource production.312 Thus, the form of the art indicates information
about the organization of the society.
A simple example of this is how the novel—a privately consumed, personal
narrative developed to reflect the European social relations—etches the individual onto a
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transforming landscape which then transforms the individual. The political conditions of
modernity are read by Jameson on the surfaces of the novel, which become a "political
allegory" for a "sometimes repressed ur-narrative or master fantasy about the interaction
of collective subjects." Novels are not individual texts for individuals but "grasped as
'utterances' in an essentially collective or class discourse."313 Modern history appears in
literature, then, as revolutions, market economies annulling old aristocracies, with a
changing cast of collectivities, from the proletariat and the masses in industrialized cities
to the transnational forces of communism and fascisms, super-states and global
corporations marking characters and plots. Thus, Jameson's formal analysis interrogates
History in terms of a context both diachronic and synchronic (a method familiar to
literary analysis) but also posits History as an immanent subtext that is fundamentally not
representable. History, in short, is that which is inaccessible to us except in textual form,
or in other words, "that it can be approached only by way of prior (re)textualization."314
This confrontational but unresolved sense of History comes into contact with the
concerns raised in Chapter One by Tyler Roberts as incongruity. But with Jameson, it is
now materialized, an effect of political economy.
Utopia in Jameson
Two key points can be taken from this summary statement about the value of
Lacan for Jameson—points that are crucial to my argument for both the problematic of
representation in the study of religion and the role Utopia can have in mediating this
problematic. First, is that cultural products are dense ideological formations that refract
libidinal attachments as social objects. Second, that what is ever thought of as existential,
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private, or "experience" is in a chain of relations—of Otherness—that keeps any claim to
experience distant from any sort of interior or liberal self. The effect is that, with a
psychoanalytic frame of Lacanian desire applied at the site of cultural products, a
dialectical method of interpreting culture, where this method is always the unity of theory
and practice, elicits the effect of a simultaneous subjective and social perspective. As
Jameson reflects in his most recent writing on Utopia in An American Utopia:
To put it methodologically, where in other systems the operation of
transcoding is unavoidable—we must pass from a language of subjective
or psychological individuality to a very different terminology governing
the social or the collectivity (a passage involving a mediation I tend to
describe in terms of a translation process)—here transcoding is
unnecessary and the same code can apply to either reality.315
Jameson employs this primarily to literature while recognizing the narrative overlaps
both novels and Marxist historical materialism. These two narrative forms echo with a
third narrative—the "personal" dimension where subjects string events into stories to
interpret existence. When this is applied to the distinctive Utopian literary genre, the
subjective or "individual" aspect is brought into closer relation to its already collective
identity. Collectivity, in Utopia, disrupts the presumed modern individuality and offers
subjectivity as it is both constructed by others and also, shows this constructedness as
satisfying, untroubled, and harmonious, or, as I have said other places, resolved of its
social contradictions.
This is, then, how Utopia becomes a figure for modernity. Within capitalism, the
genre with the most telling fragments of the political unconscious is Utopia.316 Utopia is
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particularly ripe because it symbolically resolves social contradictions but then, delivers
contradiction back in the form itself and across the genre. Jameson's formal analysis
allows those contradictions to be read across multiple literary works within the same
genre of Utopia: some Utopias emphasize work while others leisure; abundance solves
some social problems whereas in others, thrift is the solution; and political centralization
marks some Utopias while others depend on a democratic complexity. Utopian literature,
then, gives access to the micro disjunctures—History—at the level of form through the
way that Utopia—as a literary form and as a figure—is caught up in giving and taking,
presenting and withholding, attending to the present while projecting some other time or
place beyond. Reading symptomatically allows the unacknowledged desires and
expressions of socio-political life to be read across the surface of the text.
It is from Jameson's near-obsessiveness with trying to think the present that
Utopia comes in as a remnant of modernity. As discussed already, Utopia references the
material conditions of travel and exploration, of French and English revolutions of an
emergent middle class, and the increased comfort provided by mechanized production
and factory labor that simultaneously constructed a new class of urban workers to first
produce and then consume these goods in the twentieth century. Jameson insists on
holding Utopia within view of his theoretical work despite its negative associations with
fascism or the failed Soviet state. Jameson does not exclude these from his interpretations
of Utopia, recognizing Utopia is just as associated with xenophoic or racist group
practices as with collective class consciousness or desires for better ways of being. What
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is most important is that Utopia will simmer as unconscious impulse within modernity
due to the contradictions of capital until brought into more conscious projects.317 While
an absolutely impossible goal, full consciousness—like Utopia—is a fool's errand and a
worthy effort. The praxis of a dialectic applies.
Whereas Utopia has been thought of as hope and change, psychological
fulfillment, particular communal groups, political treatises, or technological
advancement, Jameson associates Utopia most with its formal operation of representing
the material contradictions of capitalism and raising these contradictions to the level of
the form itself. To read Utopia as either a blueprint or an impossibility would be to
misread Utopia, and what it demands instead is a dialectical method. The formal method
of Furey describes the dialectic as it operates with regards to Utopia's stubbornness in
being formalized at all:
In Utopia, this far-away land, there are no clear divisions between
unfamiliar and familiar, novel and known, critiqued and approved. This is
the point. Absolute difference sounds intriguing, but not only is it both
theoretically and practically impossible, it's not what Utopias offer
anyway. They put existing pieces together into a non-existent form, like
Homer's chimera, a never-before seen animal with the head of a lion, the
body of a goat, and the tail of a serpent. This is not merely the familiar
rendered strange, but dialectically so: distinctive in a way that leverages
critique, it enables us to see where we are while imagining that it could be
otherwise. 318
Utopia compels through this instability of representation both in its form and its content,
what Jameson describes as not just about content of Utopia—the city its features, its
kinds of relations—but about what it can and cannot register: “The representational
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relations established between the form and the content of the Utopia.”319 Beyond the
contradiction of the name itself, Utopia generates its fundamental appeal by being
simultaneously both strange and familiar, and thus only accessible by way of dialectical
movement. This is evident in the example of Utopia's closed off island that is available
by way of a familiar traveler who mirrors the reader's imaginative participation in the
space. 320 These have been noted above.
What Jameson adds is how Utopias (the literary form)—by entering into the
circuit of representation in being written out and shared—spread Utopia (the figure)
across materiality and fantasy, where in taking form, it annuls itself as the possibility of
actually being the Utopia.321 In Freudian language, the Utopian text would need to obey
both the pleasure principle and reality principle simultaneously—to deliver jouissance
and also, to keep itself in the realm of the believable, possible, long enough to appear
realistic in human terms of relation, meeting objections of the reader along the way.322 In
these ways, Utopia depends on being moved into representation where it then, in being
caught in several contradictions, points back to the ways that social life itself is always
mired in the material contradictions that Marx described as intrinsic to capitalism's
development. Because of the literary Utopia's particular ability to deliver capitalism's
contradictions into view, Jameson marks Utopia for special attention in his Marxist,
formalist method.
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This attention of form, as mentioned, does not excuse content. At the level of
content, Jameson identifies the absence of money as More's fundamental principle.323
Utopias distinguish themselves for their details on how to arrange social life, such as
Saint-Simon's administration, Bellamy's industrial army, Morris's aesthetic directive, or
Callenbach's ecological harmonization. If these programs are of the authors’
predilections, they also are responses to larger social or historical situations. These
contents of Utopia—the ways that the society is organized for maximum fulfillment and
satisfaction—are woven from the economic necessities of their time. Throughout,
however, is the abolition of money and property, "run[ning] through the Utopian tradition
like a red thread" that is "now aggressively affirmed on the surface, now tacitly
presupposed in milder forms or disguises."324 Jameson does not leave the questions of
resource distribution to a matter of Utopian contents: he also regards this will to
economic satisfaction as mirrored in the Utopian enclave itself, a kind of mental space
that has been stilled and quieted against the rush of historical change.
In this relationship of the contents that abolish money and the form that creates an
enclave from which to launch a comparison to expose the conflicts of the present society,
the Utopian form highlights anxieties of capitalism and attempts to puzzle its resolution.
As discussed in Part One above, other literary theorists proposed that the imaginative
force is constructed through the bounded island that is then traversed, reported on, and
generative of alternatives outside of the text. Jameson emphasizes the "closure" of the
island that is mirrored in the closure of the narrative. This is repeated in the concepts and
categories that distinguish the text from others and thus, "close" it off. As mentioned
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above, this closure has the paradoxical effect of opening up to other possibilities. What
Jameson adds to this analysis of the Utopian form is that in being a genre about islands
and enclaves, it constructs social life as a bounded form, a totality and that this total
formation displaces thought:
Totality is then precisely this combination of closure and system, in the
name of autonomy and self-sufficiency and which is ultimately the
source of that otherness or radical, or even alien, difference already
mentioned above and to which we will return at some length. Yet it is
precisely this category of totality that presides over the forms of Utopian
realization: the Utopian city, the Utopian revolution, the Utopian
commune or village, and of course the Utopian text itself, in all its radical
and unacceptable difference from the more lawful and aesthetically
satisfying literary genres.325
Thus, as contrast, it is not just that Utopian literature generates imaginative
possibilities—difference—by its representation of a different society. The more radical
possibility Jameson upholds is that Utopia, as imagined enclaves within the existent
world, does not offer only alternatives but somehow is "felt to replace our world
altogether."326
It is important to note the inclusion and radicalization (dare I say Aufhebung?) of
Ruppert's formal analysis of contradiction. Whereas Ruppert treats the transpositions of
marriage practices and technological innovations as temporary resolutions of lived social
contradictions, and he regards the Utopian form itself as igniting a cognitive
contradiction that redirects the reader's attention to her own experiences of contradiction,
Jameson sees how Utopias both displace the immanent social world and occlude
thought—in other words, they generate antinomy. Jameson here reflects a kind of
deconstructionism, inscribing the formal contradictions of Ruppert's Utopia within the
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Late capitalist moment, arriving at the situation where Utopias continue to try to decide
that which is undecidable.327 Thus the contradiction is more overwhelming, stepping the
analysis of the Utopian form back into the open-endedness of temporality, like Bloch.328
Jameson widens the scope of the effect and place of Utopia's contradictory force to the
point of seeming to "replace our world altogether." To reiterate: the social totality —of
representing society en total—has effects beyond the ability to deliver social
contradictions. While Utopia does this, it does more.
It could be leveraged that Jameson overstates his case for social totality and its
role in delivering both contradiction and antinomy to present interpretation. Jameson sees
the contradictions of Utopia also across the genre in the way that some texts promote a
pastoral while others a city life. The oppositions multiply across the texts: work/leisure;
abundance/thrift; political centralization/democratic complexity;
individuality/collectivity.329 Utopia figures the obstacles met in social discourse and
attempts a solution. In this effort, Jameson finds that it is the formation of the collective
itself, its presupposed unity of individuals, that shocks and disorients, earning the proper
name of Utopia. Thus, if Utopia strikes an ambivalent tone, this is as much to do with its
structuring of contradictions as with the historical record of twentieth century political
failures. The Utopian form is then, for Jameson, its combination of its consistent contents
that attempt to resolve lived social contradictions and the effect of these attempts when
circulated through an aesthetic of written, fictional narrative.
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Utopia as Figure of Desire, not Concept about Desire
Jameson differs from Levitas in two ways that I find particularly salient for my
considerations of Utopia: first, the claim that desire depends on representation—on taking
form—and, in doing so, becomes something for introjection and projection. The second,
the claim that desire always refers to a collectivity—a determinate set of ideological
material, in many cases, a social class—that constructs itself differentially from an Other.
Both these cases of desire relate it directly to ideology but an expansive definition of
ideology that inscribes all social activity within it. With this kind of encompassing
definition of ideology, the question arises: how can we see outside of it? The answer is by
the differential logics that construct it; that is, by the particularities of a text that appear as
odd or strange, and therefore do not satisfy. To return to an example from Morris, there is
something aberrant to me about the sexual attention given to the women within the text,
particularly the attentions that are differently given to different women, with Morris
lingering on the details of younger women. I can read this as nineteenth-century
bourgeois sexism because my social formation is differently constructed from that of the
text, whereas the romanticism of the rowing along the Thames is quaint but appealing for
my positive associations with exercise and fitness as a part of beauty.
To summarize: where there is a desire for Utopia, there is a representation of
ideological material. The material aligns enough with a particular social formation that it
reasserts and legitimates this formation. How it distinguishes itself from other literature is
in its particularly modern wish-fulfilling fantasy of aligning the "individual" (made so by
capitalist reification) with its formative institutions. It delivers the pleasure of this
fulfillment aesthetically—as a formal closure—but does so incompletely, prompting
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desire to keep going, to keep searching for its Utopian object. Utopian literature, in as
much as it presents the reality principle as the Utopian social order, subtends the private
wish as ideology. Yet as a representation, Utopias return the gaps of all representations,
all systems of signification, and echo with the qualitative incommensurability of what is
particular, isolate, "me" and "my" desires and what are the systems, discourses, and
languages that "I" am embedded in. Utopia as a figure stands for the aesthetic, linguistic
object of desire—the private wish of the end of social contradiction and the modern
scientific orientation that representing social life "just properly enough" is what can
precipitate this end.
Utopia in Critical Religious Studies
In this chapter, I have argued that the Utopian literary form generates the
ambivalence that moderns encounter with Utopia and contributes to Utopia's association
with desire. I explained how Utopian narratives are primarily travel narratives of
alternative, self-sufficient societies that move the reader dialectically between worlds,
generating a mix of familiarity and unfamiliarity that ultimately propels the reader to
recognize their own social world and its complex problems. By operating with a logic of
spatial relations of difference primarily, Utopia develops as a figure of wholeness or
totality. This totality, as I proposed through Jameson's Marxian-Lacanian method, has
several representation effects. It comes to signify the resolution of social contradiction at
the same time as it generates awareness of the social as a "whole." This makes for a
displacement or, as Marin calls it, a "neutralization" of the present, as if to replace it.
Utopia becomes associated with desire not only through its wish-fulfilling fantasy quality
against the modern conditions of capitalism but also through its insertion into the circuits
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of ideological and libidinal relations. It amplifies these circuits through its simultaneous
"resolution" of social contradiction in form and its failure because it is ultimately
someone else's fantasy and also always impossible for the restructuring of everything to
everyone's satisfaction.
This chapter on the representational dynamics of the Utopian figure continues my
overall argument that critical approaches, particularly ones in religion, face a dilemma in
presenting the existential lived dimensions of existence alongside their explanatory
arguments. Utopia offers a means to consider this problematic. I contend that critical
approaches are invested in Utopia by way of their dependence on representing social
totality and imply social collectivities in their formulation of social construction. They
come across as dry, objective, or overly locative in that they emphasize the social totality
and analyze subjects by their various social formations. However, critical methods
contain in them a kind of "Utopian seed" as they draw on their explanatory tools of social
totality and historicization. Through these tools, they reference the Real of History, the
frictions of social contradiction, and the political potentials that are within the
descriptions of formations as always social, thus not isolated or individual. Thus,
explanatory projects of social construction are linked to the existential by way of the
aesthetic figure of Utopia. When critical religious studies is read for its Utopian
connections or as an expression of a desire for Utopia, it turns from being an account of
society's structuring forces and subjectivizing procedures to offering an oblique glimpse
of the existential, lived dimension of social life. Never fully representing "experience," it
offers explanatory jouissance, recognizes the psychic pull of History, and delivers the
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Utopian wish of collective association. I will continue this mapping of Utopian desire to
critical religious studies in Chapter Four.
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Chapter Four
Utopia as Method: Encountering Representational Dilemmas
This chapter connects my argument to others who make similar claims about the
problematics of representation in social constructionist methods. I have argued Utopia is
uniquely situated to provide a means of considering the problematic of representing
social constructs and existential life for critical religious studies. I examine a similar
claim by Utopian Studies scholar and Sociologist Ruth Levitas and distinguish my
narrow use of Utopia as a modern figure from her more generalized utopia. My
distinction preserves the historical and thematic connections of Utopia to sociological
methods while holding on to its connection to its aesthetic form. I contend, contra
Levitas, that the existential, lived dimension of social life that has been repressed through
the twentieth century should not be revived through an appeal to secularized religious
tropes. I argue instead that it is in the analysis of the consonance of Utopia and critical
projects, in their shared aesthetic of representing social totality, that the existential is
raised obliquely. For existence to be "represented" in critical religious studies, it will
need to emerge via a dialectical method of reading and interpreting social life without an
explicit articulation. Utopia does not immediately present itself in critical religious
studies but is uncovered by symptomatic readings. Tomoko Masuzawa takes a
symptomatic approach to reading scholarship in religious studies in her own "quest" for
origins. Her method of reading origin provides a parallel to my own in reading Utopia.
By her approach, I show how desire is an apt term for how complex aesthetic figures like
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Utopia inhere in critical projects and energize scholarly work in unconscious ways.
Raising attention to the Utopian aspects of critical religious studies invites in an
aesthetic-critical perspective and opens to the affective and libidinal dimensions of
scholarly practice.
Outline
In my goal to develop the category of Utopian desire most relevant to critical
religious studies, I consider the work of Ruth Levitas and her claim that contemporary
sociological methods suffer from a repression of its utopian history and themes. Both
sociology and utopia are reconstitutions of society, and social methods, she argues, would
benefit from A stronger association. I present her work as it intersects with my own
position within critical religious studies. In her claim of the shared historical foundation
of sociology and utopia in the nineteenth century, I find the overlap of the explanatory
value of representing society as a discrete object. I separate my Utopia from her own
lower-case, more broadly defined "utopia" when it comes to the value she gives to its
explicitly normative role and to how it can communicate a range of universal, existential,
and positive themes. Levitas depends on overtly secularized religious tropes to carry
messages of temporal and spatial heterogeneity she finds in life and ascribes to utopia.
While I agree that utopia generally can signal these differential dimensions of existence, I
argue that my own figure of Utopia makes a better case. Supported by the dialectical,
critical method of Fredric Jameson, I argue that an historicized Utopia makes existential
"experience" an aspect approached obliquely rather than through explication.
In Part Two of the chapter, I turn to Tomoko Masuzawa's Freudian symptomatic
reading of origin in religious studies scholarship. Like Jameson, Masuzawa offers a

216
complex, historicized account of psychoanalytic desire. Steering psychoanalysis away
from an account of innate drives, Masuzawa shows how figures like origin come to
signify potent associations. I compare her project to mine for the ways that prohibitions
function in scholarly discourse. Masuzawa's argument about how the desire for origins
fuels religion scholarship has been tremendously influential. Because of her impact on
the field, it is important for me to contrast what she claims about origin to what I am
arguing about the useful fantasy of social totality. Where Utopia is a representation of
social totality, it is a fantasy that serves a purpose for critical religious studies. This has
overlaps with origin. By following Masuzawa's lead, I introduce desire as a historicized
tool for interpereting the attachments and interests of scholar-subjects.
I. Utopia as Method-Levitas and Jameson
In a late-stage career reflection, Sociologist Ruth Levitas considers the
relationship of Utopia to sociology through the histories and repressions of the field in
her series of essays Utopia as Method: the Imaginary Reconstitution of Society. In this
text, Levitas revives her argument from The Concept of Utopia published 23 years
previously with the definition that utopia is, at its core, "the desire for being otherwise,
individually and collectively, subjectively and objectively."330 (For my discussion of
Levitas, I return to her lower case "utopia" to signal our differences.) She expands this
definition further, arguing that utopia and sociology both imply a normative perspective
and that both demonstrate the relationship of social structures and their effects on social
life. Levitas avers that her primary reason for bringing utopia to sociology's attention is
that there is a need for
330
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exposing the limitations of current policy discourses about economic
growth and ecological sustainability. Utopia facilitates genuine holistic
thinking about possible futures, combined with reflexivity, provisionality
and democratic engagement with the principles and practices of those
futures. And it requires us to think about our conceptions of human needs
and human flourishing in those possible futures.331
This visionary introduction expresses both political and ecological urgency for western
ideals that are, by implication, either absent or threadbare in her scholarly field and in
need of (re)assertion. While permitting that utopia includes the possibility of "utopianism
of right-wing politics," her wish is plainly for constructions which provide more
egalitarian, more ecologically-sustainable relations, ones which switch to biofuels,
protect subsistence farmers, and "deliver secure and sustainable livelihoods and ways of
life for all."332
I do not object to her political interests, and her connections of utopia to sociology
are salient to my own interest in the representational dilemmas that critical social theory
raises in regards to subjective life. However, I contend that my formulation of the
Utopian figure is better suited than hers to address the obstacles of critical methods.
Because of the kind of capillary quality of Levitas's utopia—going in so many places
with its various ways of promoting social change—her analysis disperses Utopia across
so many domains that Utopia's contradictions appear as a problem of application instead
of as the operation of Utopia itself. Said simply, Levitas's broad definition attempts to
contain Utopian contradiction instead of explain it.
To track the import of this distinction, I look at how Levitas relates her utopia to
sociology through its mutual historical development and how utopia might be developed
as a method. I first investigate her claim of the shared historical foundation of sociology
331
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and utopia in the nineteenth century. This includes how her reflects utopian position.
Then, I will examine how Levitas regards utopia as a method of social analysis. This
reflection includes her argument that utopia is normative and that it offers sociology
"holistic thinking." I find her claim to utopia's holistic perspective particularly relevant
because of how she perceives sociology to exclude existential, lived experience. I
contend, however, that her appeals to holism does not effectively reintroduce this
dimension for my argument. She relies on secularized religious tropes that sound too
close to what religion scholar Craig Martin calls "individual religion." To counter these
limitations of her project, I revisit Fredric Jameson and his proposal of "utopia as
method." Overall, I contend that Levitas's generalized "utopia" raises relevant concerns to
critical religious studies that are, after consideration, better addressed by my own
theorization of Utopia for how it figures social contradiction.
Shared History of Sociology and Utopia
For Levitas, the shared aspects of utopia and sociology are that both are
"imaginary reconstitutions of society." Her argument is not against any specific text or
method in the field, only against the concern that twentieth century institutionalization
has stripped sociology of its association with utopia: sociology has turned away from its
utopian past and, in turn, repressed its interest in the future, its normative dimension and
"the existential dimension and what it means to be human."333 While offering a glimpse
into the sociology of utopia, her attention is mostly on utopian dimensions of sociology
and how, over the twentieth century, these aspects have been driven underground,
returning intermittently through such political-theoretical perspectives as feminism and
333
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the realism of Rawls and Rorty. Levitas’s recovery of the overlapping history of utopia
and sociology and her assumptions about how they both reconstitute society supports my
claim that Utopia condenses social life in service of critical thought.
Her primary mode of recovery of utopia and sociology is to show this shared
history. Pointing to the end of the nineteenth century, Levitas presents each as subtending
the other, "where there is sociology as utopia, as well as utopia as sociology."334 Reading
utopia back into sociology, Levitas returns to Auguste Comte, Karl Marx and Emile
Durkheim for evidence of social theory’s congruence with utopian themes. She then
picks up the overlapping sociological/utopian writings of Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and
finally returns to the authors of nineteenths century utopias—Edward Bellamy, William
Morris, and H.G. Wells—to frame her discussion. Gilman and Wells stand out in this list
for their writings of both sociology and literature. Through Gilman, Levitas sees the end
of the nineteenth century as a site for opportunities for emergent forms of gender
relations. 335 Wells's sociological writings are frequently ignored in sociological
discourses, and Lewis Mumford was to use Wells as an example in his complaint that
social scientists, in their antipathy to utopia, had turned their discipline dull and were
guilty of "not being good scientists by not being any good at literature."336
Sociology was utopian at the start, she argues, because it was normative: early
figures proposed the good life in the midst of their analysis. In Comte, she identifies his
value of social laws that stabilized and precipitated change and that he "argued for a
334
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scientific organization of society matching individual aptitudes to occupational roles."337
Comte's interest in making work more satisfying through matching ability to occupation
becomes Levitas's basis for the normative edge of sociology. From Marx, she reads
against his condemnation of the unscientific utopian socialists (an argument she makes in
Concept) by associating Marx with a voluntaristic and idealistic perspective of social
change. Marx wanted the world "to be otherwise" and held a vision of the "good society"
(though resisted formalizing it) and this, under her lights, is appropriately utopian. 338
Marx also held "biography and history together," making sociology both collective and
individual. From Durkheim, she takes his claims to "normal" society as an implicitly
utopian ideal. Her reading of Durkheim bears attention for my own project, since it is not
his normativity but his use of society as an object of analysis that lends him his Utopian
dimension.
Durkheim as Utopian
Whereas Levitas avers that Durkheim was explicitly antipathetic to utopia, she
reads his 1893 text, The Division of Labor in Society, as presenting utopian vision.
Durkheim writes, "the actual state of the world [is] pathological, contrasted with a benign
normality which should have emerged, and which must and will."339 Durkheim proposes
"normal" and "abnormal" forms, setting up a contrast of a non-existent-yet-normal of
highly-divided labor societies verses pathological forms where the "'division of labor
ceases to bring forth solidarity'"340 The maldistribution of workers to jobs and the
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weaknesses in non-familial bonds like social clubs or even the state's failure to secure the
coordination of different social elements threatens the modern society. Durkheim's
evolutionary perspective, while mentioned, is folded in as a utopian aspect of his thought,
reading his "normal" mode as a guide for sociologists and wider readers to see the better
society that is possible.
Levitas's reading of Durkheim serves as a useful case study for considering the
purchase gained by a narrow definition of Utopia. Her overdetermined concept of utopia
shines brightly across a range of material, washing out distinctions that I see as crucial for
treating Utopia, specifically its complex representational logics, its critical potentials, and
its associations that make it rise and fall in currency. For example, she seeks out
examples that support a universal utopia, citing Durkheim that "'[m]en have long dreamt
of finally realizing in fact the ideal of human fraternity' and that such aspirations 'can be
satisfied only if all men form one society, subject to the same laws.'"341 This equates
utopia with human nature, which, as I argued in Chapter Two, is a claim that gives so
much to Utopia that it overlays a western ambition and behavior on those who have
suffered from its force. This seems a cruel twist. Second, this equation renders all
aspiration as utopian, erasing what might distinguish my version of Utopian longing with
economic or political valence—a distinction Levitas does not make. Is it that all longings
are for political and economic change through total social revision? Levitas's concept of
utopia is too abstracted, too inclusive for the political, institutional, or intellectual shifts
that she is pushing for. Third, her comparison of Durkheim's thought to themes in Wells's
A Modern Utopia for the purposes of establishing their mutual interests seems more like a
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general attitude of intellectuals than of Utopia specifically.342 In contrast, I contend that
Durkheim's and Comte's normative visions, especially Durkheim's "normal" and
"abnormal" categories, are better when historicized as a remnant of a Eurocentrism and
its evolutionary theory of society.343 This does not remove these sociologists from my
own considerations of Utopia, but treats them by different criteria. it isn't normativity that
makes Utopia but how these norms offer a resolution a resolution to contradictions
produced in industrial capitalism—the alienations of subjects constructed through a labor
economy. Levitas's formulation of utopia involves Durkheim's arguments of moral and
ethical claims that while relevant for proposing a normative dimension to sociology is
more precisely a discussion about relative social goods. I would say that Durkheim's
potential as an author of Utopia—in my sense—is more through his emphasis on the
value and means of sustaining social solidarity.344 This social solidarity is constructed
both out of love for others and loyalty to society—two phenomena that, according to
Ernest Wallwork, lose their distinction in The Division of Labor text.345 In this way, it is
Durkheim's aspiration and interest in preserving collective associations in all of society's
"evolutionary" expressions that makes him, by my lights, Utopian.
Beyond his emphasis on collective associations, I more strongly associate
Durkheim with Utopia in his dependence on and use of the abstraction of "society" to
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guide his theory and method of sociology. Levitas sees this connection as so foundational
that utopia and sociology itself are at risk when postmodernity questions, among other
tightly-held assumptions, society as a totality.346 However, Levitas layers extra
expectations onto utopia, calling it "holistic, social, future-located, unequivocally better
and linked to the present by some identifiable narrative, and one which embeds a view of
human flourishing."347 I contend that the Utopia of sociology is not the ideal or good
society of normative comparison; it is instead how Utopia articulates the relationship of
social structures and their effects on social life. This is how social totality functions:
imagining the society as a totality that generates its subjects from its institutions.
If Durkheim does imagine society as better than it is, then it is by means of an
optimism endemic to his era for a progressive direction of change, a wish or assumption
in line with Marx that depends first on an analytic of "society" that can be described
functionally:
Although we set out primarily to study reality, it does not follow that we
do not wish to improve it: we should judge our researches to have no
worth at all if they were only to have a speculative interest. If we separate
carefully the theoretical from the practical problems, it is not to the neglect
of the latter; but ... to be in a better position to solve them.348
I contend, therefore, that sociology is Utopian not for its interest in social reform but for
the form to reach that that reform—by tracing structures to behavior, interests, and
desires that determine the dispositions of society's members and by comparing these
structures for their configurations and effects. Levitas says it is in Durkheim's
specification of a good society, of its ultimate unrealizability and the voluntarism needed
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to get there, that makes him utopian.349 While these are elements in Durkheim, I argue
against Levitas that they should not be used as the basis of claiming them as "utopian"
because they can just be as easily claimed for a realist position—a position he claims for
himself against a utopian one.350 Levitas acknowledges Durkheim's claim against utopia
but calls him utopian anyway on the basis of the "normal" society set to contrast the
precarity of his surrounding social situation and established as a "goal."351 But Durkheim
resists the term goal. Instead of exposing these dimensions of Durkheim as contradictory,
Levitas overlays her intention without acknowledging the text's resistance to the utopian
label.
Utopia as Method of Social Analysis
As I have proposed, what makes sociological analysis Utopian is its ability to
derive critical insight from treating human life through the lens of a social totality—an
innovation that is shared between sociology and the form of Utopia. Levitas includes this
nod to social totality but adds several other dimensions, two of which bear on my
argument for Utopia. One is that of the normative agenda of utopia and two is utopia's
ability to speak to the whole of life—"of the existential dimension and what it means to
be human." 352 I will address these two dimensions of her method separately. First, I
contend that her account of normative debates is not directly Utopian, by my formulation
of the figure of Utopia, and that hers supposes a more direct temporal or future direction.
Second, I address her claim that utopia captures the sense of existence that is lost in
349

"But for Durkheim, as for [Raymond] Aron, to be utopian is something else entirely. It means to specify
the future good society in detail, to be unrealistic, and to adopt voluntaristic models of social change." Ibid.,
71.
350
Durkheim, Division of Labor, 408-9.
351
Levitas, Utopia as Method, 71-72.
352
Ibid., 85.

225
critical methods. It is this second one that most directly relates to my own interest in
Utopian desire for critical religious studies. While I agree with her appeal to utopia to
reintroduce sociology to its "existential dimension," I contend that her proposal as it
stands suffers from a generalized, liberal utopianism. By way of Fredric Jameson, I will
sustain that Utopia can serve to introduce the existential dimension but will have to go by
other routes than what Levitas proposes.
Normative Method
For Levitas, any normative assertion stands as enough of a utopian element to
generate the kind of comparison to spark interest in things being otherwise. This is a
dimension Levitas sees as repressed within sociology, a "speculative mode" of "possible
futures open to criticism and debate."353 Thus, by her account, the normative or
prescriptive dimensions that sit with social critique as a method should not be ignored but
embraced. As mentioned above, Levitas sees how early sociologists insert norms within
their analytic and explanatory theories of social forms. Utopia, she argues, has been since
rejected by sociology because of its evaluative content, contrasting utopia to science that
seeks out an "is" and not an "ought." Sociology could bear to learn from utopian literature
as they "contain narratives of the place in history of both originating and alternative
societies, of how we got here and how we might get there."354 Levitas challenges the
separation of description and evaluation, not so as to "collapse this distinction, but to
admit normativity as a proper aspect of sociology itself" by arguing that "evaluation and
openness to the future are intrinsic to description and explanation" and through the
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example of feminist challenges to academic practices that were—in the 1970s and
continue to be—both methodological and substantive.355
As discussed above, Levitas unearths the normative elements in early sociology.
In another gesture to preserve the normative, she describes her own scholarly method as
utopian in its hunt to draw out evidence in political claims and policy initiatives of the
"good society." Calling it an "archaeological" mode of sifting through the cultures to lift
out the shards and fragments of the "good society" that are buried, Levitas pieces together
these remnants and occlusions through imaginative reconstruction to show how social
orders that claim pragmatic objectives are also latticed by ideas of what makes for human
flourishing.356 Her examples of research from the United Kingdom on the implied or
explicit rhetorics of meritotocracy, civil society, and economic growth in New Labor to
resist the neo-liberal and neo-conservative utopias of the new-Right demonstrate how
sociological research can sustain the "ought" within the "is": by bringing these aspects of
discourse to light, sociology can move into democratic debate the implicit or the partial
embedded within policies. One such example from her reflections on the utopianism in
meritocracy is how state-funded schools have not made private-pay education (what are
called "public schools" in the UK) obsolete or irrelevant in the UK despite claims and
initiatives to improve and support education since the 1950s. Meritocracy is a platform of
the Labour Party but so is equality, and these cannot easily sit side by side, with
meritocracy promoting social mobility (up as well as down) whereas equality can be a
platform for sustaining the inequalities as they stand (i.e. if everyone gets the same
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benefit, then those who start out with more still have more afterwards).357 The method of
utopia that Levitas applies in this example is how meritocracy harbors in its rhetoric the
utopian collective norm of fairness and openness while at the same time is challenged by
the individualizing forces of markets and competition—decidedly un-utopian for the way
they instrumentalize human productive capacity. Levitas's method of archaeology to
recover the competing norms in order to trace the interactions of policy, rhetoric,
influence, and quality of life is a compelling case for how sociology can both study value
claims at the same time as assert the relative merits of policies for how they actually do
what they promise to do.
As an outsider to sociological methods, I find Levitas's use of normativity in
relationship to Utopian formations compelling. However, her claim of its "utopian"
quality is more interesting to me for the way that her use of "utopia" in this case depends
on the collective norm of fairness against individualizing forces and that this collective
value is what makes society better. This matches my own definition of Utopia for its
ability to signify collective social arrangements within a dominant liberal capitalism.
Thus, I would argue that this is a Utopian norm because of the value of collectivity, and
not that normativity in sociology is generally utopian. I think that Utopia—as collectivity
and social totality—can be located through an archaeological method but think that it
should also include a focus on the contradictions of Utopia. I will explain how Jameson
adds to Levitas's method at the end of this section.
Holism Method
My second frame for considering Levitas's utopia as method is her claim that
utopia recovers a lost vision the subjective perspective within sociology. As quoted
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above, "Utopia facilitates genuine holistic thinking about possible futures, combined with
reflexivity, provisionality and democratic engagement with the principles and practices of
those futures."358 This definition of holism at first would suggest that it is a kind of
mapping of various social processes in coordination. However, such a view must also
make "connections between economic, social, existential and ecological processes in an
integrated way."359 She goes on to add that sociology could most be helped by utopia
through a "holistic approach" that connects "individual biography and history"—what
Levitas names as "the essence of the sociological imagination."360 What has been lost to
sociology is an evaluation of life from a normative perspective of "human flourishing," a
perspective she shares with sociologist Andrew Sayer, whom she quotes:
Sayer suggests that '[a]s sentient beings, capable of flourishing and
suffering', we are 'particularly vulnerable to how others treat us' and that
'our view of the world is substantially evaluative'. Wellbeing is an
objective condition. It is also relation: we exist not as discrete individuals
but necessarily embedded from the outside in relations with others.361
Later on the page, Levitas contends that, "[a]lthough he does not present it as such,
Sayer's argument is also deeply utopian. He addresses, as I do here, the existential before
the institutional." This existence is the one that is suspended "between the present and the
future."362 Comparing these ideas to Bloch's temporal unfolding, Levitas insists that when
utopia is added to sociology, sociology can more fully accept its history that permits a
category of human nature that itself is completed through culture.363 Levitas sees what I
have identified: that Utopia opens to the existential. However, to claim utopia as holistic
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thinking overdetermines Utopia and erases its contradictions. In her account, holism
begins to speak with agential human subject that, in my formulation, does not sit with
critical methods, especially those in religion.
For utopia to be a useful method to sociology, Levitas asserts that it needs to
include the "ontological mode" that gathers together the claims to a good society and
human flourishing along with the existential, a dimension of being that includes the
experience of time and of affect.364 She bundles these features together as elements of the
"warm stream" of Marx that have been forced "underground" by critical approaches.
Sociology is comfortable with utopia only as an element in the social
imaginary that is the object of explanation. It repeatedly approaches
utopia and retreats from it. And yet the impulse towards social
transformation, there at the origin of the discipline, does not go away.
The warm stream runs underground. Both the general diffusion of utopia
across culture (in Bloch's sense) and the parallels between sociology and
utopia (in Wells's sense) would lead us to expect this. For the excitement
and promise of sociology lies in this presence; the disappointment lies in
its recurrent repression and denial.365
In this case, it is critique that she claims that is pressing the warm stream of Marxism
away. I might add that it is not only critique but scientific positivism that displaces this
dimension of Marxist attention to human flourishing. Levitas is not alone in catching how
critical, social scientific methods, active in Marxist historical materialism, can turn
Marxist critique rigid. It is a concern of Bloch's, an argument waged between E.P.
Thompson and Louis Althusser, an interest of Perry Anderson, and an abiding focus of
Fredric Jameson. Each has found a way into the "warm stream" by way of Utopia. It is
also overreliance on the "cold stream" of ideology critique, historicization and dialectical
criticism that concerned religious studies scholar Tyler Roberts. As discussed in Chapter
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One, Roberts identified in Russell McCutcheon, Steven. Wasserstrom, J.Z. Smith and
others an overly "locative" approach that did not have room for considering incongruity.
This dissertation points out this representational dilemma within critical approaches and
considers that Utopia has a role to play in its engagement for contemporary religious
studies arguments.
I want to distinguish myself from Levitas's reclamation of existential perspectives
through Utopia by way of my narrower definition of Utopia that I have established thus
far and with the critical tools that Fredric Jameson uses. The reason for this is that Levitas
unnecessarily bundles so much within her definition of a general utopia that it becomes
confused with a left-liberal perspective and in doing so, borrows religious tropes to speak
address the specialness of the transformative power. Thus, the second way her holism
intersects with my own use of Utopia for critical religious studies is negatively. Levitas
naturalizes utopia through Bloch and does so in such a way that returns his religious
language the fore. Her method of utopia as a process of recovery works hard to
reintroduce an unalloyed "utopian marvelous" and a "quality of grace" that can be used to
address "what it means to be human."366 Social conditions contribute to the desire for
alternatives, however, utopia is cast as an experience of "grace": "Everything that reaches
to a transformed existence is, in this sense, utopian."367 In using Bloch to help figure a
view of humanity with "moral and existential depth", Levitas defers to secularized
religious language. This, she admits, is due to "evacuation of existential depth from
secular culture." She cites Paul Tillich as offering a secular grace, in line with the
perennial philosophy, of "the incursion of redeemed experience into the mundane, which
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transform both our relation with ourselves and our relations with others."368 These
references to a secularized religious sensibility hold also for how encounters with
aesthetic objects like the color blue or music invite this transcendence that she calls
utopian. Utopia enters in to substitute for representational failure: "The use of
'otherworldly' or utopian metaphors may illustrate the limits of language. It may also
suggest that, as with colour, music's affective character is associational rather than
intrinsic." The presence and absence of color and music—the spacing of color and the
spaces of musical rest—is utopian for its suspension.369
I argue that while religion and utopia may both culturally signal the failures of
representation, the encounters of heterogeneities of time or space, or of a post- or transindividualism that confronts the individualizing forces of capitalism, a scholarly approach
needs to go further to explain this connection. Levitas renders utopia as a model for
holistic thinking, thus expanding the concept of utopia across many domains, including
secular-religious transcendent experience alongside of normative claims for a "good
society" and hopeful futures. She has brought in universalism, human nature, aesthetics,
temporality and social transformation together as one word. What develops through her
claim to holism is not only a confused notion of utopia but also a kind of secular
religiosity that adds meaning, value, awe, and poignancy to life and calls this "utopia."
I find this too-confused a figure for thinking alongside of critical religious studies.
Craig Martin's category of "individual religion" seems to capture a dimension of Levitas's
utopia. Martin identifies how contemporaries in sociology of religion have failed to take
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into account research from religious studies and have unreflexively employed
spiritual/secular distinctions.370 In preserving individualism as a category, they have
imported a privilege of freedom in their claims and repeat insider accounts. Whether or
not this is intended—if it is a rhetorical slippage of an insider’s claim to freedom or the
sociologist’s assertion of their freedom—the assertion overall points to a lack of
theorization or reflection about the perceived or actual autonomy claimed by sociologists.
Martin argues how such slippage is little more than repeating what is hegemonic:
Social theory at its best explains how individuals or individual choices are
products of social forces. To explain things by pointing to individual
choice is in fact not to explain them at all. . . . To posit self-causing
monads, even out of apparent respect for individuals, is to turn social
theory into liberal ideology, or worse, theology—for what is more
theological than self-causing agents, unmoved movers, which escape
causal fields yet make effects in the world?371
Martin's argument against the category of individual within social theory as it relates to
religion is instructive in critiquing religion where it is defended as a distinctive, nonsocially prescribed experience and in troubling the private/public binary about religion—
a distinction that fails to hold up when and since private choices of faith come to
influence public policy or sentiment, or inversely, "choices" are promoted and legitimated
by public conditions.
Martin identifies in sociology that claims to spirituality reinforce a concept of an
individual that is not active in early sociologists like Durkheim, and that claims to
experiences like "grace" or "transcendence" within sociology reinsert liberalism within a
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sociological discourse that does not support a category like the "individual." I follow
Martin in thinking that the individual is derivative in Durkheim: it has no substance but is
an effect of social totality. To avoid Levitas's collapse of utopia and into religion and a
reinsertion of a liberal individual, I have emphasized how it is that Utopia refracts the
existential dimension and signals the diremption of "biography" and "history” within
social theory. This is a subtle yet crucial distinction for considering Utopia alongside
critical approaches in religious studies. Utopia cannot be approached so directly as
Levitas presents in her wish to preserve holism. I go by way of other means, ones that
make use of psychoanalytic and postmodern terms and conditions of social life that have
rendered the subject more suspiciously.
Jameson's Archaeology of Utopia as Method
Levitas's utopia-as-method bundles utopia's functions such that the figure
becomes overdetermined. As a counter to this, I argue that Utopia is a figure that carries
the existential dimension through its aesthetic form. Utopia in this way maintains its
critical value by highlighting social contradiction, but not explicitly characterizing or
representing the existential dimension. Instead, the subjective, lived quality is
encountered through the Utopian representation as a wish-fulfilling object. As is the case
with Freud, this wish is never truly fulfilled, as is the case in Lacanian desire that the
proper object does not exist except as Symbolic and Imaginary language—itself always
in deferral. I traced these moves in Chapter Three. In revisiting Jameson's take on Utopia,
I can better set up how critical religious studies can see its own projects for their desires
for Utopia.
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The archaeological methods of Jameson apply here more than Levitas's.
Jameson's archaeology attends to the different modes of production that settle and layer
within culture, never fully passing out of use but which are covered over and then heaved
up again by history's work. This archaeology is active in Jameson's own "Utopia as
Method," an essay published in 2010, five years following the first appearance of his
collection, Archaeologies of the Future.372 In the essay, he revisits the book’s main
themes as if responding to interlocuters and critics of his reading of Utopia through
literary form. Jameson shares Levitas's primary concern of "ecological catastrophe” and
also admits that there is a pervasive cynical reason that makes Utopia difficult to consider
at this historical moment—a perspective the coincides with Levitas's observation of the
repressed of utopia.373 Levitas lists a variety of causes but Jameson focuses on one: the
saturation of global capitalism. If postmodernity is to blame, it is because it coincides
with this event and because the ideas are a part of an infrastructure of capitalism.
This grandness of Utopia as the counter to capitalism sounds in some sense
hyperbolic compared to Levitas's multiple small repressions and their counterbalance of
diffusive utopian events, from musical performances to political policy to the structuring
of thought towards normative ends or ontologies of the future. I contend, however, that
Jameson's concentrated approach does more to target Levitas's concern—that of the loss
of holistic approaches to social analysis that include the existential and subjective drives
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and desires that activate social change. The lack of content that he gives to Utopia
broadly is precisely the point:
that what is important about Utopia is not what can be imagined but what
cannot be imagined. [T]he utopia, I argue, is not a representation but an
operation calculated to disclose the limits of our own imagination of the
future, the lines beyond which we do not seem able to go in imagining
changes in our own society and our world (except in the direction of
dystopia and catastrophe).374
In speaking back to Levitas, I would say that she invokes Utopia not because "utopia" (in
its many styles and types) is being repressed but that Utopia is a signifier for what is
repressed within capitalism. Said another way, Utopia is the figure that speaks for what
cannot be said within capitalism.
In Jameson's use, Utopia speaks of the grand overhaul of society, not just
counterforces or pragmatism. It isn't so much that utopia is being repressed by anyone but
that it has lost is footing or its soil has eroded. The conditions that Jameson is reporting
on overlap with Levitas: the shift from the late nineteenth-century highpoint for Utopia
and the subsequent 120 years:
The waning of utopias is thus a conjecture between all these
developments: a weakening historicity or of a sense of the future; a
conviction that fundamental change is no longer possible, however
desirable; and cynical reason as such. To this we might add that sheer
power of excess money accumulated since the last great world war,
which keeps the system in place everywhere, reinforcing its institutions
and armed forces. Or maybe we should adduce a different kind of factor,
one of psychological conditioning—namely, that omnipresent
consumerism, having become an end itself, is transforming the daily life
of the advanced countries in such as away as to suggest that the
utopianism of multiple desires is here already and needs no further
supplement.375
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Thus, Jameson's viewpoint on the waning is that it occurs not from a socially-forced
resistance or fear (that defines repression) as much as capitalism's steady advance.
Under these conditions, Jameson's method for Utopia recognizes that there are
repressions of Utopia, as Levitas argues, but that recovering it or retelling it will not be so
straightforward as providing evidence of hopeful projects or feelings of collectivity.
Capitalism, as Marx points out, demands interpretation because its forces bend and
distort. Marx's methods have been refined through interpreters like Althusser, who
brought forward that the imaginary relations to the real conditions of consistence will
never be completely unfolded and smoothed out for complete and total explanatory
access. However, tracing the creases can offer clues for where capitalism will fold itself
again. In this way, Jameson appreciates the complexity and difficulty of repression that
Levitas misses by some of her bolder, more hopeful claims to the normative contents that
fit her own ideological profile. This profile is hard to unpack because of its sympathies
with both left-leaning projects and humanities disciplines. Unfolding her method from
within my own opens up the question first of how to interpret Utopia as a repressed
object.
Jameson's archaeologies keeps to the claim that periodizations mark distinct
material relations but also are heuristics for explanatory purposes. Periods, such as
postmodernity, mark differences and should not be seen in any evolutionary sense.
Instead, they function as a style or structure of knowledge that makes use of distinctions
in service of the mode that is most dominant. Jameson's archaeological method is similar
to Levitas’s in its description of sifting and reworking of silences. However, in
referencing Lacanian psychoanalysis directly, Jameson points to both the inherent
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failures in this process and the ugly or unsavory—the "noxious"— that creates the
ideological folds:
The utopian impulse, therefore, calls for a hermeneutic, for the detective
work of a decipherment and a reading of utopian clues and traces in the
landscape of the real; a theorization and interpretation of unconscious
utopian investments in realities large and small, which may be far from
utopian. The premise here is that the most noxious phenomena can serve
as the repository and hiding place for all kinds of unsuspected wish
fulfillments and utopian gratifications; indeed, I have often used the
humble aspirin as the unwitting bearer of the most extravagant longings
for immortality and the transfiguration of the body.376
Jameson goes on to offer Walmart as his noxious example of present-day Utopia. In
Walmart, there is the expression of unification through the standarizing UPC or the
shipping container and the advance of capitalism of its size and monopoly transform the
market qualitatively, that "which abolishes the market by means of the market itself."377
Like Levitas, Jameson is on the hunt for the future that is in the present, but searches by
way of a dialectical relation where ambivalence is transformed into points of positive and
negative viewed simultaneously. As stated above, the attention to the form of Utopia (in
this case, as the enclave of Walmart) and the dialectic prevails over the content. In
attending to the present in its complexity, the Marxian dialectic triggers the existential
dimension without representing it explicitly.
By giving his attention to the despicable of Utopia, the "better" of Levitas matures
from the "good"/"bad" drama of a Lacanian Imaginary and its binary. Jameson's method,
practiced with Walmart, is future-oriented, like Levitas's:
This kind of prospective hermeneutic is a political act only in one specific
sense: a contribution to the awakening of the imagination of possible and
alternative futures, a reawakening of that historicity which our system—
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offering itself as the very end of history—necessarily represses and
paralyzes.378
While I can appreciate the need for a future (for it is a future that makes the present, in
some respects, bearable), it is not the focus of my insertion of Utopia into critical
religious studies so much as is the attention historicity. Critical religious studies offers
historicity through its emphasis of historicization. This is the temporal edge of Utopia
that I see active in critical religious studies. While historicization IS thought to be a
deadening project, according to critics like Roberts or even Levitas's objective-seeking
social theorists, the dialectic of Jameson makes the present a constantly renewing source
for analytic potential.
Instead of the future as the home of Utopia, I would propose it is the present that
Utopia addresses, where method relates the potentials of explanation and calls out
instances of collective organization. My own account of Utopia acknowledges that utopia
has been repressed but acknowledges this as an operation of capitalism. In regards to the
repression of accounts of existential or lived dimensions of social life, Levitas is correct
to note the strong anxiety stemming from critical social-science arguments but a Marxian
approach to these questions is more successful in framing the repression as part of the
larger problematic of representation.
As this dissertation has argued, these methods include seeing this occlusion as a
problematic of representation that is tricky to overcome or perhaps impossible. The figure
of Utopia represents social life as a totality and addresses its payoffs but concedes its
limits and failures. Setting up a narrower definition of Utopia based on aesthetic form
delivers the opportunity to glean the existential dimension from a dialectical encounter
378
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with the text. It also permits the jouissance of explanatory power that is both potential
and risk of closure. In these narratives, the collectivity of Utopia is ushered in through its
associations of a harmonious community or at least, a society where the subject has been
reconciled to her subjectivation.

Instead, the desire for Utopia, as I have been

treating it, is a longing that is met with satisfaction and frustration, possibility and threat.
If there is a way in which Utopia educates, it is through showing how to sustain attention
through the levels of contradiction and antinomy that present themselves in thought, in
material conditions. Jameson offers this more sober account
The desire called Utopia must be concrete and ongoing, without being
defeatist or incapacitating; it might therefore be better to follow an
aesthetic paradigm and to assert that not only the production of the
unresolvable contradiction is the fundamental process, but that we must
imagine some form of gratification inherent in this very confrontation with
pessimism and the impossible.379
Thus, in the figure of Utopia, the existential, lived dimension of social is not fully formed
as an agent who possesses desire but is instead a subject transversed by desire, immersed
in but not reducible to it. The psychoanalytics of Lacan name this subject through the
language of the Other that delivers the Imaginary for identification, the Symbolic for its
differential potentials, and the Real that resists representation all together. This
formulation coincides with the social constructionist positions of critical social theory
while still permitting the actuality, the reality of the subject's perspective within the
social.
I turn now to consider how an historicized desire can function to limn the
attachments to Imaginary narratives of fullness or emptiness like Utopia represents. I
consider how Tomoko Masuzawa uses Freudian repression more deftly than Levitas has
379
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done and how claiming Utopia as a desire funds critical religious studies and thus, can be
an opportunity to have an "encounter" with "incongruity" that Roberts argues is integral
to the field.
II. Desire in Critical Religious Studies—Masuzawa
Desire, in its colloquial use, connotes passion or strong feeling. Yet, this surface
level, dime-store Romance sense of desire is not as useful as psychoanalytic models.
Relating desire to Utopia has, thus far, involved reading against those utopian scholars
deploying it without much reference to its psychoanalytic meanings. It also has involved
Jameson's Marxist-Lacanian approach of reading backwards through literature. Desire is
difficult to address head on—a claim further supported by Tomako Masuzawa in her text
In Search of Dreamtime: The Quest for the Origins of Religion. In this text, Masuzawa
argues that desire is a result of repressive forces—prohibitions of social and
representational dimension. In an effort to limn this difficult term, I track Masuzawa's
project to show how desire signals a limit of representation. Using it to describe how
origin functions for religious studies scholars, Masuzawa points to the dissolution of
certainty in knowledge production. This corresponds with my own argument that desire,
as used in utopian studies scholarship, signals subjective attachment that is otherwise
prohibited or difficult to sustain in social constructionist models of analysis. I first
examine how the term "interests" displaces desire as a category in social construction
because of desire's connation of innate drives. I then examine Tomoko Masuzawa's use of
psychoanalytic and deconstructive methods in order to demonstrate how desire can serve
as a term in critical, historicizing projects. Through her work, I argue that that there are
strong comparisons between how origin and Utopia function discursively to signal the
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limits of representation and demonstrate that critical religious studies benefits from
unseating its certainties through psychoanalytic terms.
Desire is not a word commonly used in ideology critique, though it is common to
post-structuralist approaches.380 Subjective "interests" have been the primary term for
thinking about desire. As I discussed in Chapter One, Craig Martin, in his Introduction to
the Critical Study of Religion, makes the clear distinction between interests and desires.
In his account, socially-given identities precipitate interests. As opposed to desires which
are short-term, interests are desires extended in time and space such that those with more
social capital are in positions to satisfy more of their social interests. In short, Martin
reads desires as subjectively held but socially given "interests" that represent those
groups by which the subject is formed. As seen in Chapter Two through Levitas and E.P.
Thompson, desire may be used to indicate a strongly-held interest that connects a subject
to latent political potentials. While Levitas recognizes the psychoanalytic portent of the
word via Bloch and Marcuse, she herself is skeptical of psychoanalytic essentialism and
seeks a historicizing corrective.381 Levitas turns back to Miguel Absensour and E.P.
Thompson to find examples of desire that animates subjects even as they are situated
within social milieus. I agree with Martin interests deserve attention and with Levitas that
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there is value in preserving desire that is not essentialized instinct or collective
unconscious.
Repressed Wish for Origins
As I outlined in Chapter One, Tomoko Masuzawa adds psychoanalytic
perspectives to her method of historicization in re-reading the archive of the field of
Religious Studies. Her text, In Search of Dreamtime, demonstrates this method. Counter
to Mircea Eliade's own claim that Religious Studies has abandoned its search for origins
of religion, Masuzawa proposes that this perspective has only been repressed. Masuzawa
uses "origin" to mark the scholars' relations to the indeterminacy of knowledge
production generally, noting where origin is mobilized around unknowns. Origin is
always a reconstructed narrative of temporal difference, reconstituted as either a time of
fullness or a void. Masuzawa calls origin an "object of intense desire" because it serves to
compensate for what is fundamentally unknowable. Where origin either can refer to a
plenum or a nothingness, it is inflected with libidinal energy and attachment, drawing to
it fantasies and projections generated from the present. It is further cathected because of
its inaccessibility via knowledge and then, is "hyper-cathected" through its prohibition in
religious studies scholarship, according to Masuzawa's interpretation, thus becoming an
object of desire. "In short, the fundamental contradiction endemic to the concept (qua
everything and nothing), as well as this logical double-bind of desire and prohibition that
defines and determines its function, together make an impossible object-idea out of
'origin.'"382
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It is important to note how Masuzawa's account of desire is constrained to
Freudian terms of repression. Desire is synonymous with wish, an idea or representation
that is excited with psychic energy because of its relationship to the drive for pleasure.
This is pleasure of the diffuse sexual variety of Freud that connects bodies to objects of
satisfaction. Wishes are mostly sublimated, tracked into other forms of satisfaction
because of the fragmentary quality of the wish or its prohibition, either internally
(psychically) or socially. When the wish cannot be sublimated, the result is neurosis from
repression of the wish. Other results of repressed wishes are psychosis or hysteria, where
the wishes are distorted or irrecoverable. Masuzawa does not claim that that there is an
innate desire for narratives about origins but instead that religious studies scholars have a
particular relationship to origin narratives because of the construction of the field of
scholarship, both in its quest for the origin of religion itself by scholars like E.B. Tylor or
through its interest in narratives or myths of origin, in such scholars as recent as Mircea
Eliade.
Seen from the perspective of the modern scholar, then, it is precisely the
difference in the management of the desire for origins—that is, whether to
embrace this desire and to form a whole system of beliefs and practices
around it, or to renounce this desire and to build science at a critical
distance from it—is what distinguishes the subject (the scholar, or
"Western man," as Eliade calls "him" explicitly) and the object (the
religious person, "the premodern," the "archaic," the "primitive") of this
scholarship383
Masuzawa positions desire as a major term for critical religious studies by historicizing
desire and showing the overlaps of the discourse of religious studies and Freud, along
with the material conditions informing these discourses. One such historical condition is

383

Masuzawa, In Search of Dreamtime (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 15.

244
the mechanical reproduction of images in photography.384 Another such condition is
those of colonialism and its dispersal with the early interest in theorizing origin in
religious studies that then is sublimated through a study of origin myths of so-called
"primitives." Masuzawa's attention to desire distinguishes her project from other critical
methods that reread the field and point to the problems of claiming a universal longing
for the sacred, to the strained binary of archaic/modern, to the authorization of certain
conduct or to assumed, unexamined phenomenological methodologies. Through the
frame of desire for origins, Masuzawa can show how religious studies scholarship
operates a series of repressions. In this way, Masuzawa's project is more a study of
repression than desire itself.
Origin and Utopia
Having examined the figure of utopia (what I designate as a particularly modern,
formally-inflected Utopia) since Chapter One, and considered "origin" through
Masuzawa, I am able to link more directly "origin" and "Utopia." Having reviewed
conceptual and literary perspectives, I conclude that what makes Utopia compelling is its
framing of logical and social contradiction at the level of its form. In this way, Utopia
functions like origin does in becoming an object of intense desire because it too, signals
the double-bind of representing a prohibited object. I have counted Utopia as formalized
fantasy. This separates it from other theorists of utopia who have broader definitions and
label communitarian groups or ruptures in time or experiences of transcendence as
"utopian." My articulation of Utopia as a form that sets up a spatial comparison of
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similarity and difference expands on the ambivalence that Utopia holds for these thinkers.
By emphasizing its formal aspect, Utopia turns from a feeling to a fantasized object that,
like origin, is cathected like an object. The ambiguity of how "real" Utopia is, along with
how "perfect" it might be, how plausible is should be, how "natural" or non-supernatural
it is, or how its ideality displaces or nulls other Utopias, signals how Utopia marks a
place of indeterminacy and holds cultural attachments. Like origin, Utopia appears
conceptually possible but is fundamentally unknowable. Like origin, Utopia substitutes as
both fullness and void in a point of time or space. In this way, Utopia expresses, like
origin, the "fundamental contradiction" of being both everything and nothing. Using
Masuzawa, I would say that, like origin, Utopia grows as an object of desire to the degree
it is prohibited from its knowability. Capitalizing Utopia is my way of distinguishing
myself from a generalized used that resists how "utopia," like "origin," is used
discursively by moderns to project their own desires and to universalize them.
Origin and Utopia can also be related by how they use narrative temporality to
orient the present. While other scholars make work of Utopia's temporal directions—
either past or future—my project sets up Utopia as primarily an object in space. As I have
claimed, Utopia is a particularly modern thought/literary form responding to early
modern material conditions of global exploration, mercantilism, early capitalism, and
nation-state formation, and is an outgrowth of intellectual movements of scholasticism
and humanism. This makes Utopia not a promise of fulfillment in the future (or the
recollection of a Golden Age or Eden) as much as a human project, subject to a Reality
Principle of sorts, where the only "magic" is that of the resolution of social of tension,
absent of any supernatural influence. In following the convention of modern Utopian
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literature, I narrow Utopia to its spatial dynamics. This reduces its associations to time,
and thus to teleology. Thus, the proximate aspects of Utopia privilege comparison over
normativity. This does not mean that Utopia does not have a normative edge but that its
primary role is generative, not prescriptive. This distinction serves to direct how it is that
the desire for Utopia in critical projects focus primarily on the effects of comparative
norms and not regulative ideals, as some kinds of utopia imply.
Desire for Utopia
The desire for Utopia could be mapped as a case of Freudian repression but I
argue that is better considered through Jameson's Marxist-Lacanian materialism. Utopia's
fall from popularity has been argued as a consequence of twentieth century politics, its
dispersal across capitalism, or, as Levitas argues, a repressive force with scholarship
away from normativity. Jameson contends that capitalism's expansion and its late-stage
appearance in culture as postmodernity has swallowed up the possibility of thinking
Utopia. Reading this as Masuzawa does origin, Utopia has faced prohibition by
capitalism's reach, further excluding it from conversation or consideration. A Freudian
psychoanalytic reading of utopian studies could also be applied, pointing to the
disjunctions and confusion in definition as a case of repression. However, as I presented
in Chapter Three, Jameson's Lacanian formulation mixed with Marxist materialism
provides a better means for seeing that desire is primarily movement and circulation that
folds in ways to produce culture. In short, I have demonstrated the necessity and
usefulness of linking link desire and Utopia without resorting to innate drives. I find that
Jameson and his use of Lacan’s psychoanalysis is more useful precisely because it
attends to subjectivity as an unfixed, endless process without devolving into an account
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of innate drives. Also, instead of pretending to be able to describe experience through
social theory, Jameson raises it as a question, holding it as a point of inquiry that cannot
be resolved or directly addressed. Lacan is useful for this because his account of
subjectivity is one that is sustained only through the Other of language, where the subject
is not self-possessing and desire is situation of lack.
Thus, it is Masuzawa's analysis of discourse, her association of discourse with the
affective attachments, and her unseating of scholarly knowing subjectivity that is more
relevant to my examination of desire than the determinations of psychoanalytic terms or
motions per se. Masuzawa insists that historical consciousness and confidence of the
modern interpreter was never as stable as it appeared, and through her deconstructive
method, she directs her reader’s attention to the postmodern undoing of this assumed
stability, thereby deftly presenting the very project of theorization as uncertain and
fragile. As the texts of her esteemed scholars come under her careful and generous
treatment, the "strangeness of time appears sometimes on the textual surface" and her
readers too are brought into the strangeness of temporality and in so doing, become
"estranged" from the image of "Western man" that these figures hold up for scholars. As
Masuzawa undoes familiar temporalities, she undoes familiar subjectivities:
Somehow, we are estranged from that picture [of "Western man"], from
the image of him standing, confronting the panorama of global history
before his eyes, as if he alone were riding on the neck of Chronos.
Perhaps we begin to imagine a new picture, just as the moment when we
feel our own ground giving way, drifting irrevocably to time and to
history.385
Her work addresses the instability of subjectivity, draws her figures with sympathy and
thus, obliquely accounts for the existential dimension by way of following her figures
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through the breaks in their texts, as if in following the turns, ruptures, and leaps that is the
subjective experience of time.
From this perspective, what is most relevant from Masuzawa to my discussion of
the desire for Utopia is first to consider that scholarly interest is guided by affective
attachments to explanation. Critical religious studies is not exempt from these
attachments. Masuzawa reads the formative voices in the field not to unseat them but to
unseat the dominant interpretative strategies. The same criticisms hold: problems of
western exceptionalism, Christian hegemony disguised as secular pluralism, and an
ahistorical essence of religion are addressed. She uses the method of psychoanalysis to
attend to how scholars, too, are subjects made through the folds of these discourses and
thus, cannot just overturn them or believe they can exceed their history. Masuzawa's
work is a methodological innovation within critical religious studies for its way of
inscribing critical scholars within the spheres of theories that have been mainly been used
on "religious others."

III. Desire for Utopia in Critical Religious Studies
My own innovation is to bring the insights about desire and origin from
Masuzawa to bear on the figure of Utopia and how it, like origin, is at work in the field of
religious studies. As I discussed in Chapter Two, Utopia has only thinly been related to
psychoanalysis in utopian studies recently yet still deploys its terms of "dream" and
"desire." Where scholars like Levitas have connected Utopia and desire, it has been to
draw out the subjective or "warm stream" of Marxist critique in contrast to the "cold
stream" of Althusserian structuralism. The exception to this has been in the work of
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Fredric Jameson. As I examined in Chapter Three, Jameson does not try to marry these
two streams through a concept of Utopia but holds them together as a problematic of
representation for critical social theory. He proposes a materialist analytic of language to
deliver the existential, lived dimension of social life obliquely through the examination of
cultural objects. His formal method matches the concerns of critical religious studies as it
is a dialectical approach that attends to ideology critique and historicization.
By way of Jameson and his frame of a problematic, I propose that Utopian desire
can function as a critical lens for better assessing the dilemma within critical religious
studies of representing human life (or "experience") as both socially constructed and
particular. As I have demonstrated, there is no simple way to resolve these two orders
into one representation and remain invested in project of critical analysis. From the
constructivist point of view, experience is a part of a humanist liberal paradigm that
should be deconstructed along with the notion of a stable subjectivity. Also, claims to
"religious experiences" are problematic for their claims to exceptional experience and
also for the accessibility by scholars. 386 As Russell McCutcheon avers, experience is
invoked often rhetorically as a " a substantive if indeterminate terminus for the relentless
deferral of meaning."387 Hidden in claims to experience is an implication of "should," by
McCutcheon's account. McCutcheon admits that there is "experience," but that it should
be treated as "virtually transparent" for the way that is so embedded in social life.388 This
is McCutcheon's way of resisting the liberal privatization of experience. Such concerns
386
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prompt critical scholars to declare their works as projects of "redescription," as J.Z. Smith
proposed, in addition to the task of description, thereby removing the scholar from the
presuppositions of knowledge or claims to shared experience. In Bloch's terms of the cold
and warm streams of Marxism, critical religious studies has chosen the cold stream.
Tyler Roberts argued as much in his charge that social constructionism is overly
locative. The criticisms of phenomenological methods as crypto-theological and a broad
suspicious tone in the academy has separated religious studies scholarship from its
affirmative, humanist aspects, according to Roberts. While Roberts does not explicitly
support a revival of experiential language, he seeks a humanistic approach that thinks
itself as "responsive." Roberts lifts examples of scholarship that "make possible
acknowledgement of and forms of concerted attention to the flux and excess of 'life.'"389
He defends the claim that while the hermeneutics of suspicion expanded knowledge of
human motivation in valuable ways, it has " withered into method weakly supported by
an ideology of knowledge for knowledge's sake."390 Roberts concludes his argument in
Encountering Religion pressing for an account of human life by religious studies
scholarship that moves beyond demystification and instead allows encounter,
incongruity, and affirmation. In short, Roberts reports on an absence of humanistic
inquiry in critical methods, a dearth of thought that supports transformative experiences.
389
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As I have argued, the figure of Utopia contributes to critical religious studies for
its signal of this conflict of presenting the humanistic discourses that Roberts proposes
alongside of the critical prohibition to "experience." Calling it a desire for Utopia signals
the ambivalence towards this project. As outlined above, hypercathected objects like
origin and Utopia become signals for the obstacles of representation by scientificscholarly means. Introducing Utopia in the way that I have defined—an aesthetic figure
based on its history within Western modernity—delivers a means to reflect the ambitions
to representation of social totality and collectivity as they stand in critical methods.
Calling it a desire for Utopia shows this project as one charged affective and libidinal
investment, material through and through. Thus, scholarly efforts at representing social
totality or collectivity in terms of social construction, social formation or otherwise is not
an objective project. It is also not merely a case of interests. To contend that social
construction depends on a desire for Utopia is to situate or locate (as Roberts might say)
without overly determining the subject within this location. To argue for a desire for
Utopia within social constructionist methods is to introduce the project of analysis as an
aesthetic, and thus, a site or deposit of attachments.
By way of conclusion, I want to include an image of Utopia from Jameson that
shows its imbrication with the explanatory investments of theory and method. In facing
the present conditions of capitalism and its ability to reify and then commodify and resell back to us the best of our Utopian ideas, it is incumbent on the theorist of Utopia to
face these conditions with some form of optimism.
What human relations might be without commodification, what a life
world without advertising might look like, what narratives would model
the lives of people empty of the foreign bodies of business and profit—
such speculations have been entertained from time immemorial by
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Utopian fantasists and lend themselves to at least an a priori, external, and
purely formalistic characterization. We can, in other words, say what a
properly Utopian literature might look like even if we are utterly incapable
of writing one ourselves. But the Utopian literature of the past was largely
positive, or even affirmative (in a bad Frankfurt-School sense); its "dreams
of rest" (Morris) bore all the earmarks of compensation and denial,
repressing what its fantasy mechanisms were unable to process, leaving
out the negative and the body, suffering and death, as well as everything
that cannot be solved in interpersonal relations. But the truth value of
fantasy, the epistemological bon usage or proper use of daydreaming as an
instrument of philosophical speculation, lies precisely in a confrontation
with the reality principle itself. The daydream can succeed as a narrative,
not by successfully eluding or outwitting the reality principle but rather by
grappling with it, like Jacob's angel, and by triumphantly wresting it from
it what can precisely in our or its own time be dreamt and fantasied as
such.391
As I have argued, the difficulty of representing subjective, existential perspectives within
critical religious studies can be sustained through engagements with cultural products as
aesthetic objects, thick with the affective attachments and pleasures that narratives of
closure provide. Explanatory projects and rediscriptions are Utopian even as they resist
the contents of Utopia, forming themselves as enclaves for thinking within the streams of
History and alongside the buzz of the phantasmagoria. I offer a challenge to critical
religious studies to recognize its Utopian desires in its fantasies of explanation and
speculations on the constructedness of subjects. As it confronts and integrates aesthetics
into its methods and objects of study, it will serve to offer not subjects as transparent but
faceted. As scholar-subjects consider the folds of their constructions and perceive them as
aesthetic products, there will be more occasion to catch the refractions of social life that
strike as the complex tumble of existential life.
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